No gain without pain?

The Romeo acquisition is a remarkable tale. It was only selected as the Navy’s new naval combat helicopter in June 2011, and yet here we are barely five years later and all 24 on order have now been delivered, initial operating capability was declared last year, a new training squadron has been stood up (725SQN) and the operational squadron (816SQN) already has three flights at sea.

On the face of it the Tiger ARH offers a complete contrast. While the Romeo is winning awards, the Tiger is the subject of Australian National Audit Office reports, the most recent of which, released in late August, offered what Defence’s Head Helicopter Systems Division, MAJGEN Andrew Mathewson, described as a “brutal” assessment of the Tiger program to date.

Tiger only achieved full operational capability (FOC) earlier this year, seven years later than originally planned, there are ongoing capability issues, sustainment costs are much higher than originally forecast, and serviceability rates are lower than planned, which has impacted crew training and availability.

No wonder then that the Defence White Paper released in February revealed the Tiger would be replaced earlier than planned (from mid next decade). And no wonder then that the ANAO report questioned whether Defence should bother upgrading the Tiger when its replacement is less than a decade away – “don’t throw good money after bad” was the subtext.

It’s pretty easy then to draw one conclusion in particular. Buying from the US via FMS represents the best value and least risk path to inducing a new capability into service. We get to buy mature systems straight off the US production line, and tap into robust upgrade plans that ensure longer-term capability growth.

The roll call of successful FMS acquisitions is growing: C-17, Super Hornet, Romeo and CH-47F.

Contrast that to MOTS projects like the Tiger and its MRH 90 stablemate, let alone developmental programs like the disastrous, and cancelled, Super Seasprite (which the Romeo partially replaces), and it’s little wonder that FMS is flavour de jour.

And yet, as this column argued two issues ago, the Wedgetail and KC-30 are examples of programs with developmental risk that, despite delays, have had big pay-offs in capability rewards.

And FMS brings with it compromises. The Navy loves the Romeo, and for good reason, but there are capability trade-offs that FMS necessitates. Romeo’s Hellfire missile, for example, lacks the range and punch of the Sea Skua that was acquired for the cancelled Seasprite.

But there’s clearly a time and place when FMS is the best fit, as there is a time and a place for acquiring a development program, and accepting some level or risk.

It’s a trade-off that essentially boils down to: when does the warfighter need the capabiilty? The 80 per cent solution delivered in three years’ time, or the 95 per cent solution delivered in five? So where does Tiger fit in all that? Firstly, there are a few mitigating circumstances here. The Tiger’s two competitors for the AIR 87 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program were the AH-1Z Viper, which too has had its share of developmental issues, and the AH-64D Apache, which at the time was deemed too expensive.

And clearly Defence initially underestimated the cost and complexity of supporting an advanced helicopter like the Tiger – again that likely would have been the case with the Apache and Viper as well. All three are far more advanced machines than anything Army Aviation had operated to date.

But do we cut our loses and not throw good money after bad? Or would we be walking away from a capability that Australia has invested significantly in, just as it is maturing with increasing serviceability and availability? And a capability with growth potential and one which Australia has the unique sovereign capability to support and upgrade, which wouldn’t be the case with an FMS program? Commenting on the ANAO report, MAJGEN Mathewson told the recent Army Aviation Symposium: “the reality is from the original requirements of Tiger it is achieving those objectives and we’ve identified a number of opportunities to make it better”.

Tiger’s best days may yet be ahead of it.

FMS brings with it compromises.