The de Havilland DH.86 in Australian operations (Part 3)

Part three of Eric Allen’s investigation into the de Havilland DH.86 in Australian operations. Read part one here and part two here.

 

During the 1980s, this writer had the opportunity to visit John Watkins OBE at his Melbourne home to discuss various aspects of his long and distinguished aviation career in Australia. Watkins’ career culminated in his appointment as Trans-Australia Airlines’ Director of Engineering in 1953, a position held until his retirement in 1971. One his many hats held prior to joining TAA was accident investigation, arising from his work with several government departments in the 1930s leading to the position of Acting Superintendent of Airworthiness and Aeronautical Engineering. This saw him enlisted to investigate the obvious difficulties faced by the DH.86 in Australian use. The disappearance of VH-URN Miss Hobart and the subsequent loss of VH-USG prompted the need for an evaluation of the aircraft by an Australian technical team.

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John Watkins explained his involvement with the DH.86 in Australia. It is a very interesting insight from someone closely connected with the accident investigations which tried to uncover what had happened to the aircraft — was it bad luck, a piloting error, or was something inherently wrong with the aircraft?

I was a very junior member of the engineering staff in the Civil Branch of the Department of Defence when I first became involved with DH.86s. But it was a pretty close association with the Flinders Island accident that really got my interest and my active participation in the investigations that brought right into the middle of the maelstrom. The Miss Hobart had disappeared over Bass Strait in October 1934 and, at the Department, we were completely mystified. There seemed to be no reason, the weather had not been bad, the aeroplane just disappeared. All we ever found was one passenger seat. It had magnesium tubes that were corroded so badly in the sea we couldn’t tell if it had broken away from floor attachments or whether they just corroded off the floor after the aeroplane sank.”

“Months after, it had been washed up on a beach on Wilsons Promontory. And that was a mystery, we couldn’t do much about it. In November the same year, VH-USG, the Qantas DH.86 on its delivery flight, crashed at Longreach. People had seen it crash, and again, there seemed to be no reason for it. It went out of control and did a sort of a flat spiral into the ground. That really was worrying because Qantas were relying heavily on the DH.86 for its share of the Imperial Airways airmail service and the Department naturally had to do something about it.

A lot of investigations were put in hand then but didn’t lead to anything specific. There were things that could have happened, the CG could have been too far aft or one thing or another, but the fact remained that it shouldn’t have been possible for an aeroplane that was flying in adequate trim for the normal purposes to suddenly misbehave in this way.

On 2 October 1935 I was very excited because I’d been nominated by the Department to go as the Departmental observer on the first flight by Holyman Airways on the Melbourne to Sydney run, which was about to be opened on their DH.86. I went out in the coach from Flinders Street to Essendon. There were two DH.86s standing side-by-side, the Loina VH-URT and Loila VH-UUB. I was directed to the Loila, which was going to Sydney. If I’d been directed to the Loina I wouldn’t have made it because we took off virtually together — one flew north to Sydney, the other flew south aiming for Tasmania, and didn’t get there. It crashed on Flinders Island.

In Sydney, Murray Jones, the manager of the de Havilland company in Australia, joined me and we flew down the following morning in the DH.86 again back to Melbourne, having gone to Flinders Island and started collecting the wreckage to find out what had happened to it. There was never any satisfactory explanation for it at all. It had been perfectly normal, if I remember rightly. I believe the record shows there was a perfectly normal radio call from the aeroplane saying he was just approaching Flinders Island, and the next thing people on the beach or in that area saw just the same sort of behaviour that had happened at Longreach. The aeroplane just went into a flat sort of spiral and hit the sea.

So there was something peculiar about the DH.86. By this time, the Department was under a lot of criticism for allowing this aeroplane to go on flying in certain quarters. Qantas still swore by it and a very high-powered committee was set up. Everybody who should have been on the committee was on the committee. Hudson Fysh and Arthur Baird from Qantas of course; Ivan Holyman, Jack Stubbs, and various other people from ANA; L. J. Wackett as a ranking aeronautical engineer; E. C. Wackett who was then the Director of Technical Services of the Air Force; Tommy Leach of Sydney University; E. J. C. Rennie of Melbourne University; and a number of departmental people including myself. We thrashed this thing out and I didn’t have any great say because I was a very junior member of the group at that time.

DH.86 Qantas Empire Airways Commonwealth Class VH-USF R.M.A. Melbourne. Impressed to RAAF as A31-6, then to MacRobertson Miller Aviation. Crashed 24 June 1945 upon landing in Geraldton, WA. Two lives were lost, while nine survived. (State Library of Queensland)

Nobody could come up with satisfactory explanations, but it was Wackett himself who said that he would never have a bar of the DH.86 because he reckoned its structure was essentially unsound. He said there had never been a biplane with a length of wing cell such as the DH.86 has out there without bracing in the rear spar of the plane. He said it’s got very flexible wing cellular torsion, that the ailerons are out on the wing tips there, and obviously it must twist because if it hasn’t got this rear spar bracing you are just twisting a flat plate in terms of the main lift bracing.

I believe he was absolutely right that it was a feature that had been disregarded by the authorities that gave the DH.86 its Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) in the first place. They hadn’t done any special investigations to see whether this feature was really safe or not. Although if everything was adequately maintained and all the bracing was kept right up to scratch, particularly the drag bracing inside the wings — which we were very dependent on to give it some sort of torsion stiffness — the aeroplane was flyable.

It was decided by this committee that we would run some tests to find out if there were circumstances in which the aeroplane could get away from us. And I was one of the observers allocated to this job. Ken Frewin, who I think was ANA’s chief pilot at the time, was the pilot and we flew the Lepena VH-USW. It had been gone over with a fine tooth comb, and it was absolutely in first-class trim. We did some experiments in the Lepena which were fairly hair-raising, and all sorts of stories about these tests featured quite prominently in the Melbourne press at the time. We tried, without success, to keep it fairly confidential.

John Watkins dressed for a test flight in France 1954 (TAA Musuem)

I suppose it did look a bit alarming — we had taken the passenger door off and put a rip panel over that and bolted a ladder to the floor so that whatever the altitude was, we reckoned we might be able to climb to the door and get out. We all wore parachutes, and Ken Frewin was the pilot, while Gordon Berg and I were the observers. Gordon Berg was my chief in the Department and a very fine bloke. He was the father of airworthiness in Australia, I would say.

We designed a series of indicators — horizontal slats supported by wires from the outer wings that could be photographed looking out the right hand to the left. We had a rigid mount in the middle with a couple of Graflex cameras looking out each way with simultaneous camera releases. We photographed these slats with various amounts of aileron applied at various speeds and plotted it out. We concluded that you could very easily get reversal of aileron control if you let the speed get up appreciably above what your normal level flight speed would be. If you had anything slack in the aeroplane anywhere, you could easily get reversal of aileron control which could make it a bit sticky, particularly given the marginal fin area. We reckoned it was inadequate.

We put all these views to de Havillands in England, and Gordon Berg went over to England and argued the toss with them. This was received quite bluntly. They were adamant that there couldn’t be anything wrong with their aeroplane and they weren’t going to have the colonials tell them they had made a bad aeroplane. Perhaps that’s a little unfair, but that was the impression we got.
Recently, you’ll have seen the article which described the work that Martlesham Heath did on the aeroplane after the approach from Australia, in which they grounded I think 7/12 aeroplanes when they tested them as they weren’t safe to fly. It wasn’t just imagination — there was something peculiar about the DH.86.

It wasn’t just imagination – there was something peculiar about the DH.86

There were two other DH.86 accidents in Australia after that. I had to investigate one of them as I’d become more senior in the department by February 1942 when a Qantas DH.86 VH-USE crashed near Brisbane.

This was the day after the Japanese bombed Darwin, so it wasn’t a normal time in Australia by any means. Maybe that’s why I don’t think the accident investigation wasn’t really worth much at all. It was quite clear from the distribution of the wreckage, though, that something had failed in the air. It was day of low cloud and the pilot, whose name I think was Swaffield, was flying blind. He didn’t like flying the DH.86 blind, and he had told people that.

He may have got encountered some difficulties, and in trying to recover from whatever situation he got into, the fin had quite obviously failed in the air under air loads. We found three quarters of the fin in bits on a property about two miles from where the pile of wreckage had hit. The main wreckage was all in one piece, but with the fin gone in an unusual attitude, the DH.86 obviously would have been quite uncontrollable. With that happening in a wartime situation, nothing much was done about it, but this was a DH.86 accident that obviously should never had happened. So, I don’t have a very high opinion of the DH.86, and quite frankly I don’t think it ever should have got its CofA. But it’s easy to be wise after the event.

It sold in reasonable numbers for that day and age. Imperial Airways used quite a lot of them and Qantas of course used them for years on their mail run, where they did quite a good job. Another one crashed at Geraldton in June 1945, and that was the last one that crashed in Australia — VH-USF of MacRobertson-Miller. I don’t know the circumstances of that one, but it was a pretty bad record because there weren’t many DH.86s on the Australian register, and too many of them crashed. I’ve always been aware of the fact that the aeroplane is a very unforgiving vehicle.

I’ve always been interested in accident investigation. I think’s a thorough investigation of accidents and taking the steps to ensure that particular cause won’t happen again is the only value you can get out of accidents. It worried me intensely that all these DH.86 accidents hadn’t really led to anything you could put your finger on and say, “We’ll fix that, and that’s it”. Various things were done, the centre section was stiffened up with plywood which did some good, the fin was strengthened, but not enough. This one that crashed in Brisbane had the strengthening modifications applied and it still came adrift in the air. But in the DH.86B — which I don’t think we had in Australia, but they were used in Europe — they put what they called Zulu shields on the end of the tailplane to increase the fin area. It did so enormously, so it can’t have been right in the first place.”

During our discussion I mentioned to Watkins, “At a meeting many years ago in Sydney there was someone who had known Prendergast, the pilot of VH-USG, and they said he was a very big man and they had a theory that he may have gone aft to do something and the CG was drastically altered.” Watkins responded, “I think that is probably right, but gosh that is a pretty sensitive sort of an aeroplane if one guy walking to the back of the aeroplane can put it out of control, it’s not right.”

Railway Air Services DH.86 G-ACVZ Jupiter crashed at Elsdorf near Cologne, with the loss of three on board.

A lack of candid information

With the passage of time, information emerged that the British aircraft industry was not candid about their concerns with the DH.86. The British Air Ministry in September 1936 had requested the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment at Martlesham Heath to investigate DH.86 handling characteristics following three major accidents of British registered aircraft in Europe:

  • 22 October 1935 — Imperial Airways DH.86 G-ADCM Draco crashed in an open field at Zwettl, Austria after encountering severe icing conditions with no injuries to occupants.
  • 12 August 1936 — British Airways DH.86 G-ADEB operating a mail run to Gatwick went out of control and crashed near Altenkirchen, Germany with both crew lost.
  • 15 September 1936 — British Airways DH.86A operating a night mail run to Germany crashed soon after take-off from Gatwick with the loss of three crew including the chief pilot of BA, Captain W. F. Anderson.

The tests conducted at Martlesham Heath tended to validate concerns uncovered earlier in the Australian tests. They revealed control handling deficiencies, difficulties in correcting a tendency to swing with one engine shut down, and a tendency to swing side-to-side under 135mph. Tests were not conducted at night. Most disturbing was the recommendation of the withdrawal of the CofA until remedial measures were taken. The result of this saw all British registered DH.86s tested with seven removed from use considered unsafe, with the nine other aircraft allowed only daylight flying with pilots in command to have a minimum 50 hours of experience.

I’ve always been aware of the fact that an aeroplane is a very unforgiving vehicle

To solve the problems, the measures mentioned above were taken, plus more — Zulu shields were placed at the tailplane tips, the wing and tailplane were strengthened with ply covering providing greater stiffness, tailplane area was slightly increased, and pneumatic undercarriage legs replaced the previous rubber damped version. Apart from these modifications, an earlier one introduced during production with more robust tubular metal-framed control surfaces replacing the original wooden fin and rudder.

After all these improvements, there were further DH.86 losses in Europe:

  • 15–16 March 1937 — Railway Air Services DH.86 G-ACVZ Jupiter crashed at Elsdorf near Cologne, with the loss of three on board.
  • 4 November 1938 — Jersey Airways G-ACZN Saint Catherine’s Bay crashed after departing Jersey Airport with all 14 on board and a farmer on the ground killed.
  • 20 July 1939 — DH.86B L7596 (formerly G-ADYJ) at Ulverston, Lancashire.
  • 31 March 1943 DH.86 AX844 (formerly G-ACZR) spun in at Donibristle, Scotland.

Other Australian problems

As John Watkins had mentioned, there were two other DH.86 losses in Australia during the 1940s. On 20 February 1942, Qantas DH.86 VH-USE R.M.A Sydney departed from Archerfield on a service to Roma-Charleville-Cloncurry, Queensland, crashing a few minutes later in the Brisbane suburb of Belmont with the loss of the Captain C. H. C. Swaffield, the First Officer, and seven passengers. John Watkins, now in a more senior role with the Department, visited the crash site but was astonished to find the wreckage had been burnt prior to his arrival. The reason advanced by Departmental Officer T. L. Amos, who visited the location earlier, was that was that there was no knowledge of the Watkins visit and the aircraft was so smashed he did not think anything could be revealed. It was a pity, as there was a squandered opportunity to have a close examination of the wreckage on land, denied in the two Bass Strait accidents.

An inquest began on 1 April 1942 by the City Coroner, Mr J. J. Leahy, S.M. The officer in charge of the Civil Aviation Department at Archerfield, T. L. Amos, advanced three possible theories for the accident — difficulties encountered in weather conditions, a structural defect in the stabilising fin causing the aircraft to become uncontrollable, or a momentary lapse by the pilot adjusting a certain control to enable him to have full control of his blind flying instruments. Amos said it was unusual for the aircraft to be nine to ten miles from its course. Eyewitness statements led to the assumption the pilot was flying blind. An eyewitness from Capalaba, Queensland said he saw the aircraft flying inverted. His reported statement continued, “It rolled right over a complete turn and righted itself. There were several of these turns, and then the aircraft righted itself on an even keel. No sooner was it right again than it took a left-hand dive strait down.” The witness said he subsequently found pieces of three-ply half a mile and a quarter of a mile respectively from the plane.

Yet another Australian DH.86 accident occurred on 24 June 1945, when MacRobertson-Miller Aviation VH-USF on the inaugural Perth-Geraldton-Carnarvon service had departed from Geraldton after refuelling. The aircraft encountered difficulties climbing after take-off and crashed in the attempted landing, killing experienced MMA Pilot H. J. Branch and one passenger. Nine others were seriously injured.

The final and somewhat troublesome DH.86 VH-USW Lepana incident was among the last. On 16 December 1945, the aircraft departed Perth for Carnarvon and experienced vibrations and handling difficulties. After landing, the cause was found to be the starboard wheel cowling had detached and hit the tailplane. The aircraft was later sold overseas to Universal Flying Services Ltd, Kidlington, Oxford and departed from Guildford Aerodrome on 19 November 1946 on its ferry flight to the UK. In an inglorious end to the flight on 26 December, the aircraft was abandoned at Allahabad, India when the crew became concerned for their safety after it developed a noticeable tail flutter.

MMA had already had an earlier incident and disposal of an aircraft. In February 1939, DH.86 VH-USD (formerly Qantas R.M.A. Brisbane) sustained damage during take-off from Broome, Western Australia following an engine failure. Although repairs were satisfactorily conducted, the registration was cancelled on 26 February 1939 and the aircraft was sold in India, later becoming VT-AKZ.

There was one final DH.86B which touched Australian shores after the war when colourful aviation identity H. W. G. ‘Warren’ Penny formed Intercontinental Air Tours and bought the British registered G-ADYH Denebola to operate migrant charter flights from Rome to Sydney. The first departure from Croydon, UK on 30 October 1947 arrived at Mascot on 28 November 1947 carrying ten British, Greek, and Italian passengers. Further flights were made until financial problems saw the closure of the venture in 1948. The aircraft passed through several owners engaged on a variety of operations in Burma and Malaya (now Peninsular Malaysia). Later, in the hands of Indonesian rebels, it was captured by Dutch forces at Maguwo, ferried to Bandoeng, and scrapped in 1949 with the salvaged Gipsy Six engines used to power locally built aircraft.

Final expert opinions about the DH.86 and looking towards the future

The DH.86 had a mixed experience in Australia. For Qantas, it enabled them to both launch their overseas operations and operate them internally in Australia. For the other Australian airlines it gave them the opportunity to introduce new services, though at times confronted with their share of some very serious outcomes. There are several pilots who have expressed their concerns with the aircraft, stressing it needed a capable crew to keep it in check. A common theme was that the aircraft was longitudinally unstable.

While wrapping up his experiences, Watkins summarised “I believe the aircraft was only just flyable. You had to be a pretty good pilot really to feel comfortable with a DH.86 in any sort of turbulence.”

Comments from experienced senior Qantas pilots give further insight into feelings about the DH.86. Russell Tapp said, “The ten-seater DH.86s were beautiful aeroplanes and were most reliable. The Gipsy Six engines never stopped.”

Ken Jackson, who after his Carpenter Airlines career joined Qantas progressing to the Boeing 707 said, “Apart from the fact that they were unstable longitudinally they were quite a nice aeroplane.” He went on to add “I think the early days on the DH.86B were by far the most interesting of my career. There were only two pilots and you did everything yourself: you did your own refuelling at a lot of places; you served the passengers their coffee and sandwiches; you made up the load sheets and waybills. At the end of the trip you submitted the form which gave the accountants in Sydney a full history of the whole trip. In addition the flying was much more challenging because of the lack of aids available.”

Hudson Fysh, speaking on his DH.86 Qantas chapter, said “It is my opinion that all four of the DH.86 disasters which occurred in Australia, the causes of which were never solved, were due in part or wholly to unawareness in the crews or lack of proper aircrew training on an aircraft which was directionally more sensitive than other types they had been used to, and indeed was their first four-engined type.” He added, “Looking back on the DH.86 drama and our drawn-out fight for survival of the type, I have repeatedly said this was by far the toughest period the company ever went through — the time of the greatest strain and uncertainty for everyone concerned.”

A common theme was that the aircraft was longitudinally unstable

Apart from these comments, the inevitable advance in aviation crystallised Ivan Holyman’s thoughts about where the future was. Concerned about the DH.86 losses, Holyman approached the Australian government for permission to import the Douglas DC-2. The long-standing policy in Australia had been to favour British aircraft. Holyman contended that the supremacy in transport aircraft lay in US designs such as the DC-2.

On 30 November 1935, the Minister for Defence, Archdale Parkhill, in an announcement from the federal government, said that new aircraft could be imported from the USA and Germany under licences issued on Civil Aviation Branch recommendations. While Ivan Holyman had lobbied for changes to the government’s existing embargo, another important catalyst to change was Edgar Johnston, Director of the Civil Aviation Branch. On his return from a visit to the US, he recommended that Australia should accept a US Certificate of Airworthiness. With Australia’s importation of the Douglas DC-2 and DC-3, a revolutionary change to the type of aircraft in Australian airline service had begun. Hudson Fysh’s earlier expressed admiration, hoping for a widespread new standard of robust metal construction, was vindicated.

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