Opinion: Don’t scrap the Spartans just yet

Defence’s own description of the Spartan makes the case for keeping it: Australia bought 10 aircraft to replace Caribou and provide enhanced intra-theatre and regional airlift.

The C-27J is built for remote environments, can operate from rudimentary airstrips, and is used for humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue, aero-medical evacuation, troop movement, cargo transport and airdrop. It is operated by No. 35 Squadron from Amberley and supported by an established maintenance and training ecosystem.

In short, it fills the gap between helicopters and larger fixed-wing transports, which is exactly the sort of niche the ADF should be reluctant to give up.

The strongest alternative to retirement is not simply to keep the fleet unchanged, but to keep it relevant. One option is a modest life-extension and upgrade path: avionics refreshes, structural work, better mission systems and more modern communications so the aircraft can keep doing what it already does well. Another is to lean harder into its regional utility role.

Recent Defence reporting shows the Spartan has been operating in the Pacific with real operational value, including fishery surveillance and airborne ISR support in the Solomon Islands, and regular deployments to Papua New Guinea under Defence co-operation programs. That is not marginal work; it is deterrence by presence, practical partnership and visible Australian influence.

A second alternative is to turn the fleet into a more deliberately joint asset.

The Spartan could be used as a dispersed, northern-operations aircraft for Army, Air Force and regional partner support, especially in Australia’s near region where runways are short, weather is poor and the mission is often urgent rather than elegant. A small number of aircraft could also be held at high readiness for civil support tasks, while the remainder continue routine regional lift and training.

That would align neatly with the 2026 strategy’s emphasis on civil preparedness and resilience, while preserving a capability that is already proven, already in service and already tied into regional activity.

In an era when Canberra says it wants to strengthen the sovereign industrial base and build deeper industry partnerships, scrapping a working platform and then hoping a better answer appears later is hardly prudent. The smarter move is to exploit the capability we already have, improve it where necessary, and avoid a gap in a mission set that no other ADF aircraft covers as neatly.

The real question is not whether the C-27J is perfect. It is whether Australia can afford to lose a compact, rugged, multi-role aircraft that delivers lift, surveillance and regional presence in the one airframe.

On balance, the answer is no. Retire the wrong capability and you do not just save money; you create a hole. For Australia, the better course is to keep the Spartans flying, sharpen their mission, and make them earn their keep in the Pacific for years to come.