Single pilot operations = single point of failure

Now there is serious consideration by regulators and airlines to introduce and permit SPO for commercial airline and freight operations, and for large air transport aircraft. The introduction of SPO would probably not be an immediate transition from a multicrew cockpit to a single-pilot cockpit, but likely a phased approach starting with regulatory approval to reduce the amount of crew required for cruise phases of flight, typically on long-haul flights.

Currently, two pilots are required in the cockpit at all times for transport category aircraft (aircraft larger than 12,500 pounds). To account for duty limits, long flights typically need at least three or four pilots to rotate through their duty and rest cycles. For future ultra-long-haul flights, five or even six crew members may be required under the existing regulatory framework. Even for shorter international and transcontinental flights, operators and regulators may look to reduce the required crew from three to two, with only one pilot on duty during cruise.

From a short-term financial perspective, SPO appear to offer cost savings, improved flexibility in scheduling, and simpler training and operational requirements — all benefits that are undoubtedly attractive to airlines and businesses.

This conclusion, however, is incorrect, as the benefits assume flawless operations with zero threats or errors and that new technologies will remove all risks. The reality is that while salary and expense costs may be saved, the potential cost from a safety perspective is orders of magnitude greater.

Consider Qantas Flights 32 and 72, and US Airways (Cactus) 1549 — flights that respectively suffered a critical engine failure, automation failure, a bird strike and subsequent ditching. Their captains De Crespigny, Sullivan and Sullivan respectively have commented at length about how multi-crew resource management onboard their aircraft was a critical success factor in reaching a safe outcome. Additionally, they have denounced the concept of SPO as a tremendous risk, the core reasons being:

• Increased workload and stress. A single pilot must perform all tasks alone, which can lead to increased workload and stress, which can increase the risk of errors or accidents. Reducing required crew from two to one does not linearly double workload and stress — it potentially squares it.
• Reduced situational awareness. In SPO, there is no co-pilot to assist with workload prioritisation and tasks such as flying, navigation, communication, systems monitoring and checklist administration. This can increase the risk of errors or omissions.
• Risk of incapacitation. In the event of an emergency or an incapacitation of the pilot, there is no other pilot in the cockpit to take control of the aircraft.
• Limited redundancy. SPO has limited redundancy and in the case of an emergency the pilot can be overwhelmed and unable to perform multiple tasks at the same time.

I have a simple example of the benefits of two pilots in a cockpit instead of one. In this case, the cockpit was not that of an aircraft but a car I was driving. My RAAF friend and colleague Bosh, who would go on to fly fast jets, was in the passenger seat. It was night time in Brisbane, we were on our way back to base after dinner and I was stopped at a major red light intersection I was unfamiliar with.

I was talking to Bosh, looking forward, when I saw the traffic light change to green. I started to accelerate, and he urgently exclaimed “Robbo, stop — what are you doing?!” I stopped, paused, looked at the green light, and realised that I had reacted to the cross set of lights turning green. I was operating on “autopilot” mode and reacted to the wrong set of lights. My human co-pilot picked up on my error and alerted me to it.

My modern car doesn’t do this today, just as the technology required for SPO does not yet exist. While regulators are progressing on the basis that SPO, when introduced, will have an equivalent safety level of today’s multi-crew operations, the underlying technology will not have the experience, situational awareness or ability to learn and adapt that a trained second sentient human flight crew member possesses.

While SPO are an option not only for military, business and general aviation but for future transport category aircraft and operations, they should foremost be considered and evaluated from a safety-first perspective, not a cost-savings objective.