Joint air power and UAVs

On the other hand, MAJGEN (Retd) Jim Molan has contended that helicopters are an integral part of land force operations and that the ADF should consider the US Marine Corps model of centralised air support.

Rather than revisiting a long-standing inter-service doctrinal disagreement, it may be more productive to reflect on how the ADF could achieve the best air power capability from a shrinking budget.

MAJGEN Molan’s interest in the USMC model for the ADF has some merit, noting that the Marines operate a wide range of airborne capabilities, from transport to fighter/attack.

At the same time, other characteristics are fundamentally different. For example, USMC air units are fully dedicated to supporting the Corps’ infantry, an approach that might gladden the heart of soldiers but would be too limited for the ADF.

It’s noteworthy that the Marines’ air component receives operational and logistic support from the US Navy (which has over 3,500 aircraft), and benefits from the strategic umbrella provided by the US Air Force.

Furthermore, the USMC is more than four times the size of the ADF, with 200,000 active personnel and 40,000 reserves.

And the Corps is slated to receive 420 F-35B & C strike/ fighters, more than four times the number the ADF eventually may acquire.

Ever since the US became Australia’s major ally the ADF has tended to follow American defence managerial practices – not always to advantage. Thus, when the US Department of Defense commercialised support units, the ADF followed suit.

During Australia’s Defence Reform Program of 1998-99 major elements of ADF logistics support were outsourced.

However, the crucial difference was that because of its sheer size the US was able to accommodate some commercialisation while still retaining vital logistic competence in-house.

In contrast, the RAAF’s competence in some areas critical to airworthiness was lost and has since had to be regenerated.

The point here is that trying to apply lessons from a force of well over a million personnel to one of 60,000 can have serious unintended consequences, for size confers benefits and disadvantages.

While Dr Stephens and MAJGEN Molan have approached the problem from different directions, it is significant that both favour a single air service. It’s also noteworthy that two of the world’s best air power nations, Israel and Singapore, have adopted precisely that model.

Both came to the air power business relatively late and have not suffered from inter-service rivalry. After much trial and error, Canada too has settled on having a single air service.

A different approach but with the same objective has been taken in the UK, where joint aviation units have been formed to maximise the potential of some rotary- and fixed-wing assets.

What then, are the benefits of a single or joint air service for a small military force? Or to approach the question from a different direction, what are the costs for a force the size of the ADF of having three separate air services? Air operations are unforgiving of inexperienced airmanship and of flawed maintenance and logistics practices. In the 1980s, concern over the ADF’s flying safety record prompted a review of those core skills.

The key finding was that the problem was not one of individual competence but rather of organisational inadequacies.

Specifically, the ADF was not doing enough to develop competent supervisors across all of the specialist areas that contribute to flight safety.

Consequently, training and supervision were strengthened and an Airworthiness Board was formed. The flying safety record improved dramatically.

However, while the Airworthiness Board continues to act jointly, the three ADF air components remain as separate entities – which is where the ‘size’ factor resurfaces.

Separate entities in a small force make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the organisational structures and personnel numbers necessary to develop the experience and supervisory competencies on which air power professionalism is based.

Given the difficult budgetary environment and the constraints on manpower, the question is: Can the ADF continue to support three largely independent air components? There is no question that the formation of a single joint air component would mean significant savings in personnel numbers and training costs and permit greater flexibility in the employment of both people and air power systems – which is where UAVs enter the equation.

Plainly, UAVs are going to be huge in the future but currently the impression is that the ADF is wandering into the business of operating and managing them, rather than taking a systematic approach.

Perhaps UAVs would provide a good starting point for a fully joint approach to at least one component of ADF air power.