The Battleplane

Yet Douhet’s rationale was reasonable.

Douhet was an unapologetic advocate of strategic air power. Appalled by the mindless slaughter in the trenches during World War I, he wanted to harness the new weapon of air power and win quick, decisive victories by circumventing ground forces and directly attacking an enemy’s political, industrial and economic centres of gravity.

It followed that, to achieve this, bombers had to reach their target, which in turn implied having to defend themselves against defending enemy fighter aircraft. It further followed that if a single aircraft type could both defend and attack, it would be more efficient and provide more value for money than having to operate two types.

The challenge, then, was to design and build an aircraft that was both the best air combat type and the best bomber type. There was nothing wrong with the concept. But in the almost 90 years since then the design and engineering challenges have proven to be almost insurmountable.

In order to be the best fighter, aircraft have needed to be fast, highly manoeuvrable, strong (to pull more ‘g’), and possess a superior power-to-weight ratio. In order to be the best bomber, they have needed a long range and able to carry an effective bomb load. Reconciling those requirements has not been easy, and the results almost invariably have been compromise.

Early attempts resulted in the so-called general purpose aircraft, such as the Airspeed Oxford, the Lockheed Hudson, and the Bristol Beaufort, types that were jack of all trades and master of none. They were useful work-horses, but that was all.

A number of first rate multirole aircraft did emerge during the Second World War, typified by twin-engine aircraft such as the Bristol Beaufighter and the de Havilland Mosquito. These were aircraft that could be used on the frontline in both main roles, but they were never quite good enough to be the best in air-to-air combat, nor big enough to carry a strategic bomb load.

A major breakthrough came in the late 1950s in the form of the F-4 Phantom, arguably the outstanding combat aircraft of its generation. The leading operators of the Phantom were the US Air Force and Navy during the American war in Vietnam, and the Israeli Air Force in a number of conflicts with its Arab enemies in the Middle East. In both instances the F-4 more than held its own in air-to-air combat against a variety of mainly Soviet built fighters; and its sheer brute strength and impressive weapons load more than satisfied any definition of “strategic” strike (noting that the emergence of aerial refuelling was an important factor in the Phantom’s success as a long-range bomber).

It is not a stretch to describe the Phantom as the first genuine battleplane.

Technology and engineering have caught up with ambition.

However, the concept came unstuck again with the F-111. But it would be unfair to blame either the designers or, indeed, Douhet.

The F-111 was to all intents and purposes forced onto the USAF and the USN in the interests of “cost-effectiveness” by Robert McNamara, a former CEO of the Ford Motor Company who understood business practices and so-called workplace efficiencies, but who had little comprehension of the military, air combat, and strategy. Although designated as an “F” – as a “fighter” – the 111’s compromise aerodynamics, average manoeuvrability and modest power-to-weight ratio precluded it from ever being credible in that role.

Disliked by both services, the F-111 was eventually cancelled by the Navy and relegated to electronic warfare missions by the USAF.
Ironically, however, the F-111 became the most important strategic weapon Australia has ever possessed. Although its crews never fired a shot in anger, the aircraft’s long-range, high-speed, heavy bomb load, and low-level penetration capability made it the pre-eminent deterrence force in Southeast Asia for thirty years.

More recently, aircraft such as the F-15, the F-16 and the F/A-18 have come very close to satisfying the idealised notion of a battleplane, excelling in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F-35 is likely to come closer still, adding electronic warfare and unparalleled information dominance capabilities to its capabilities. Simply put, technology and engineering have caught up with ambition.

It’s taken a while, but perhaps Douhet wasn’t far off the mark after all.