Boeing’s next, best — last — hope
Boeing’s narrowbody world continues to implode, with airlines’ 737 MAX’s groundings now extended past the one-year mark, its production line shutting down, regulators playing ever-harder hardball with the company’s leadership, and no end in sight despite the sacking of former chief executive Dennis Muilenburg.
As readers of last month’s special 737 MAX edition of Australian Aviation’s counterpart magazine World of Aviation know, the future of the MAX is increasingly up in the air. The aircraft that was to be the cash cow for Boeing’s 2020s is now looking like a veterinary anatomy lesson, with airlines abandoning the aircraft, passengers’ opinions clear about the MAX, and Boeing left without a narrowbody future.
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The 757 is dead, its tooling broken, its generational commonality no longer relevant. Boeing now needs to bring forward the aircraft that the 737 MAX’s low marginal cost and correspondingly high marginal profit was supposed to fund: its own replacement, the Future Small Airplane (Aircraft), or FSA.
Boeing was mulling a new narrowbody concept at the beginning of the 2010s before pivoting to the quick-win 737 re-engining that become the MAX, and is again shopping one around to airline customers at the beginning of the 2020s. A decade on, engine and construction materials have advanced substantially, meaning that the 2020 FSA is correspondingly more attractive than the 2010 version.
But the very demand for narrowbody aircraft means that neither the materials used, nor the construction methods employed, nor the production methodology used, nor the engine improvements required, can be hugely revolutionary.
‘Boeing needs to offer a lot more than a mea culpa to the airlines that have not abandoned their 737 MAX orders’
Boeing will need to build too many of these aircraft, at too high a rate, in too short a time period for anything revolutionary, and any decline of the MAX order book will only increase this pressure. The Airbus A320 family, for example, is built at sixty aircraft per month presently, with hopes to raise it to 63 per month by 2021. In the absence of the débacle of the 737 MAX, Boeing’s narrowbodies could have been expected to be produced at roughly the same rate.
This kind of production rate means that Boeing must walk a very fine line. It must be just ambitious enough to persuade customers that there is an advantage over Airbus’ re-engined narrowbody, but just prudent enough to convince buyers, suppliers and the rest of the industry that it can deliver on its promises — something that the US airframer has repeatedly failed to do with its new aircraft programmes since the turn of the century.
In the absence of revolution, it seems most likely that the FSA will be a low-winged monoplane with engines slung underneath the wings, and with a single tail and low horizontal stabilisers at the rear — as opposed to any sort of T-tail, rear-engined configuration à la VC-10 or DC-9.
‘the FSA will be sized according to the number of six-passenger rows that can be installed at row intervals of approximately 30 inches down an oval tube’
For this fundamental layout constraint to change, it would require a paradigm shift in the way that commercial aircraft are designed or manufactured: a flying wing, perhaps, a mini ‘Sonic Cruiser’ idea, or some sort of delta-planform design that changes the essential shape of a passenger jet from being a long tube with wings.
This kind of change will be massive in terms of design, construction, materials, certification and production, and is unlikely to be mature enough in time for an aircraft that will need to be constructed in the numbers in which the FSA will be required. Rather, any kind of evolution in this regard is likely to begin in the more long-haul widebody niche.
As a result, the FSA will be sized according to the number of six-passenger rows that can be installed at row intervals of approximately 30 inches down an oval tube. And that’s where things get interesting.
Fundamentally, a narrowbody aircraft is constrained by the number of economy class seats in each row, and by its height off the ground.
Since the dawn of commercial jet aviation, aircraft have largely taken a form that can be drawn by any small child with a sticky-fingered crayon: a long tube with windows that carries passengers, plus wings, engines, a tail and horizontal stabilisers.
Since regulators require, among other things, that passengers be seated not more than two seats from access to the aisle, any single-aisle configuration can max out at a 3-3 layout, where a twin-aisle could be up to 3-6-3 — although there are of course major engineering challenges to creating an aircraft of the wide ovular shape that would require.
At present, the smallest widebody in general use is the 767, which offers a 2-3-2 layout on most of the airlines operating it. While this is great for passengers, with only one middle seat per row and nobody more than one seat from the aisle, needing to fly enough space for that second aisle to enable an increase of only one passenger per row compared with a 737 or A320 is a fairly large marginal cost for not very much marginal benefit.
Given the 3-3 layout, the question is whether the FSA will be shaped in the tall oval style that has characterised previous narrowbodies, particularly Boeing’s. (The 737’s outside fuselage is 4m high and 3.8m wide, as is the 757’s, while the A320’s is 4.1m high and 4m wide.) It seems unlikely given the constraints on Boeing and the volume of FSAs required that anything more revolutionary like double-bubble fuselages will be attempted.
At the same time, the size of a conventionally shaped aircraft’s fuselage — to an extent mitigated by the size, shape and functionality of the wing root chord where the wing joins the fuselage — constrains the length of its landing gear, which in turn constrains the fan size of the engines that can be installed underneath the wings.
When Boeing designed the 757, it took this into account: unlike the 737, with its short gear that do not even fold the tyres of the aircraft inside the fuselage, the 757 offered relatively long landing gear that, in hindsight, would have provided more than enough space for a re-engined 757 to adopt the most modern and efficient of turbofans. The counterpoint is that the 757’s landing gear always looked a little bit like a tall wading bird, not entirely in proportion to the rest of the aircraft.
Taken to an extreme, one can imagine some sort of flamingoesque aircraft, with struts the proportion of Concorde’s rather inelegant nose gear. But the FSA is not Concorde in terms of volume or performance, and Boeing cannot go too far in this direction, since adding weight and complexity with engineering solutions like folding gear is undesirable.
‘The aircraft that was to be the cash cow for Boeing’s 2020s is now looking like a veterinary anatomy lesson’
Given the likely requirements of the next and subsequent turbofan generations, as well as the re-engining trends for aircraft, the driver is thus for Boeing to make the landing gear tall enough to be able to accommodate this generation of engines plus at least two more: so along the proportions of the 757, perhaps a little longer.
When it comes to narrowbody width, less may not be more, and Boeing may need to break with tradition
Fuselage width, divided by the number of seats, is another key question for Boeing.
Obviously, this question is one that is key to passenger comfort. Compare the original layouts of the Boeing 777, which for almost all airlines apart from the domestic high-density operations of All Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines seated nine passengers abreast in a 3-3-3 layout when entering into service, and the 3-4-3 configuration which most airlines now fly on the same aircraft some two-and-a-half decades later. But while this kind of add-a-seat option does not directly translate, the basic size of today’s human beings does.
These high-density 777s’ seats are 17” rather than 18” wide, and the aisles narrow too. (For an inches-based reference, UK clothier Brooks Brothers quotes 17” across a man’s shoulders as its Extra Small size. Look around you the next time you’re in a crowd and think about how many people would be wearing an XS shirt.)
It’s the same on narrowbodies: the 737’s narrower fuselage means its seats are always 17” wide — despite some lamentable number-fudging from airlines and seatmakers who decide there is no standard armrest width — while the A320 seats can either be 18” wide for comfort or narrower to give an extra few inches in the aisle in order to speed up boarding and deboarding.
From a passenger perspective, clearly the A320 is superior in this regard, but of course it is correspondingly heavier than it would need to be if the fuselage were slightly narrower and the seats were thus more uncomfortable.
(As an aside: Boeing’s narrowbody fuselages are unchanged since the dawn of the jet age: the 737’s fuselage width is, like the 727 and 757, materially the same as the 707. Average passenger size at shoulder and hips, of course, has increased steadily.)
Other considerations, including cargo, will affect the width of the aircraft.
For some airlines, the A320 family offers a dealmaker: the ability to load Unit Load Device-based containerised cargo and luggage rather than having to throw individual bags onto the aircraft. This is largely a benefit to network and full-service airlines that use their narrowbody passenger aircraft to service their cargo markets over their hubs. Think, say, Finnair, where both passengers and freight transit Helsinki swiftly and efficiently.
It would be smart of Boeing, as it seeks to court A320 family customers with the FSA, to settle on a fuselage that offers at least as much cargo space as A320, and even to adopt the same LD3-45 (IATA code AKH) 3.7-cubic-metre underfloor container sizing as the A320 offers, potentially with the option for FSA-only operators to use a slightly larger variant if they wish.
Sizewise, the FSA variants need to hit several key sweet spots
The laws of physics and the rigours of commercial aviation engineering constrain the shape of every aircraft, but let’s particularly talk about the proportion of width to length.
Consider the aircraft we think of as either comically or majestically long, depending on our preferences: the Boeing 757-300, Airbus A340-600 or Douglas DC-8-61, for example, which extend further forward and aft of the wing than their smaller cousins
Now consider those that are either beloved as cute or mocked as stumpy: the Boeing 747SP or 767-200, or the Airbus A318. These aircraft are so short compared with their wingspan that, in some cases, they require aerodynamic adjustments like an extra-height tail, with the A318’s some 80 cm taller than the A319.
Fundamentally, the sweet spot in the physics and aerodynamics stakes reflects the sweet spot in the aesthetics stakes. Indeed, legendary aircraft designer Clarence “Kelly” Johnson of Lockheed’s Skunk Works had an unofficial rule on his famous list: if it looks ugly, it will fly the same.
Another key constraint is crewing cost. There is a cost step at fifty-passengers intervals in terms of flight attendants, given that one per fifty passengers is required. This is clearly seen as low-cost carriers seek to increase the number of passengers onboard their longer narrowbodies, such as the Airbus A321, closer to 250.
Yet all 200-seat layouts are not made alike: Ryanair can fit two hundred economy class seats on its forthcoming 737 MAX 8 aircraft (whatever their eventual name: 737 MAX 8 200, 737 MAX 200, 737-8200, or something else). United Airlines, meanwhile, doesn’t even fit that many on its latest layout of the 767-300ER, which seats just 167 passengers thanks to a preponderance of the fully flat business class seats with direct aisle access that are becoming increasingly de rigeur. The sweet spot for the FSA is likely somewhere in the middle.
Business class seats — together with the rise of longhaul premium economy, which in the narrowbody world means recliner seats in a 2-2 configuration like domestic business within Australia — are a key driver behind the airline preference for a larger model of aircraft becoming the most purchased model as generations evolve: from the A320ceo to the A321neo, for example.
(This trend is less pronounced than it might be as a result of economy class seats becoming increasingly a commodity, with few airlines able to command enough of a premium to make the experience anything more than bargain-basement.)
At present, the A321neo can hold up to 240 passengers, which works out to 40 rows of six seats. Adding a further ten, via a row of six and perhaps a row of four at one of the larger doors, for example, is not beyond the realms of feasibility for the airframe.
Indeed, it is widely expected that Airbus will announce a stretched A322neo at some point in the not-too-distant future once it has had a good run milking the monetary herd of A321neos that are on order.
It wouldn’t be surprising if one of the triggers for Airbus’ decision is an agreed sizing for the FSA’s first, second and possibly third variants.
‘The 757’s landing gear always looked a little bit like a tall wading bird, not entirely in proportion to the rest of the aircraft’
For context, let’s look at the largest narrowbody currently in operation, Boeing’s stretched 757-300, nicknamed the “pencil jet” for its almost ridiculously long fuselage.
German leisure airline Condor fits 275 seats on its 757-300 in an all-economy layout, while Delta Air Lines offers 234, split into 24 US domestic first-class recliners, 32 extra-legroom seats and 178 down the back. United’s, although with more extra-legroom seats, also seats 234.
Can this be scaled up? The 300-seater narrowbody might sound like a horror from a boarding and deboarding perspective, but with a third set of stairs it is little better or worse than a two-stair 200-seater.
There are questions around weight, balance, aerodynamics and tailstrike, and while many may break out in a cold sweat at the suggestion of computer software fixing aerodynamic problems, it is better to start thinking about this option now than further down the line.
But it’s in the middle of the narrowbody size scale that there is also scope.
Qatar Airways’ A320 seats 132 passengers, of which 12 are in fully flat business class seats and 120 are in economy pitched at 31 inches. A321neos, meanwhile, seat quite a few more: Aer Lingus’ A321LRs seat 184 passengers, for example.
‘Many may break out in a cold sweat at the suggestion of computer software fixing aerodynamic problems’
A narrowbody variant that offers a reasonable 150-passenger flexibility between the A320 and A321 fuselage sizes, and particularly one that includes impressive long-haul credentials at this market scale would be particularly smart.
When it comes to variants, the FSA needs to come in at least three models to begin with
What the FSA needs is a series of variants that meet several key markets, and getting these sizes right — and in the right order — will be crucial. When Boeing was creating the 777, it talked about A, B and C markets for the aircraft when discussing size and range, and it may be sensible to do something similar here but in terms of model size given the diversity of airline types likely to order the aircraft.
• -100: the “between A320 and A321” model, allowing 200 passengers in a low-cost configuration and 150 in a variety of a more premium layouts for long and thin routes
• -200: the “a bit bigger than a 757-200” model, offering 250 passengers in tight low-cost configuration for midhaul flights or 200 passengers on longhaul full-service carrier missions
• -300: the “a bit bigger than a 757-300” model, if such a thing is possible, cramming in 300 passengers for an LCC on short- to midhaul flights, or 250 passengers in a more premium configuration for efficient mid-haul flights on full-service airlines
Fundamentally, there are constraints in making anything smaller than a 200-passenger low-cost configuration work on the same airframe as a larger narrowbody. Enter, perhaps, an aircraft we might call the FRA, or Future Regional Aircraft, built by the former Embraer commercial aircraft business now known as Boeing Brasil – Commercial?
A key question is whether Boeing needs to offer all these size options at the same time. Offer, perhaps not, but announce, very probably. Airlines like to know whether if they buy the -100 they can truly expect the -300 to come along as well, and few will be giving Boeing any benefit of the doubt.
This also leads us neatly into engines, because the powerplants that are required for a long-haul 200-passenger premium carrier version of an FSA-200 and those needed for a shorthaul max-pax 250-person version of the same aircraft are different.
Whether through different engine variants, or through a system of derating engines to reduce takeoff thrust (and thus affecting maximum takeoff weight, runway length requirements, hot and high performance and other factors), it could well make sense to offer a choice between long-range or short-range versions of the same aircraft.
The FSA needs to be a key part of Boeing’s MAX strategy
It’s hard to think how Boeing could be in a worse position to fund the creation of the FSA: the bill for grounding the 737 MAX for a year alone, let alone the lost sales and eventual cancellations, will be unprecedented; its other commercial programs are not presently covering themselves in glory either; its reputation lies in tatters; and it needs to run multiple new aircraft and re-engining programmes at the same time.
Criticisms of Boeing’s dividend-first strategy and ongoing malpractice investigations aside, any airframer would need a serious war chest to develop the next generation of its bestselling aircraft. Boeing does not have that, and if it looks too much to once again lean on its local, state, and federal government connections to reduce costs then it loses a leg to stand on in state aid complaints in fora like the World Trade Organization.
As part of its airline customer relations strategy, Boeing needs to offer a lot more than a mea culpa to the airlines that have not abandoned their 737 MAX orders. For many of them, this offer may well include substantial discounts not just on the MAXes they ordered when the future of the aircraft looked much longer and much less dismal than it does now, but on the aircraft that will replace it.
Fundamentally, carriers that had expected to operate large fleets of MAXes that would retain long-term value will be looking to Boeing to make them whole. Expect announcements of FSA orders to come either with cancellations or reductions of 737 MAX orders, or to quietly precede or follow them.
And that’s a key problem for Boeing: the FSA could have been expected to be a safe bet and a huge money-spinner for the company. If Boeing gets it right, it still will be — although that confidence will not be as firm as before the MAX disasters. But if Boeing has to discount it because of the nearly 5,000 MAX aircraft ordered by over six dozen customers, the aircraft’s profitability will be that much further away.
But the US’ largest exporter doesn’t have a choice: it has to build the FSA, it has to build it now, and it has to build it right. The very future of Boeing is at stake.
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