ADA Defence Philosophy: Wanted – A National Policy

This paper presents a statement of current views on national defence by the Victorian Branch of the Australia Defence Association.

Defence means the protection of the community and external defence means the protection of the community against attack from overseas.

ADA supports the view of the Swedish Government as expressed in its official publication, “The Swedish Naval Defence”.

“The aim of this (security) policy is to secure national freedom of action in all aspects in a form decided by the people in order to maintain and develop the society within the country politically, economically, socially, culturally, etc. , according to the Swedish (Aust. ) values. “

This content is available exclusively to Australian Aviation members.

Login

Become a Member

To continue reading the rest of this article, please login.

Username or Email

Password Forgot password?

Keep me signed in on this device.

If you check this box before you log in, you won’t have to log back into the website next time you return, even if you close your browser and come back later.

If you check the box above before you log in, you won’t have to log back into the website next time you return, even if you close your browser and come back later.

---

or

---

Login with a Passkey

To unlock all Australian Aviation magazine content and again unlimited access to our daily news and features, become a member today!
A monthly membership is only $5.99 or save with our annual plans.

PRINT

$49.95 for 1 year Become a Member

See benefits

• Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
• Access to In Focus reports every month on our website

MOST POPULAR

PRINT + DIGITAL

$99.95 for 1 year Become a Member

$179.95 for 2 years Become a Member

See benefits

• Unlimited access to all Australian Aviation digital content
• Access to the Australian Aviation app
• Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
• Access to In Focus reports every month on our website
• Access to our Behind the Lens photo galleries and other exclusive content
• Daily news updates via our email bulletin

DIGITAL

$5.99 Monthly Become a Member

$59.95 Annual Become a Member

See benefits

• Unlimited access to all Australian Aviation digital content
• Access to the Australian Aviation app
• Australian Aviation quarterly print & digital magazines
• Access to In Focus reports every month on our website
• Access to our Behind the Lens photo galleries and other exclusive content
• Daily news updates via our email bulletin

View more offers and details

ADA further supports the view of the Australian Government expressed in the introduction to the 1976 White Paper “Australian Defence”, where it states:

“The first responsibility ot government is to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from the constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack. ” (emphasis added).

It is not sufficient, therefore, to possess the capability to resist armed attack since even the threat of such attack may inhibit the development of the capability.

The capability must be displayed in the form of combat-ready forces supported by industry, government and the community to deter attack.

Again, we quote from an official, Swedish publication, “The Defence of Sweden”: “The prime purpose of defence is to keep the country out of war. Further, the defence has to be so _strong that the cost to defeat Sweden (Aust. ) is out, of proportion to the strategic advantages which an aggressor might obtain. ” In the long run, a policy of defence by deterrence will be cheaper in money terms and incomparably cheaper in terms of preserving life and the welfare of the Australian community.

In particular, a policy of deploying minimal forces capable of maintaining the state of the art of modern warfare has no deterrent effect and may indeed invite attack by the very weakness it demonstrates.

Strategic Policy

Despite the existence of national defence forces since the earliest days of the Federation, ADA can find no evidence of a commitment to a rational strategic policy.

The policy that is referred to, “The Strategic Basis of Australia’s Defence Policy” is a highly classified document not available to the public or even to Members of Parliament. It is believed that the document does no more than identify potential threats to Australia or the lack of them.

ADA believes that such a policy is barren and, indeed, dangerous for three reasons:

• It is vulnerable to inadequate information, misinterpretation of available information and wishful thinking. (Note that many developments in recent years both globally and in our region have arisen with scant warning. Examples include the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the collapse of South Vietnam, the influx of refugees from those countries and the Cambodia-Vietnam War. )
• According to researchers such as Dr Ross Babbage*, the threats to our security can easily emerge much faster than we can develop the forces to meet them. Even this presupposes that the Government will rapidly recognise the emergence of a threat. (* in a paper presented to a Strategic and Defence Studies Centre seminar “The Defence of Australia – Fundamental News Aspects”. )
• Merely sitting around waiting for a threat to manifest itself has no deterrent effect and, given the nature of the world, is more likely to encourage attack by the demonstration of weakness.

ADA believes that the strategic policy ought to be based the identification of key interests critical to national survival and the provision of forces and industrial support sufficient to deter attack or to defeat attack if deterrence fails.

ADA suggests the following as critical areas of interest:

a. the concentration of population and industry in the South-east of the continent.

b. the mining areas, including offshore areas, of Central and North Queensland, Western Australia the Northern Territory.

c. the trade route with Japan (especially because Japan’s capability to defend the route is . ,. limited).

d. the Mid-East oil route.

e. the major naval and air / bases that would have to – be constructed in the North and west to achieve b, c and d.

Further, a strong case could be made for including in the list the defence of the ASEAN States and Papua New Guinea because they are critical to items c and d, and because a form of regional alliance, in which a key factor is a major Australian defence industry, would be vital to Australia’s long-term security against a major threat.

ADA does not reject the value of defence alliances such as ANZUS but points out that such alliances often change in value according to the changing perceptions of the parties and impose significant obligations on the junior partners.

ADA believes that basing a whole defence policy on one or more alliances with major powers is dangerous.

On the other hand, an alliance of some kind with the ASEAN States is essential to Australia and is likely to be more soundly based because of the interests common to Australia and ASEAN.

Public Debate

ADA believes that such a strategic policy based on essential interests must be produced and made the subject of public debate in the Parliament, the media and the community at large so that a truly bi-partisan defence policy based on national interests can be generated. This will have the effect of committing future governments to a consistent and real defence policy.

We believe that the public adoption of a strategic policy based on interests will ensure that the serious lack of preparedness experienced in World War II is less likely to be repeated. Australia survived then rather by good luck than good management. We cannot count on the same degree of forewarning and protection by a major ally next time.

In the context of a public debate, ADA asserts its right and duty as members of the Australian community to engage in the debate.

Options

In terms of Australia’s defence posture, there appear to be three main options. These, with our views on each, are

The “Armed Camp”

This option implies the maintenance of large forces with manpower provided by conscription.

The cost would be very great and the need questionable. For example, the extra cost of conscripting the available manpower of any one age for two years would be over $3000 million at current cost levels.

This would produce armed forces of nearly 200,000 in any one year.

The “State of the Art”

This option, effectively the one exercised at present, implies the existence of minimal forces equipped with small amounts of the latest equipment available in the world.

While the cost is relatively low, the force has, at best, very limited or no ability to respond to low or medium-level threats and its capacity for rapid expansion is limited by the lack of infrastructure, the uncertainty of obtaining equipment from overseas and a growing inability to support or supply equipment from Australian industry.

The option is based on an assumption, the validity of which ADA questions, that the latest high-performance military equipment in the world is necessarily the best for Australia’s needs.

Reaction Force/Core Force

The third option, supported by ADA, is that Australia’s forces should have a dual capacity:

• the force should be large enough to respond to and contain low or medium-level threats;
• the force should be provided with such infrastructure of camps, training cadres and equipment to be able to mobilise additional forces rapidly as major threats emerge.

Implicit in this and related to Australia’s vital interests is the need to provide substantial naval and air forces with a long-range capability. Ground forces and their air support will be relatively limited.

Capability

Some commentators, e.g. Malcolm Booker in his book “The Last Domino”, have questioned Australia’s capability to defend itself.

ADA does not question the capability (particularly against all but the most serious threats) but the community’s will to do so.

Force Structure

The question of force structure is a technical one, but ADA believes that the Australian forces are at present inadequate for present tasks or to meet low or medium-level threats.

The 1976 White Paper (para 27) speaks of the need for a force in being capable of surveillance, a range of independent operations and a capacity for timely expansion. The White Paper emphasises the uncertainty of the future and the need to provide insurance against unforeseeable contingencies.

ADA believes that Australia’s present forces are too small and lack the support necessary to meet the requirements set out in the White Paper.

The following factors are relevant:

• the capacity for surveillance of our areas of strategic interest by fixed devices or mobile forces is limited, and, according to the Hope Royal Commission into Security and Intelligence, Is not supported by an adequate intelligence assessment organisation.
• reaction forces, maritime, ground and air, are too thinly manned or equipped to be able to maintain sustained operations, i. e. for more than three months, at even modest levels of commitment.
• there is little evidence of a core force capability. Reserves are small and getting smaller while stockpiles of equipment are not being produced. There appears to be no policy on the retention of obsolete but serviceable equipment for the use of an expanded force.

Hi-lo Technology

ADA is concerned that the “state of the art” philosophy that appears to govern the Defence Force procurement policies (regardless of what the White Paper says) is not the most suitable for Australia.

As a technological gap between what is purchased and what Australian industry can maintain or manufacture grows the nation’s defence becomes dependent on overseas suppliers whose ability and will to supply free of constraints is placed increasingly at risk.

In any case, a philosophy that regards high technology and high-performance equipment as ipso facto the best for Australia has not been justified and is questioned.

There is a point at which the marginal increase in effectiveness represented by a new equipment item is not justified by the associated increase in cost.

Command and Control

ADA is concerned that the reorganisation of the Defence Department carried out in recent years has not led to an increase in efficiency.

ADA is perturbed at remarks attributed to the Secretary, Department of Defence, that the organisation is not geared to fight a war. This is a thoroughly fallacious basis on which to organise defence.

ADA is of the opinion that the formation of a separate Coastguard would not only relieve the Defence Force of the task of offshore law enforcement, for which it is ill-equipped but would contribute to the surveillance function of defence in peacetime and operations in wartime.

More importantly, ADA questions whether Defence has learned the lessons of World War II that combined operations involving more than one Service are the norm in wartime rather than the exception.

ADA believes that the unique roles of the Services justify the retention of individual Services, particularly in the training and support roles. However, we believe that rather than retain their single-service operational commands, a number of joint service commands should be set up with formed units and headquarters staff allocated for normal operations and higher unit training.

Examples are:

• Continental Defence Command – for land/air operations
• Maritime Command – for sea/air operations
• Amphibious Command for land/sea/air operations
• Air Defence Command – for air including AA operations.

Costs

Table I compares recent defence budgets, the defence budget proposed for 1980/81 in the Defence White Paper and a defence budget capable of developing our proposed force over a period of 10 to 15 years. All costs are in $A million at estimated December 1978 levels.

Industrial Support

In one of the more useful documents produced by the last Parliament, sub-committee “C” of the Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee reviewed Australia’s Defence Industry.

The Committee accepted the statement of Defence Industrial Policy set out in Ch. 8 of the Defence White Paper but was critical of the failure to implement that policy. In the introduction to its report, it stated: “It is quite apparent that increases in the technical complexity of modern weapon systems and in the techniques involved in their design and manufacture have left many of our capabilities behind; that the gap in our technological self-reliance has been widening; and that, because of the very high cost of current equipment and their responsibility of economic justification for substantial local participation in the provision of the small quantities that are needed or can be afforded the gap will continue to widen, and possibly at a faster rate, unless a determined effort is made to reverse the trend. ”

ADA has reservations about some of the assumptions implied by that statement, in particular the assumption that only small quantities of equipment are needed or can be afforded. It also questions the assumption in other parts of the repeat that Australian industry cannot manufacture a substantial proportion of our defence needs and that of our ASEAN neighbours.

Need for Industrial Support

Based on statements to the Hamer Committee and the Industries Assistance Commission, the Department of Defence orthodoxy appears to rest on assumptions that Australia cannot afford to produce its own defence equipment nor does it need to because of the strength of our alliances which enable us to take a portion of the most advanced equipment produced overseas.

There are strong elements of wishful thinking inherent in those assumptions while, from an economic. point of view, the policy places great pressure on Australia’s shaky balance of payments and contributes to unemployment by exporting jobs. The decision, endorsed by Labor and coal1t1on governments, to buy two American patrol frigates instead of building the Australian-designed DDL destroyer at Williamstown Dockyard will add at least $600 million to Australia’s import bill while taking 2000 jobs off the home labour market.

Even at today’s relatively low level of defence spending, the Defence Department is a substantial consumer of resources and should not be entitled to make procurement decisions in isolation when these have a substantial impact on the domestic economy.

Apart from the economic impact of these decisions, there are sound political and military reasons for making the Australian Defence Force as independent as possible of foreign arms suppliers.

Among other countries, Australia now operates equipment from the US, Britain, France, West Germany, Sweden, Italy, Norway and Switzerland. By implication and sometimes by agreement, the Governments of these countries must be consulted before their equipment is used.

In past years, France, Switzerland and Sweden threatened the Australian Government with the loss of spare support if their equipment were used in Vietnam. US law can be used to direct the foreign policy of recipients of American equipment as Israel and Indonesia, among others, are discovering.

The result is that our defence and foreign policy cannot be an Australian policy but one hedged about by limitations imposed by outsiders.

From a military point of view, overseas purchase raises questions about our capacity to replace or repair battle casualties in times of war as well as our capability for rapid expansion of our forces in times of immediate and serious threat.

If our trade routes were cut, normal battle wastage would quickly reduce our ability to sustain a conflict while the needs of our suppliers would inevitably take precedence over ours when we tried to expand.

Balance of Payments

Australia currently buys 60-65 per cent of its defence needs in capital equipment and consumables overseas.

Based on the budgets projected in 1980-81, this would add over and above current purchasing of around $800-850 million at current prices to Australia’s import bill.

With a debit balance on the current account in 1976-77 of $1936 million not quite offset by a historically high net capital inflow of nearly $1400 million, Australia is trading in the red or very close to it.

Oil imports, which are expected to rise. by $2500 million. .per annum by 1985, will make it impossible for Australia buy much defence material overseas. It is virtually certain, therefore, that the projected levels of defence expenditure, however inadequate, will not and cannot be met if we rely on overseas suppliers.

How Much is Enough

ADA accepts the view that Australia cannot be totally self-reliant? However, the purchase of no more than 40-45 per cent of defence equipment and services in Australia is too low.

ADA notes that it is Swedish policy to provide 90 per cent of defence requirements, from domestic industry.

ADA is reluctant to be dogmatic on the desirable level of Australian production but believes it should be closer to the Swedish figure.

Current attempts to provide a higher degree of Australian participation in defence procurement through the Australian Industry Participation scheme have not been successful.

The policy requiring a fixed percentage of the value industry (usually 30 is not per cent) well conceived of any project endangering to be as”. offset” to Australian industry is not well conceived leading as it does to bidding up by overseas competitors followed by a failure to meet targets,
delays in projects and cost escalations.

In fact, 10 per cent of offset work properly directed could have more value to the growth of technology rather than 30 per cent of basic work.

Defence and Industrial Development

Industry, in terms of defence needs, is technologically backward and high levels of protection discourage the sort of restructuring that would be necessary.

One significant problem is that of attitude. The hierarchy of the Defence Force demands the latest and best in military hardware. Not unnaturally, they believe that small forces must have very high-performance equipment. However, an influential group of defence-oriented academics, systems analysts and other commentators question this belief and suggest that a larger number of cheaper, lower technology weapons platforms (aircraft, ships, etc. ) would be more effective provided they can carry modern weapons and sensors.

So far, the Defence Department has not had to justify its attitude politically. There are welcome signs that this situation may be changing.

A move to lower technology equipment could have a revolutionary effect on Australia’s defence industry and, because of the inevitable spin-off of technology, on all industries and the national economy.

The 1978-79 Defence Budget provides for around $1180 million to be spent on equipment and services for the Defence Force. If the 1976 Defence White Paper Projections are followed this would rise to $1900 million (at 1978 prices) in 1980-81. A sustained increase to around $3100 million as suggested by ADA (Table IV) would not only provide Australia with a Defence Force having a substantial deterrent capacity but would provide Australian industry with a significant market growth from today’s $470 million to $2800 million each year if the 90 per cent Australian production target were set and achieved.

This very substantial market growth in employment terms alone represents some 60,000 jobs. The additional return to the Government in taxes of all kinds would be around $475 million, thereby reducing the net cost of the defence program.

The development of a broad-based defence industry in Australia would attract overseas buyers, particularly from the ASEAN nations, whose needs in terms of “tropicalised” equipment are similar to Australia’s. This would reduce the pressure on Australia’s balance of payments.

This is not “pie in the sky”. Indonesia and the Philippines at least have already made suggestions along these lines in the ASEAN forum.

Although the world is beset with a multitude of arms suppliers, the Australian Government could use its foreign affairs power to restrict the sale of Australian arms to those countries whose interests are similar to ours. At the same time, Australian control of the supply of spares could be used to stabilise relations, especially within the South East Asian region.

The technological development within the Australian manufacturing industry resulting from such a program would stimulate restructuring in industry and lead to a reduction in high-cost protection and a growth of trade especially within our region.

The high levels of protection of the manufacturing industry are being seen by many people as contributing to economic recession and inflation in Australia. There is a growing realisation that structural adjustment is necessary, and indeed, there ought to be no fear of what is no more than a stage of our 1 economic development.

Security of Key Industries

Key industries, nominated by the Hamer Committee to include shipbuilding and repair, aerospace, munitions and electronics, have a claim on protection and maintenance because of their value in wartime.

This protection may involve subsidies, tariffs or preferential ordering, all of which add to the costs of defence, but ADA believes they are legitimate costs. . .

More important to their long-term survival would be policies that program defence procurement on the basis of a long-term (15-year) perspective plan similar to Sweden’s.

This avoids the “peaks” and “troughs” in workloads which have crippling effects on individual enterprise.

In return, it would be reasonable for governments to impose conditions on defence industries in relation to such matters as modernisation, industrial relations and so on.

Conclusion

ADA believes that urgent action is required to give Australia’s defence:

• a strategic policy valid for the rest of this century based on the preservation of Australia’s critical national interests.
• forces adequate not only to defend those interests but to deter attacks on them.
• the high degree of industrial development necessary to guarantee support for the Defence Force and independence of national decision-making.

What is needed is a firm commitment to those requirements from the political level of Government and Parliament, the Defence Department and the Defence Force.

(Figures in brackets indicate the percentage of the total Defence budget for that year.)

*Includes estimated modernisation costs and ancillary equipment.