Bushrangers
If one instrument of war dominated the Vietnam conflict more than any other, that instrument was the helicopter. Perhaps the senior American officer, arguing the virtues of the aircraft as a weapon, was pressing the argument too far when he declared: “The Vietnam war hangs on the rotor blade of a helicopter. ” Nevertheless, helicopters were used so extensively in such a multiplicity of roles that they became for the Allied commanders in the field almost indispensable. It seemed that in all combat activities whether in direct con tact with the enemy or not, the ground commander called for the use of helicopters in support. “More than any other artifact of war, the chopper has become the indelible symbol of the lndo-China conflict” wrote Newsweek’s editor, Russell Watson. But in the same article he quoted a United States Air Force general’s warning: “It cannot survive when the enemy has sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons or air power. “
The basic helicopter idea was an ancient one, at least as old as Leonardo da Vinci who designed one in the 16th cen tury. The first workable helicopter was invented before the Second World War. Yet they had scarcely been used until the Korean war and it was not until Vietnam in the 1960s that their role in the conduct of operations became so dominating. The reason for this was that helicopters committed to action in Vietnam and particularly the Iroquois helicopters operated by No. 9 Squadron, were a vast improvement both in what they could do and in reliability compared with the pioneering designs. Aeoronautical engineers, busy with the problems of conventional winged aircraft, took much longer to solve the basic helicopter problems, particularly the problems of vibration, power, stability and control. Until designers began to power them with the new turbo-shaft engine, helicopters did not really become effective as aircraft. By the time the Vietnam conflict began the basic helicopter problems had been solved.
But it was not only the solution of basic problems that made the helicopter such a successful weapon in Vietnam. As an aircraft it confers its greatest benefits in a primitive, undeveloped country where roads, bridges, airfields and communications generally are lacking or where such surface routes as may be available are subject to harassment and ambush by hostile forces. Vietnam was such a country, except that it did have airfields most of which had been built for military purposes by the Americans and before them the French. So the helicopter came into its own. It could land anywhere a small landing pad could be provided and if no pad or landing zone was available, soldiers could be lifted or lowered by means of winches.
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Another vital need for helicopter operations was that there should be effective control of the air through which the aircraft must fly and an absence of hostile anti-aircraft weapons on the ground. In other words a permissive ir environment was needed if the helicopter was to reach its full potential. Such an environment existed in the main in Vietnam and the whir and clatter of the helicopter rotor blade became a familiar sound in Vietnam skies throughout the long drawn out conflict.
Although the RAAF helicopters had performed so successfully in a variety of operational roles, the squadron did not have a “gunship” version of the aircraft and squadron members became convinced as a result of their experience in action that the squadron needed the more heavily armed gunship which was capable of giving much greater fire sup port to the ground forces in addition to laying down heavier suppressive fire during casualty evacuation which all too often had to be carried out against fierce enemy opposition.
One of the major tasks of No. 9 Squadron was the insertion and extraction of SAS patrols, a type of operation that required troop carrying helicopters (‘slicks) to be supported by a Light Fire Team (LFT) consisting of two gunships. The gunship support was made the responsibility of the United States Army. However, United States gunships were not always immediately available and sometimes missions had to be flown without their support. Although they were very proficient the United States gunships were seldom aware of RAAF procedures and terminology and this created difficulties in achieving the close co-ordination between the gunships and the slicks so necessary in many of the situations confronting the squadron.
The major difference between the gunship and the standard helicopter was firepower. The RAAF slicks were armed with M-60 machine guns. So the RAAF urged that a number of the existing models should be converted to the gunship role by means of modification kits which would provide them with the Gatling type “mini” guns and rocket pods in addition to the existing M-60 machine guns.
Another reason advanced for seeking the gunship capability was that the Australian ground troops wanted to have gunship cover in the hands of fellow Australians. Because of the very high degree of co-ordination and teamwork required between the crews of gunships and slicks there would be big advantages in their being able to train and work together. Briefings for operations would also be much simpler.
In the meantime Group Captain Hubble had sanctioned the carrying out of trials by the squadron with kits on loan from the United States Army. Performance and handling trials, group and air firing trials were successfully carried out with a “Bravo” model Iroquois. Further trials were made with a “Hotel” model. The squadron was then in the process of being fully re-equipped with the Hotel model and the greater lift capacity of this type allowed for the carriage of two seven tube rocket pods, two 7.62mm mini guns with an ammunition load of 9600 rounds in 16 ammunition bins strapped to the floor behind the pilots in addition to two sets of twin mounted side firing M-60 machine guns with a total ammunition load of 4000 rounds.
Because of the nature of gunship operations which called for the rapid turn around and frequent re-arming at various bases it was essential that the crew members of the aircraft should assist in the work of re-arming. When re-arming at bases other than Nui Dat or Vang Tau it was necessary for the crew to be fully responsible for this task because it was neither feasible to send armourers to other bases nor to carry them in the aircraft during operations.
The squadron was now ready for gunship operations and in the meantime a number of pilots had already experienced gunship operations with the 135th Assault Helicopter Company at Blackhorse, about 20 miles north of Nui Dat. The helicopters of this company were heavily committed to mass formation combat assault troop lifts under the protection of gunships. The normal formation of the assault troop lift was 10 helicopters full of troops protected by four gunships. Once the troops were on the ground, the gunships stayed in the area to lend support and they remained until given the all clear to leave. This taught the RAAF pilots a great deal about the techniques of mass formation and large scale troop air lifts. Hot and dusty, Blackhorse was a very busy base. “They never seem to stop” an RAAF pilot commented.
While some experience of gunship operation was learn ed in this way, in the main the RAAF gunship crews had to learn their new skills in “on the job” training. The early operations were really training missions which became “the real thing”.
The squadron adopted the familiar Australian word “Bushranger” for their gunships and having been given approval to conduct gunship operations, flew its first Bushranger mission on April 11, 1969. Three Bushrangers were in action, but there was little to report from the activities of that first day. There was more action on May 4 when two Bushrangers, in response to a report of the sighting of eight Viet Cong, flew to the scene and engaged the enemy with rocket and minigun fire. On returning to base they reported: “Results unknown, clothing hanging in the trees, but no bodies.”
Three Bushrangers were continually fired on when supporting a South Vietnamese company in action against a Viet Cong force on May 11. In the afternoon of the same day they engaged a North Vietnamese company hiding in a rubber plantation. Again the Bushrangers were fired on by automatic weapons throughout the action, but took no hits. The Bushranger crews reported: “All three aircraft fully expended. A United States Army Cobra also operated in the area. A sweep by ‘friendlies’ resulted in a body count of 14. Seven claimed by the squadron and seven by the Cobra. ”
On May 15, three Bushrangers were briefed to attack Viet Cong forces which had occupied the town of Dat Do to the east of Nui Dat. The Viet Cong had been engaged by South Vietnamese Regional Forces who had American and Australian army advisers with them. The Regional Forces had found that each time they moved towards the town centre they had been fired on by heavy automatic weapons from Viet Cong who were holed up in houses in the centre. When the Bushrangers arrived on the scene, the Regional Forces had pulled back and by radio directed the Bushrangers to the enemy occupied houses. The Bushrangers swept down to a height of 300ft firing their rockets and mini guns. On their second pass at the target, a heavy twin barrelled machine gun mounted on a tripod opened fire on them. Because the hostile machine gun was too close to friendly forces the Bushrangers could not attack it but continued their fire on the Viet Cong from another direction. Further ground fire was observed, this time from AK47s, but only one hit was scored on the helicopters.
The Regional Forces then moved forward again in an attempt to eject the Viet Cong. However by next day the Viet Cong had pulled out. The Bushranger fire had severely damaged the houses occupied by the Viet Cong and the squadron later learned that six enemy had been killed and 13 wounded during the engagement. “Unfortunately,” the squadron reported, “our support was not sufficient to save the life of the US army adviser who had taken part in many operations in the Long Hais. “His throat had been cut by the enemy. ”
Next day (May 16) three Bushrangers and three other RAAF helicopters took part in a “hot” extraction of an Australian Special Air Service (SAS) patrol which had been surrounded by Viet Cong in the jungle. Because they were surrounded, the patrol could not move away to an area where the extracting helicopter could land. There was no alternative but to attempt to winch them up through the trees. In the vulnerable minutes in which the winching took place, three Bushrangers moved in and opened fire. The patrol marked their position with a smoke grenade and Flying Officer Butler’s crew then began to lift the patrol out as the gunships maintained their continuous gunfire all around them and to wihin 10 metres of their position. The hazardous extraction was a success because the heavy suppressive fire by the gunships, in spite of enemy return fire which was kept up until all helicopters had moved 2000 metres from the pick up point.
In a sharp action on May 21 three Bushrangers played a significant role when their fire pinned down a 50-man Viet Cong force located in a bunker complex. For two hours the Bushrangers, led by Flight Leiutenant Robertson, who was on his last mission before returning to Australia, maintained a continuous suppressive fire at times only 100 metres ahead of Alpha Company, 7 RAR. The Bushranger fire enabled the company to reorganise and launch a highly successful assault on the bunker positions. In addition to the contribution by the Bushrangers two other helicopters of No. 9 Squadron were used to evacuate sitting and walking wounded and a third to resupply tanks with ammunition. “Without the assistance of the Bushrangers, the action would not have been the success it was” the company commander told the members of the squadron when he visited their mess the following week.
The busy “bushies” as they came to be known were in another successful operation on May 30 when they were sent to Thua Tich to escort Australian Armoured Personnel Carriers returning to Xuyen Moc after a successful ambush. Anticipating that the Viet Cong might attempt to mount a counter-ambush against the APCs, the Task force provided them with Bushranger support. The carriers and their escort had almost reached Xuyen Moc when the Bushrangers left them with the intention of flying to the site of the ambush to check on any further enemy movements. No sooner had they left the carriers than a Viet Cong fired a rocket propelled grenade from close range – about 10ft. The grenade penetrated the side of a carrier and landed on the driver’s lap, but failed to explode. The Bushrangers were contacted im mediately and returned to the carriers. Both Bushrangers and Carriers opened fire, the Bushrangers killing three enemy and six probables. Having disposed of the enemy attack, the 14 Bushrangers returned to base for re-arming and refuelling and then flew to the original ambush site where Viet Cong were found and killed by mini gun fire.
A Bushranger was forced down by enemy fire for the first time on June 5. Flight Lieutenant Hazelwood with two other Bushrangers were supporting 6 RAR when his aircraft was hit by five rounds of 30 calibre which slightly wounded the crew man, LAC R. G. Ferry. The loss of transmission oil caused by bullet damage forced the aircraft down. While the other two Bushrangers covered them, another Iroquois lifted out the downed crew. The helicopter was recovered by an American Chinook. Later, Flight Leiutenant Hazelwood was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. His citation read (in part): “On June 5, 1969, while providing close air support, hi. sair craft was hit and seriously damaged by enemy fire. In the face of a critical emergency he reacted calmly and it was entirely due to his efforts that the aircraft was landed safely and subsequently recovered without injury to the crew. ”
Two weeks later, crew members of an RAAF Dustoff helicopter braved enemy mines at night to rescue soldiers of an Australian Army patrol wounded by an exploded mine. A total of 17 soldiers of the 5th Battalion had been wounded and three died as a result of the mine explosion which was followed by a second explosion while attempts were being made to evacuate dead and wounded hit in the first.
LAC Ronald Wilson, of Garbutt, Queensland, the medical orderly on the Dustoff helicopter, disregarding the danger of further mine explosions tended wounded and assisted them back to the helicopter.
Describing the events LAC Wilson said: “I was in a Dustoff helicopter and there was a second aircraft with us. We went into the landing area first and picked up five of the wounded, three on litters and two walking wounded. We wasted no time in getting them away, as we knew we would have to come back for more.
“The second helicopter also went in and picked up a full helicopter load of wounded.
“While we were on the way back for our second lift of wounded we heard that another mine had exploded and more soldiers were hurt.”
The second mine had gone off when uninjured soldiers in the patrol had been searching for the victims of the first ex plosion. When Wilson reached the scene the second time he saw only two soldiers, one of whom appealed for assistance to bring out the wounded who were hidden by the darkness and thick vegetation some 30 to 40 yards away.
LAC Wilson sought permission from the pilot, Flying Officer Ian Harvey, to go in after the wounded. The·pilot agreed but warned him of the danger that more mines might explode. Wilson and AC Lee, the gunner, nevertheless went in to search for the soldiers, leaving LAC Jeff Smith, the crew man, to man the helicopter’s machine guns.
LAC Wilson continued: “We went about 50ft along the track which had been marked with packs and rifles before we saw the first casualty. We put him on a stretcher, and set off to carry him back to the helicopter. For a moment we lost the marked track, but through the darkness we could see the searchlight the pilot was operating.
We found the track again and gently lifted the soldier into the helicopter. Then I stayed to look after him while Jeff and Ian went back for more. Between them they brought out two more stretcher patients and one walking wounded.
“On both journeys back to the base hospital the small space in the helicopter was crowded with the wounded. The normal medical load is two litters with walking wounded sit ting next to the gunners at the side. There was no room for three litters on the floor of the chopper so we laid the third man between the others without a stretcher. I had to straddle the patients and do the best I could to help them.
“The three of us applied tourniquets and field dressings during the flight to base. There was no room to move and only a small red light to see by. I cut off three trouser legs and found more wounds. The army medical orderly had done a great job because a lot of the soldiers were well bandaged up when we got to them. One soldier had lost a leg. The tourniquet which had been applied by the army medical orderly saved his life.”
For their fine effort in a dangerous and difficult situation, the medical orderly, LAC Wilson and the helicopter crewmen LAC Smith and Aircraftsman Lee, were all awarded the mention-in-despatches. The citations referred to their bravery in action when, in complete disregard of their own safety, they assisted in the recovery and evacuation of the wounded soldiers.
On August 15, Flying Officer Tardent (now promoted from pilot officer) led three Bushrangers in an action in sup port of B Company of 5 RAR who were in continuous action with enemy forces. Air strikes and artillery as well as the gunship teams were used in support of the heavily engaged troops all day. The performance of the RAAF gunships on this day was highly praised. Apart from the support they gave they were credited with killing five of the enemy.
Six days later on August 21, A Company of the same bat talion was in a fierce jungle battle and gunship helicopters of No. 9 Squadron and the American Army were called in to give close support. During the battle A Company had suffered heavy casualties – one man killed and 31 wounded. RAAF and American Dustoff helicopters were scrambled. One of the RAAF Dustoff helicopters sent to evacuate wounded at 4. 30 pm was captained by 21-year-old Flying Officer Bob Treloar of Maidstone, Victoria with Flight Lieutenant Jim Satrapa of Queanbeyan, NSW as co-pilot. They were joined on the way to the scene of battle by three US Dustoff helicopters. For 20 minutes the helicopters hovered over the battle area while the Australians and the enemy fought it out. Then with the support of three Bushrangers led by Flying Officer Tardent, one of the American medical evacuation helicopters moved in to begin the task of bringing out the casualties. As Flying Officer Tardent’s Bushrangers bought down heavy fire on the enemy positions, the American helicopter hovered at 25ft above the troops and winched up three casualties. The enemy fired on him however and the ground commander waved him off. A few minutes later Flying Officer Treloar took his aircraft down to the 25ft level, dropped his jungle penetrator, and hauled his first casualty into the helicopter. A second casualty was half way up when an enemy grenade exploded at three top level, unfortunately killing one of the wounded Australians waiting on the ground to be rescued.
Enemy fire continued from 30 metres away as the third casualty was hauled up and shrapnel peppered the aircraft holing the perspex windscreen and the top window and port door. .
The heavy fire forced Flying Officer Treloar to move away. Nevertheless his aircraft was hit again six times by AK 47 rifle fire as he gained speed over the tree tops.
One of the wounded soldiers was hit and wounded again. When hoisted aboard the helicopter he had been suffering from a neck wound only. But in the helicopter he was hit again in the head and the groin while lying on the floor. Fortunately he recovered from his injuries in hospital. The sympathies of the helicopter crew were with him when he was heard to say during the heat of the action: The miserable little bastards, they’re even shooting at me in an aircraft”.
Shrapnel pierced the helicopter’s fuel tank and another bullet cut through the aircraft between the feet of the two pilots and smashed the instrument panel.. The bullet continued past the head of the co-pilot and finally embedded itself in a steel frame.
Flying Officer Treloar suceeded in bringing his damaged aircraft some 15 miles to Nu1 Dat where on inspection It was found to have been holed 11 times. The other members of Flying Officer Treloar’s crew were LAC A. M. Huntley, crew man of Coogee, Sydney and AC John Kerins, gunner of Nelson’s Bay, NSW.
For his part in this action, Flying Office Tardent was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. The citation read in part: “Fig Off Tardent took the initiative and in conjunction with the ground force commander, directed the gunships’ fire in such a manner as to ensure maximum suppression of the enemy forces and so provide the best possible protection of the medical evacuation helicopters. During the engagement Fig Off Tardent personally made accurate rocket and mini gun attacks on the enemy position.”
The year 1970 saw no reduction in the overall operational activities of No. 9 Squadron in spite of rumours of withdrawals from Vietnam of Allied forces. With the superb efforts of the ground maintenance crews paying off, the squadron con tinued to mount in the order of 4000 sorties a month. By March 1970 the total sorties flown by the squadron in nearly four years of war had climbed to above the 170,000 mark.
Keeping the helicopters on the line was a maintenance section of two officers, 17 senior NCOs and 72 airmen representing airframe, engine, electrical, instrument, radio and armament fitters in addition to general engineering hands. The task of the section was to provide 12 helicopters online for operational use every day. In fact this number was usually exceeded. The section had the proud record in 1969 of an average serviceability rate of 82 per cent. In a 12 months period the section had carried out 82 unscheduled engine changes, a most abnormal situation for a squadron with only 16 aircraft. The higher rate was due to the adverse conditions of the Vietnam theatre.
RAAF helicopter maintenance methods were demonstrated to Vietnamese Air Force parties. Squadron Leader Keith Taylor of Canberra, the squadron’s Senior Engineer Officer said that the Vietnamese were particularly impressed by the RAAF serviceability rate. “We maintain a daily requirement of 13 aircraft out of our 16 unit strength. At Nha Trang their (the Vietnamese) rate is about 16 out of 32. ” The excellent performance of the squadron as a whole was again officially recognised when it was awarded the Gloucester Cup for 1969/70 – the third successive year. The award takes into account factors such as total flying in relation to the squadron’s role, technical standards and morale.
On October 6, 1971, No. 9 Squadron airlifted 500 roops of the 3rd Battalion to the deck of HMAS Sydney and with the withdrawal of the last Australian troops of the 4th Battalion from Nui Dat on November 7 the actual support of Australian troops in the field ended.
A total close to 50,000 Australian servicemen of whom 4443 were RAAF members served in South Vietnam.
Australians who were killed or died in the Vietnam theatre totalled 492 and 2876 became casualties as a result of wounds or injuries. RAAF casualties totalled 70. RAAF battle casualties were four killed, 30 wounded and two missing. Non-battle casualties were seven killed, one died of illness, 19 injured and seven hospitalised from illness.
Operational sorties carried out by the RAAF in South
| No. 2 Squadron | 11,963 |
| No. 9 Squadron | 223,487 |
| No. 35 Squadron (includes RAAF Transport Flight) | 79,739 |
| Total | 315,189 |
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