By the book
Essential lists keep safety in check
It’s Wednesday, February 21 2017. The morning air is cool, around 12 degrees, combined with light winds and clear blue sky, just what Greg De Haven, Glenn Garland, Russell Munsch and John Washburn were hoping for – a perfect start to their day. They are four tourists and good mates from Austin, Texas who are on the trip of a lifetime and about to charter a flight from Melbourne, Essendon to King Island for a round of golf.
They are very fortunate to be able to travel the world together and they are excited by the opportunity to play golf on a course that features high on the ‘must play’ bucket list. The King Island Golf Course, described as visually mesmerising, is known for its beautiful ocean backdrop. Six of the holes are located hard against the coast and across rocky inlets with tees perched above the waves. This is a trip that will be full of the normal humour, laughter, and post-golf anecdotes.
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Their pilot, Captain Max Quartermain, is well respected with more than 30 years’ experience (well over 7,000 hours total aeronautical time, including more than 2,400 hours in the King Air B200). He’s flown 66 hours in the previous 30 days, all of which makes for a good mix of recency and total experience in taking command of the charter flight. Max starts his day just before 7am to prepare the aircraft, VH-ZCR, including the pre-flight inspection, refuel and re-positioning of the aircraft to the southern end of the passenger terminal in time to meet the passengers who arrive just after 8.40am.
Little do the five of them know that what starts as a perfect day is about to turn into tragedy.
From the time the aircraft receives its takeoff clearance and starts to accelerate down the runway, it takes less than two minutes for the B200 to commence a deadly descent crash into the Direct Factory Outlet (DFO) building adjacent to the airfield. The speed of the transition from relaxed and calm to deadly fireball is much too fast for the occupants to fully process.
For witnesses on the ground it was horrifying: “I looked up and saw the plane banking to the left. It hit the roof and then exploded. The flames were that high they were above the roof of the DFO. Cars were on fire, tyres were exploding. The heat was so intense and the smell of jet fuel was so strong,”
The aftermath was equally devastating for widows, families and friends lost for answers; lives lost in the blink of an eye.
‘The heat was so intense and the smell of jet fuel was so strong.’
In the wake of the recently released Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) accident investigation report Loss of control and collision with terrain involving B200 King Air, VH-ZCR, it is apparent that some missed checklist actions contributed to the tragic loss of the aircraft and its five occupants. Some of the key findings from the ATSB report include:
The pilot did not detect that the aircraft’s rudder trim was in the full nose-left position prior to take-off. The position of the rudder trim resulted in a loss of directional control and had a significant impact on the aircraft’s climb performance in the latter part of the flight.
At the time of the accident, the operator did not have an appropriate flight check system in place for VH-ZCR. Although this did not contribute to this accident, it increased the risk of incorrect checklists being used, incorrect application of the aircraft’s checklists, and checks related to supplemental equipment not being performed.
A key safety message delivered by the ATSB report was:
Cockpit checklists are an essential tool for overcoming limitations with pilot memory, and ensuring that action items are completed in sequence and without omission. The improper or non-use of checklists has been cited as a factor in some aircraft accidents. Research has shown that this may occur for varying reasons and that experienced pilots are not immune to checklist errors. This accident highlights the critical importance of appropriately actioning and completing checklists.
Given the ongoing sensitivities surrounding the Essendon DFO accident, this article will not provide further analysis of the report, which is comprehensive, and readily available via the ATSB website. Rather it will focus on what we can learn to enhance our own performance in dealing with checklists.
Appropriate and disciplined use of approved checklists remains critical to mitigating the risk of a lapse in memory that may have safety implications. There are numerous examples across the world in which accident reports refer to the importance of checklists.
Preventable accidents
On September 9 2016 in Warrenton, Virginia, USA, a Pacific Aerospace 750XL aircraft being used for skydiving suffered extensive damage during an aborted landing and runway overrun. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) post-accident report found that:
The pilot reported this was his third skydiving flight of the day and he performed a back taxi on the runway for takeoff. He further reported that as he rotated the airplane for takeoff, he heard a ‘steady’ stall warning horn, the flight controls felt mushy, and the airplane would not climb. The pilot reported that he aborted the takeoff and applied max braking and reverse thrust, but the airplane overran the runway remaining. Subsequently, the landing gear collapsed and the airplane collided with a fence. The left and right wing sustained substantial damage.
After the accident, the pilot reported that he observed the wing flaps in the fully retracted position. He reported that the flaps should have been set to 20 degrees for takeoff. The pilot reported that he forgot to set the flaps during the back taxi for takeoff because he was communicating with other airplanes near the airport. The pilot reported that he did not use a physical checklist, but he did run through a checklist mentally.
The NTSB determined the probable cause(s) of this accident as:
The pilot’s failure to set the wing flaps for takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall, an aborted takeoff, and a runway overrun.
In another example, on May 31 2014, a Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV, N121JM, crashed after it overran the end of runway 11 during a rejected takeoff. The aircraft rolled through the paved overrun and across a grassy area, collided with approach lights and a localiser antenna, passed through the airport’s perimeter fence, and came to a stop in a ravine. The two pilots, a flight attendant, and four passengers died. The airplane was destroyed by both the impact and a post-crash fire.
During the engine start process, the flight crew neglected to disengage the aircraft’s gust lock system, which locks the elevator, ailerons, and rudder while the aircraft is parked to protect them against wind gust loads. Further, before initiating takeoff, the pilots neglected to perform a flight control check that would have alerted them to the locked flight controls. A review of data from the aircraft’s quick access recorder revealed that the pilots had neglected to perform complete flight control checks before 98 per cent of their previous 175 takeoffs in the aircraft, indicating that this oversight was habitual and not an anomaly.
In this case the NTSB report determined the probable cause of this accident was:
The flight crewmembers’ failure to perform the flight control check before takeoff, their attempt to take off with the gust lock system engaged, and their delayed execution of a rejected takeoff after they became aware that the controls were locked. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s habitual noncompliance with checklists.
Good checklist habits and discipline could have prevented these accidents.
Genesis of checklists
Atul Gawande, in his acclaimed book The Checklist Manifesto – How to Get Things Right cites one of the defining moments in the development of modern checklists – a period that some suggest almost resulted in the bankruptcy of Boeing.
On October 30 1935, at Wright Airfield in Dayton, Ohio, the US Army Air Corps held a competition for aircraft manufacturers to build the military’s next long-range bombers. Boeing, through its Model 299, was well ahead of its competitors. The Model 299 could carry five times as many bombs as requested and could fly faster and almost twice as far than previous bombers. The competition was considered a mere formality with an expectation that at least 65 aircraft would be ordered.
With a small crowd of dignitaries watching, the sleek and impressive aircraft with a large wingspan and four engines (as compared to the usual two) roared down the runway, lifted off and climbed quickly to 300 feet. Then it stalled, turned on one wing, crashed and exploded. Two of five crewmembers died, including the pilot.
‘Then it stalled, turned on one wing, crashed and exploded.’
The investigation revealed the crash had been due to pilot error. Substantially more complex than other aircraft, the Model 299 required the pilot to attend to four engines, each with its own oil-fuel mix, the retractable landing gear, wing flaps, electric trim tabs and constant speed propellers, all of which required the attention and careful adjustment by the pilot. While doing all this the highly experienced pilot, also the chief of Air Corps flight testing, had forgotten to release the new control lock. The Boeing Model 299 was deemed “too much airplane for one man to fly”, and a smaller aircraft by another manufacturer was declared the winner.
The final outcome of the investigation did not recommend more training but rather a more innovative approach: the creation of a pilot’s checklist. Since then, modern checklist design has continued to evolve and remains crucial to the achievement of ultra-safe aviation operations.
So what tends to go wrong, and what can you do to establish your own checklist habit-pattern for high performance?
NASA’s ASRS
Established in 1976 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary system that allows pilots and other aircraft crew members to confidentially report near misses and close calls in the interest of improving air safety.
Protection of identity is provided by NASA through de-identification of persons, companies, and any other information. Furthermore, the FAA will not use, nor will NASA provide, any report submitted for inclusion under ASRS guidelines or information derived therein for use in any disciplinary or other adverse action.
The outcome is a large number of reports (more than 1.3 million in 40 years) to provide information to the FAA and the aviation community to assist them in identifying and eliminating unsafe conditions to prevent accidents.
In 2014, the FAA released an ASRS report specific to checklists, which found that errors related to checklist usage generally fall into one of five categories:
Checklist interrupted
Checklist item overlooked
Use of the wrong checklist
Failure to use a checklist
Checklist confusion.
The following are real examples from the FAA ASRS of checklist usage failures.
Checklist interrupted
Distractions and interruptions are the factors most often cited in ASRS reports involving checklist errors. For example, during a typical Before Pushback Checklist, a flight attendant brought in the passenger count documentation at exactly the same moment the first officer read the ‘takeoff trim’ item. The captain responded to the flight attendant interruption and subsequent verbal exchange and then the crew proceeded to the next item, ‘cockpit door’, without actually having reset the takeoff trim to the correct setting. During the takeoff, as the throttles were advanced, they received a takeoff warning horn. The result: takeoff was rejected at low speed and after clearing the runway; the crew discovered the takeoff trim was not set in the proper position.
Checklist item overlooked
An aircraft captain allowed a habit pattern to affect the proper completion of the Shutdown Checklist. In this case, the captain taxied in on three of four engines when the normal shutdown habit pattern involved shutting down engines one and three (with number two shutdown prior to the arrival gate). In this case, engine number two was left running. It was missed on the full shutdown checklist as the captain didn’t actually look at the levers, simply because, in the captain’s mind, they had all been shut down.
Use of the wrong checklist
On departure, at approximately 300 feet, the first officer’s primary flight display (PFD) and nav display (ND) went blank. The captain assumed control of the aircraft and after reaching a safe altitude called for the first officer to find the appropriate abnormal checklist for the situation (loss of right PFD and ND). The first officer said he was ready to proceed, and he read the first item on the checklist.
The checklist called for the crew to check several circuit breakers that supply power to systems that provide information on the pilots’ cockpit displays. A circuit breaker was pulled and this resulted in the loss of the captain’s PFD and ND. At this point it was determined the first officer was reading the checklist for loss of left PFD and ND and the crew immediately attempted to reset with no success. They then completed the checklist procedure for loss of right PFD and ND, but did not regain the first officer’s PFD or ND.
Considering developing weather along the route of the flight, the crew elected to divert and make an overweight landing.
Failure to use a checklist
You have already seen how interruptions can lead to missing items on a checklist. This pilot learned what can happen when an interruption results in missing the whole checklist.
It was the third of three takeoffs and landings for night currency. The other two landings were uneventful. Upon turning base, the pilot noted another aircraft nearing the vicinity. They made another radio call announcing turning base to be certain it was not a faster aircraft on final approach for their destination. This transmission interrupted the pilot’s normal habit pattern and they failed to do their BCGUMP (Boost pump, Carb heat, Gas, Undercarriage, Mixture and Prop) landing checklist. They believed that the gear was down and that they had three green lights until the prop stopped, an unfortunate and preventable gear up landing
‘This transmission interrupted the pilots’ normal habit pattern.’
Checklist confusion
Checklists, especially those dealing with emergency or abnormal procedures, have to present a clear, unambiguous sequence of actions that will provide the safest and most efficient method of handling a given problem.
The crew of a regional jet aircraft, upon further review, determined a checklist was not completed correctly. The crew misread one of the steps in the procedure that called for the ‘thrust reverser’ to be turned off, and instead read it as though the ‘thrust lever’ should be shut off. In the end, this resulted in a landing configuration with the engine shut off instead of at idle, as per the checklist.
Tips for establishing checklist habit-patterns for high-performance
While not a comprehensive list, here are a few of my own experiences for enhancing the use of checklists:
Always use the aircraft manufacturer approved checklist. There really is no excuse for not using the checklist approved by the aircraft manufacturer. In several instances I have declined to fly an aircraft until this has been resolved – at times through purchasing my own copy of the correct checklist. Using anything else, without very good reason, simply exposes you to unacceptable risk (for example, litigation) if anything goes wrong that may be linked to incorrect procedures. It can also lead to complacency. If, for instance, you allow your checklist actions to be ‘loose’ on one aircraft type then you’re more likely, with increased experience, to consider this as acceptable practice on another. As you progress to more complex aircraft the use of correct checklists remains critical for safe operations.
Study the checklist. Take time to carefully review the aircraft flight manual and checklist items, and regularly review and quiz yourself on the contents. You will also need to identify those checklist actions/scenarios where you don’t have the luxury of time: for example, if an engine fails in a single engine aircraft. There will be some checklist items that you must be able to recall from memory while simultaneously exposed to a large amount of stress. You must learn these checklists over and over – visualise the emergency has occurred, run the sequence in detail through your mind (sometimes referred to as flying a desk) to ensure the process becomes so overlearned the checklist can be completed subconsciously.
As part of this process you must consider at what time you might access the checklist to back up your immediate actions. It’s all part of creating habit patterns (immediate actions/bold face recall) followed by, time permitting, backup use of the checklist to ensure all actions are complete. This is also why training systems assess you in controlled environments such as simulators, and under elevated levels of stress (for example, simulated engine) to continually and regularly evaluate your competence with critical emergencies and appropriate use of checklists.
Go back. If you realise you’ve missed a step, go back a few steps prior to the missed item or repeat the entire checklist.
Remove distractions. If performing checks on the ground, whenever possible, stop the aircraft, remove unnecessary distractions (such as ongoing communication with Air Traffic Control) and complete the checklist(s).
Recognise complacency and/or overconfidence. The most proficient operators remain methodical. They still position their aircraft stationary in run up bays rather than trying to do important checklist on the move. This is even more important when workload and distractions remain high – lots of aircraft taxiing for example). As you get more confidence and experience, you may be capable of speeding up your actions, but in most cases, you’re only saving a few minutes for a potentially significant increase in risk. And it doesn’t look good if you’ve missed a simple but critical action item such as removing a control lock or take-off trim settings.
While I’ve provided some general tips regarding checklists, it is also important to consider the various human factors (such as stress, fatigue, distractions, complacency, normalisation of deviance) that can impact your performance. On a day when you’re having trouble with attentional focus – you may find yourself easily distracted or missing simple things – then the most professional aviators know this is the time to slow everything down and to be extra vigilant in using checklists to guard against memory lapses.
Australian Aviation is keen to hear about checklist practices that allow you to maintain the highest levels of performance and professionalism. Please contact us via [email protected].
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