Out of the Blue

After a similarly unspecific communication enquired in February whether I could arrange my affairs in order to be in Muscat, Oman within two days, it was explained that my next sleeping location would be another nuclear-powered carrier, this time the French navy – Marine Nationale – flagship, the Charles de Gaulle (R91).

It was late in the afternoon when along with three other companion travellers I was shepherded through the back rooms of border control at the Muscat International Airport to the tarmac, where we undertook a ‘hot’ (ie: helicopter rotor blades still spinning) boarding of a French navy Dauphin helicopter.

After the mandatory safety briefing in French, I was pointed to a red tab on the window next to me and via a mix of hand gestures it became clear that in the event of a water ditching I must pull the red tab to release the window from the airframe in order to provide a means for escape. Of course, the idea was not to exit the cabin until the rotors had stopped turning and the cockpit area was fully consumed by water! An hour or so out from Muscat over a calm but oil-slick dotted sea, a dark shape on the horizon progressively became much larger to ultimately represent itself as the Charles de Gaulle. The carrier and its roughly 2,000-person crew (including a 600-strong aviation component) had just stood down from heading up the Coalition maritime task force CTF‑50 in the Persian Gulf, which since September 2015 has been prosecuting Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the military response to the rise of the Islamic State.

Having stowed my gear in a quad-bunk room shared with a French TV journalist on the fourth deck above the waterline in the 3rd (‘C’) compartment from the Charles de Gaulle’s bow, it was not long before we were propelled into regular shipboard life. Now dressed in heavy fireproof Marine Nationale overalls, the first thing you notice is that despite the many air extractors and conditioners, life inside the ship is hot. Keeping well hydrated therefore becomes an important part of daily life.

Our schedule of briefings requires us to walk at pace through the Charles de Gaulle’s 20 (A-T) bow to stern compartments, with the heat intensifying as you descend multiple gangways (15 steps at a time) into the bowels of the carrier. It gets even hotter as you visit those areas of the ship supporting its motivation and stabilisation systems, as well as the steam generation and drive infrastructure that supports the catapult assisted takeoff barrier arrested recovery (CATOBAR) system which enables aircraft launch and recovery. The area around the Charles de Gaulle’s two nuclear reactors is nevertheless surprisingly cool.

Sailing in a relatively calm sea that for 360° around the aircraft carrier runs straight to the horizon makes it difficult to work out just where you are when there are no mobile phone signals to generate a Google map. A navigation system readout on the Charles de Gaulle’s bridge nevertheless logs us at 20° 03’ 564 N – 059° 59’ 351E as we transit well clear of national 12 nautical mile territorial limits down the coasts of Oman and Yemen, and into the Gulf of Aden.

During this time the fleet led by the Charles de Gaulle (Task Force 473) included the aircraft carrier itself, the air defence frigate Chevalier Paul (D621), the FREMM multi-mission frigate Aquitaine (D650), and the fleet command and refuelling vessel Marne (A630) – a Durance-class ship which the design of Australia’s HMAS Success was based upon. Then somewhere under the waves is a Rubis-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) – which, like the Charles de Gaulle, was built by predecessor companies to DCNS, the French national shipbuilder recently selected to build Australia’s new Future Submarines.

The Rafales appear to have shouldered more complex missions.

Embarked upon the Charles de Gaulle was a larger than normal aircraft complement comprising two Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, 18 Dassault Rafale M F3 multirole fighters, eight modernised (or SEM) Dassault-Breguet Super Etendard strike fighters, and three helicopters (two Dauphins and one Alouette III). These latter aircraft are tasked to support rescue-at-sea and small volume ship-to-ship or shore transport operations.

The Rafales can carry Magic 2 or MICA air-to-air missiles, the SCALP EG cruise missile, a broad range of Paveway-type laser-guided and Frenchmade precision-guided AASM bombs, plus the AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. The soon-to-be retired Super Etendard can carry the Exocet, the AS-30 laser-guided missile and laser-guided and ‘dumb’ bombs.

Traditions die hard, with markings on aircraft having returned from combat operations clearly disclosing a predominance of bombing missions for the Super Etendards, while the Rafales appear to have shouldered more complex missions, including the occasional SCALP deployment.

Shamal winds

French land-based and naval air power have been providing a significant component of Coalition air strike capabilities over Syria and Iraq under the national banner of Operation Chammal (or ‘Shamal’). In the early months of its deployment, the Charles de Gaulle teamed up with the Nimitz class carrier USS Harry S Truman to support high levels of air combat sorties against Islamic State positions.

Following the Truman’s return to Bahrain, the global shortage of US aircraft carriers saw France invited by US authorities to assume leadership of Coalition maritime task force operations in the Persian and Arabian Gulf regions.

France’s acceptance of this invitation was historic, in that the Charles de Gaulle became the first non-American ship to take command of CTF-50. The confidence of the United States in readily assigning this task reflected years of quiet cooperation between the US and French navies extending back 20 years to when the Charles de Gaulle was first designed. It was at this time that the two governments agreed the new French carrier should adopt contemporary American shipboard aircraft launch management, recovery and operational procedures.

The wisdom of this decision has subsequently been affirmed many times by enabling the interoperability of French and US maritime air combat operations evidenced by the effective prosecution of the bombing campaign against Islamic State.

Although French military deployments are typically planned well in advance, the Charles de Gaulle was quickly mobilised following the November 13 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and French President, Francois Hollande’s subsequent declaration that France was at war with IS. Accordingly, the aircraft carrier left its home-port of Toulon in southern France just five days after the bombings across several locations in the French capital.

Within 10 days of departure from Toulon, the Charles de Gaulle had commenced airstrikes from the eastern Mediterranean against Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq as part of Coalition operations coordinated through the US-managed Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Bahrain. After completing these operations, the Charles de Gaulle and its French national battle group next transited the Suez Canal, and within two weeks had taken up a position in the Persian Gulf to resume coordinated airstrikes.

Joining US-led international Coalition combat operations is not a simple matter, and takes years of investment in equipment and training in order to achieve a level of interoperability necessary to achieve effective operations.

Robust information sharing and communication channels need to be established that fully comprehend what each coalition partner brings to the battle in terms of warfighting assets and mission prosecution capabilities, as well as what diplomatic constraints are likely to end up being applied to the disposition of each nation’s forces.

For maritime-based air combat operations, such functions are coordinated through the CAOC which, via a multitude of intelligence feeds generates a daily palette of recommended (or draft) missions for Coalition force elements to consider. These recommended draft mission sets are then reviewed by individual Coalition national commanders with reference to their own national government instructions concerning combined military operations as framed through associated rules of engagement.

In the case of France, three types of combat missions had been prosecuted by the Charles de Gaulle in the weeks preceding my visit. These first involved the pre-planned targeting of known targets. The second sought to provide a dynamic response to intelligence information gathered on the ground or by surveillance aircraft. The third, over Iraq only, involved the close air support to ground forces where selected targets could be reliably engaged at the direction of ground-based forward air controllers.

As Coalition partner comments come back on draft mission sets, the CAOC next works to consolidate them into a battle plan to generate a series of agreed airstrike missions that are consistent with guidance provided to French liaison officers (otherwise known as ‘red card’ holders). From the French perspective, the priority is to ensure that each individual target set has been properly vetted against the combat mission profile previously agreed by the French government.

Combat missions subsequently executed by the Charles de Gaulle’s strike aircraft generally lasted an average of six hours – thus necessitating fourfive air-to-air fuellings over the operational theatre – with aircraft either on-station or preparing to launch kept appraised of changes to agreed mission execution requirements via NATO standard radio frequency communications and/or tactical datalink feeds.

The bombing of Darwin

The second day of our transit sees the familiar profile of an Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG frigate take up a position off the stern of the Charles de Gaulle, in the form of the Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin.

The Darwin at the time was undertaking its seventh deployment to the Middle East region under the Australian-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is responsible for counter-terrorism operations within the region. While not formally joining Task Force 473, the Darwin nevertheless spent a few days conducting what is referred to as PASSEX activities that opportunistically draw off the proximity of a major carrier fleet.

HMAS Darwin Captain, Commander Phill Henry, tells Australian Aviation that several days will be “well spent working with the carrier’s combat aircraft fleet to test higher-level warfighting skills not frequently encountered by the frigate when executing its regular global security andcounter-terrorism charter. ” Since 1990, Australian vessels have rotated to the Middle East region 62 times to undertake patrols of international waterways and to execute boardings of suspect vessels to check people movements and counter weapons and drug smuggling. CMDR Henry adds the ready availability of an air combat fleet allows him to test his area defence capabilities, “including the potential employment of long-range anti-air SM-2 and medium-range ESSM missiles”.

Back aboard the carrier, French pilots are similarly eager to use the Darwin’s presence to practise their own surface vessel attack tactics and procedures. Standing on the carrier deck, I witness 17 aircraft catapult-launched in rapid succession – all with, I suspect, cruel intentions for the poor souls of the Darwin. Two of these aircraft are equipped with additional fuel tanks to undertake air-to-air refuelling so that the onslaught against the Australian FFG can be fully extended.

Thankfully I am well equipped by my Marine Nationale hosts with a sturdy fitting helmet, ultra-effective hearing protection and heavy overalls as the noise generated by so many jets taking off with full afterburner would otherwise be deafening. A farewell gift from the jet blast of each departing aircraft after catapult launch is a liberal peppering by small items of grit coming off the flightdeck.

In the subsequent hours there is little news on the success of each side’s respective endeavours. All the Charles de Gaulle’s aircraft return in night landing operations that are critical to pilots retaining a full spectrum of carrier operation qualifications. Yet in the quiet reflection of the officers’ mess later that evening, there is notable comment from French pilots that the

Darwin turned out in the end to be “a very capable ship”.

The Australian frigate’s presence also provides a timely opportunity for the Charles de Gaulle to exercise the RAN’s S-70B-2 Seahawk helicopter for pilot rescue, should any pilots end up having to ditch at sea. In regular combat aircraft operations, a single diver-equipped French helicopter is always airborne to execute this task. However, in the context of the larger than normal aircraft complement sustaining higher tempo operations, a multiple aircraft incident either onboard or in the vicinity of the carrier would test this capability.

Shadowing a 42,000 tonne French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier often travelling at its top speed is much easier said than done. To sustain its continual availability to undertake takeoff and landing operations, the French carrier must constantly manoeuvre to secure a 28kt wind across the deck. This often means fast-paced sailing when the tranquil seas of the Gulf don’t blow much more than a couple of knots.

So maintaining a set distance from the stern of the carrier becomes a real test of navigational skill. The task is all the more critical at night. If the Darwin gets too close, fighter pilots undertaking final landing approach risk accidentally mistaking the Australian frigate’s external navigation lights for the carrier’s own interactive illuminated navigation aids. Any error could therefore have catastrophic consequences.

Launch and recover

Although big, the Charles de Gaulle is roughly half the size of contemporary US Navy carriers. Its main deck space is only 262 metres long and 64 metres wide, and contains a single 195 metre-long runway marked out in red at an 8. 5° angle to the ship’s axis. Two aircraft steam catapult launch areas are located adjacent to the island superstructure that accommodates the bridge, radars and other sensors/communications equipment.

The CATOBAR system for the E-2Cs and Rafales employs a mechanical shuttle that connects to the aircraft’s nosewheel to drive each aircraft off the carrier deck at launching intervals of up to one aircraft per minute. This procedure is a little different for the Super Etendards, as their introduction into service preceded the genesis of the Charles de Gaulle itself. These aircraft instead employ a cable strung from hard points on each wing across the aircraft’s underbelly, which is then hooked into an adaptor clipped over the steam catapult shuttle to literally drag the aircraft off the carrier deck as the means to attaining flight.

For the recovery of landing aircraft, the Charles de Gaulle is equipped with a triple arrestor cable system. Thirty per cent of landing aircraft successfully engage the first cable, 50 per cent the second and 20 per cent the third. It is standard procedure for landing aircraft to engage full power just upon impacting the deck, as pilots unable to engage their tail hook on the arrestor cable don’t have much more than a couple of hundred metres of deck to re-attain flight before overshooting the bow and inevitably ending up in the water.

While the resident Rafale combat aircraft fleet provides the Charles de Gaulle a dynamic air defence capability, the job of protecting the carrier and its Task Group is considerably more involved. A range of sensor feeds are thus employed to generate a situational awareness picture around the aircraft carrier, as well as defend it. This picture is also enhanced by data feeds from the E-2C AEW aircraft, other vessels in the Task Group, along with additional data fed in from third-party assets.

For its own aircraft deployment purposes, the Charles de Gaulle is equipped with a DRBJ 11B tri-dimensional air search radar, a DRBV 26D air search radar, a DRBV 15C low-altitude air search radar, and an Arabel target acquisition radar. For electronic warfare and soft-kill purposes, the carrier is equipped with an ARBR 21 detector and ARBB 33 countermeasures suite, the ARBG2 Maigret interceptor, four installations of Sagaie anti-missile decoys and the SLAT torpedo counter-measures system.

For hard kill purposes, the Charles de Gaulle is protected by two batteries of eight-cell A-43 Sylver silo-launched Aster 15 surface-to-air missiles, as well as two SADRAL multi-target very low-level air defence system batteries which each employ six Mistral surface-to-air missiles. Various Darwin turned out in the end to be “a very capable ship”. 20mm cannons and 12. 7mm machine guns also provide close-in defence against air and small boat surface threats.

The despatch of combat aircraft is always preceded by the launching of an AEW aircraft, which is capable of scanning a radius roughly 250 nautical miles from the carrier task force. As such, the Hawkeyes provide a critical feed into both the tactical air operations picture as well as the subsequent assembly of fleet situational awareness. Through French national and/or NATO Link 16 and other standardised datalinks this awareness is shared and enhanced by other French ships or coalition assets supporting the Task Force.

Over the next few days I witness numerous steam catapult-assisted takeoffs and arrestor cable landings, both from the surface of the Charles de Gaulle’s deck and the launch/recovery control centres embedded within the deck space itself. The majority of landings roughly fall within the 30/50/20 statistics outlined above, yet on several occasions an aircraft misses all three cables. Whether this is by default or on-purpose for training, the inability to secure an arrestor cable is immediately accompanied by a wall of sound and air blasting across the carrier deck as the aircraft performs a ‘bolter’ and performs a go-around.

Aircraft carrier operations cannot be reasonably predicted. There are many variables affecting its success that span both the aircraft carrier itself, its embarked aircraft and the technical crews that support them. Recently eight crew members aboard the USS Dwight D Eisenhower were quite seriously injured following an arrestor cable malfunction. In the annals of the Charles de Gaulle’s own operations are instances of aircraft lost overboard due to catapult launch and missed arrestor cable events. Significant technology is also built into the ship to ensure stability of the platform to sustain combat aircraft operations within safer operational limits.

To help provide a stable platform for takeoffs and landings, the Charles de Gaulle is fitted with the SATRAP computerised, integrated stabilisation system, which is designed to maintain stabilisation to within 0. 5° of horizontal, thus allowing aircraft to be operated up to sea state 5/6. In addition to dual pairs of active stabilising fins and twin rudders, the Charles de Gaulle also has two computer-controlled compensation units mounted on two rail tracks that accommodate trains carrying 22 tonnes of deadweight. These tracks run transversely below the flightdeck, and are employed as a means to provide compensation for changes in wind and heel, and to control platform roll, yaw and surge.

The Charles de Gaulle has two Areva K15 pressurised water reactors capable of generating up to 150 megaWatts to drive two Alstom steam turbines capable of producing a total of 61MW shaft power. This is sufficient to push the carrier along at its top design speed of 27 knots – a significant statistic noting that to sustain aircraft launch the Charles de Gaulle regularly employs such speed to sustain a steady 28 knot breeze over the decks.

Much has been written about the practical level of interoperability of French forces with those of the United States and other NATO allies given France’s history of military independence, and strong support for an indigenous national innovation and industry focus that ensures the majority of the carrier’s systems and support equipment are sourced from French suppliers or, in other cases, allied European Community nations.

For those countries who are NATO members, interoperability at the cutting edge of combat execution has been addressed over many years through the development of standard military protocols and accompanying equipment performance standards (STANAGs), all supplemented by complementary/integrated logistics systems. To achieve the all-critical interoperability with US forces, NATO vessels these days come to the fight with standard external communications suites spanning the Link 11, Link 16 and Link 22 protocols, supplemented by joint satellite tactical data links.

The Charles de Gaulle’s credentials in this regard were first tested in 2001 upon a successful trial of the Link 16 high-bandwidth secure data network, supplemented by collected data transmitted in real time to the anti-aircraft frigate Jean Bart through the older MIL-STD-6011 system. A major refit of the Charles de Gaulle in 2007 saw it equipped with the newly-developed SYTEX command and control system, an upgrade of Link 16 to MIL-STD-6016 and installation of the Syracuse III satellite communications system. The ship’s weapons are in turn managed by a Senit combat management system which has the capacity to track up to 2,000 targets. All ship and theatre data flows across Task Force 473 are brought together in a Command Information Centre (CIC) aboard the aircraft carrier with the Chevalier Paul responsible for providing the area air defence bubble over the entire fleet.

Carrier commonality

In the global game of maritime power projection, an aircraft carrier-led task force represents the ultimate expression of national power to shape international events. Only three major Western countries in recent times have been able to summon the required resources to support such task forces – the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Severe defence budget cuts in 2010 saw the UK retiring its aircraft carriers, which from the end of the decade will be replaced by a new short takeoff and landing (STOVL) capability based around two F-35B Joint Strike Fighter-equipped Queen Elizabeth II class aircraft carriers currently under construction.

The CATOBAR system nevertheless provides the baseline for today’s high level of interoperability between US and French aircraft carriers beginning over 25 years ago when the Charles de Gaulle was first laid down (April 1989). At the time, the carrier’s design provided for the installation of two 75-metre long C13-13 steam catapults – a shorter version of the Lakehurst (New Jersey)-developed catapult system installed aboard US Navy Nimitz class aircraft carriers. The Charles de Gaulle’s first steam catapult runs from amidships out to its bow, while the second is located further back towards the stern and crosses the carrier’s angled landing deck to achieve aircraft departure.

Consistent with this technology transfer, the aircraft carrier’s crew also adopts the same methods of operations for landing and recovering aircraft as does the US Navy, and extending right down to the nomination and colouring of the uniforms of deck personnel that are responsible for all aspects of aircraft operations. As a result, the Charles de Gaulle is the only non-US carrier in the world that is able to operate American naval aircraft such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet multi-role fighter and the C-2 Greyhound transport. In return, US Navy carriers have on several occasions hosted landings of Rafale fighter aircraft and exchanged flightline operatives.

The Charles de Gaulle itself is scheduled for a major 18-month refit in 2016, and having cancelled its second aircraft carrier (PA2) project in 2013, discussion is underway in France as to how the unique skills associated with operating an aircraft carrier-led battlegroup can be sustained until the Charles de Gaulle comes back online in 2018. With the Super Etendard to be retired at the end of 2016, one option involves deploying Rafales from multiple land bases in and around the Middle East. Another continuity option involves aircraft detachments operating from US carriers when assigned to coalition operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Oceans as the majority of those platforms will retain CATOBAR systems well into the future, whereas the new UK carriers are principally being fitted for STOVL-only operations.

Nerve centre

Four days at sea pass very quickly when aircraft carrier operations begin early in the morning and run late into the evening, however, there is still time to visit the Charles de Gaulle’s CIC prior to my departure. The French model for aircraft carrier operations follows very closely those developed by the US and (originally) the UK navies, with the contemporary architecture for CIC operation centres evolving rapidly in parallel with the digital information technology revolution.

Unsurprisingly, the Charles de Gaulle’s CIC turns out to be the best airconditioned rooms on the ship, and around the periphery of a large semi-darkened square room are located a number of groupings of terminals, displays and operators tasked with individual responsibility for monitoring/ executing key aircraft carrier functions such as helicopter operations control, the underwater picture, air traffic control, electronic warfare, air and self defence of the aircraft carrier itself, and the air picture supporting all Charles de Gaulle aircraft operations.

In the centre of the room there is a large collation of terminals, flat panel displays and operators whereby all this subsidiary information is fused to generate the full situational awareness picture for Task Force 473. This information is ordered across the display screens to provide a timely information flow to the Captain who, while having a special seat in the CIC, is normally resident during operations on the bridge. Such an arrangement underlies the importance at times of elevated tensions of the bridge and the CIC working extremely closely together in order for Task Force 473 to be combat effective.

As I leave the Charles de Gaulle by Dauphin helicopter headed for the French land base in Djbouti, the frigate Aquitaine and the Charles de Gaulle are aligning themselves with the fleet auxiliary Marne to undertake an underway replenishment. While a Marine Nationale Task Force deployment is frequently measured in months, serving roughly six thousand meals a day and tasking close to forty aircraft in dawn to dusk operations works its way quite quickly through the large stock of consumables, fuel and replacement parts and equipment initially held on the ship.

Although able to sustain operations without resupply for an extended period of time, the Charles de Gaulle has a habit of taking on new supplies roughly every ten days. For until it reaches its home port back in Toulon, day to day operations continue on the understanding that the Task Group can be re-directed by Paris to undertake additional combat operations at any time.