Zeroes and ones

Game-changing technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (including weaponised variants), lasers, hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, robotics, and directed-energy weapons all need to be explored by the RAAF. And as argued in September’s On Target, the dependency on cyber and space for all capabilities must be fully addressed.

The critical dependency in all of this is software.

In highlighting the challenge of software dependency as the RAAF moves quickly to a fifth-generation fleet and positions itself to adopt some of these technologies, this column draws on some of the current challenges facing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

One of the F-35’s recent challenges was a software glitch that impeded the operation of the APG-81 AESA radar. The problem came to the fore in March and was described as ‘radar stability’ – that is, the ability of the radar to stay up and running. It occurred in the 3i software increment used in the F-35A jets which were subsequently declared operational by the USAF in August.

While that particular glitch has been resolved, the fix required some code writers to be diverted from their work on increment 3F, which in turn delayed its release. Still, the solution to the 3i problem was transferable to the 3F coding, so both increments benefited from the effort expended.

Block 3F will be available in 2018 and will, among other things, allow the F-35A to manoeuvre up to 9g rather than 7g currently achieved with 3i.

Follow-on Block 4 software is scheduled for release in 2021 and will significantly enhance the F-35’s weapons capability.

Another issue was the need for system reboots before the aircraft could takeoff. As reported to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, the USAF attempted two alert launch procedures, where multiple F-35As were pre-flighted and prepared for a rapid dispatch, but only one of the six aircraft was able to complete the sequence and successfully takeoff. That problem too has been resolved.

A third issue is that there are still significant challenges with the Autonomous Logistics Information System (ALIS). There has been a reluctance to allow testing of the actual operational system, including its many connections, as security deficiencies are still being rectified.

Software dependency is not confined to the F-35.

ALIS is described as the backbone of what will be a worldwide F-35 fleet. It is an information technology hub that is used to plan missions, track aircraft status, order spare parts, and manage sustainment. By contrast, legacy (4th generation) fighters use several stand-alone systems to perform these daily functions. All ALIS servers connect through encrypted land or satellite military networks, rather than through the commercial internet.

The US Marines conducted their first expeditionary test of the F-35 in December last year and reported decreases in the need to troubleshoot software problems, noting that ALIS already enhanced maintenance performance and promised much more. According to the Marines, despite initial challenges, the system was constantly improving and upgrades to software had been easy to obtain and apply.

Notwithstanding these positive observations, as additional software capabilities are added, new problems are being discovered that need fixes and verification testing. For example, fixes are now needed to process warnings of enemy ground and airborne radar signals that detect the F-35, as well as tracking moving targets on the ground and sharing imagery between aircraft.

Software dependency is not confined to the F-35. Aircraft computer software is a relatively new technical discipline, whose short history has been characterised by dynamic change and exponential growth. Today, software pervades almost all aircraft and is crucial for operations across the board in the newer, more technologically sophisticated commercial aircraft.

What can we take from these observations? The F-35 will provide its pilots with unparalleled situational awareness, noting that, historically, the vast majority of kills in air-to-air combat are achieved not by manoeuvre, but by the pilot who sees (including with radar and other sensors, perhaps off-board) his protagonist first. Networking will allow F-35 pilots to see information provided by other aircraft, ships or ground units. The F-35’s advanced autopilot frees the pilot and enhances his capacity to process and act on this unique degree of awareness.

All of these important capabilities require advanced software, which in turn brings with it risk that has to be managed. That risk is not limited to software malfunctions but includes the potential for breaches or cyber-attacks.

The key to dealing with software dependency and the potential for cyber-attacks is to know where the technology is heading, where the vulnerabilities and threats are going, and to not simply react, but to get out in front proactively.

Software dependency is not confined to the F-35.