ADF air power and critical mass: an alternative perspective

I must say as a one-time Army helicopter pilot that one of the crashes was far too recent even to speculate about and the others were as complex in their causes as air accidents normally are.

We have a history in the ADF of great tension around the dispersal of air power through the services. We have decided on a model that goes some way toward matching the intimate user of the air power to the aircraft type. This was all about meeting the customers’ needs. Army and Navy are the customers of helicopters and seem pretty happy with the result.

From my observation over many years, the decision to locate rotary-wing assets in the Army has been overall an extraordinary success. There is still much friction around bringing aircraft into service and operating them but that applies to all Services and many aircraft.

What should not be ignored is the hard and soft integration of Army Aviation into the land force as an integral combat arm, where combat aviators fly as part of what Army calls the combined arms team. The combat culture and team attitudes are as important as the actual missions of troop lift, logistics and firepower.

To many outside the tent, esoteric terms such as ‘combat arms’, ‘combat aviators’ and the ‘combined arms team’ should only ever be tolerated as an Army foible but nothing could be further could be from the truth.

Battlefield helicopters are not an optional extra for a land force in any modern war — they are central to land operations. The result of having this essential part of the land force integral to a joint land force commander is a winning organisation and culture at the tactical level.

If the argument is that all air power should be centralised under the RAAF because perceived failures in the personnel system are leaving the Air Force without a critical mass of pilots for its fighters, then the Services structure of the ADF has gone stark raving mad.

At a time when the future is becoming more unpredictable due to the change in power relativities in our part of the world — but when the nature of those changes is far from clear and the exact type of capabilities in the ADF to meet this new world cannot be predicted — now is not the time to focus only on the JSF or submarines or even an amphibious capability.

Now is not the time to say that the JSF is more important than the rotary-wing capability, so let’s return to the time when many saw helicopters as a reserve of pilots to be sent to other aircraft types in times of conflict.

The ADF must stay balanced and broad in its capabilities until a threat materialises — then perhaps we can focus on meet specifics.

It would be interesting for all of us to consider how the United States Marine Corps develops a common ethos from the infantryman to the pilot, while apparently and simultaneously producing fighter pilots.

A Marine comrade of mine with whom I served in Iraq has a son and a son-in-law who are Marine Corps F-18 pilots. Both have done several combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. My friend’s son also served one tour in Iraq as a terminal controller with infantry units in Ramadi — and his radio operator died in his arms.

Perhaps this is the kind of centralised model the ADF needs.