Going for growler?

The move follows industry and Defence insider reports that an Australian Growler buy has been in the works for some time. It’s reported also that ADF Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit personnel have been embedded with the US Navy electronic warfare community at NAS Whidbey Island, Washington State and have had some first-hand insight into Growler operations over Libya last year.

Background

When the F/A-18F Super Hornet bridging air combat capability was ordered in 2007, Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Geoff Brown was the RAAF’s Director-General Capability Planning at the time. In that role, he saw the potential of an AEA capability, even on the small scale the ADF was likely to be able to afford, and has championed the possibility of acquiring Growlers ever since.

Not long after the RAAF F/A-18F order was sealed, an engineering change proposal (ECP) was presented by Boeing to the US Navy and the RAAF for some of the order to be pre-configured for later conversion to a Growler-like capability, should that decision be made by government. The ECP involved modifications to some of the F/A-18F’s structure so as to accommodate the gun-bay avionics racks, more robust wiring harnesses and future antenna installations.

In late 2007, it was decided to modify 12 of the 24 Super Hornets at a cost of about US$4 million each including the non-recurring ECP work. These aircraft have been given the unique official Boeing designation of F/A-18F+. Visually, they feature subtle differences in the form of various discreet antenna apertures and weigh about 120kg more than a standard F/A-18F.

What Makes A Growler?

Called ‘Grizzly’ in US Navy service to distinguish it from the similar sounding but heavier EA-6B Prowler when launching from and recovering aboard an aircraft carrier, the Growler differs visually from the F/A-18F in several key areas. These differences include the wingtip AN/ALQ-218(v)2 radio frequency (RF) receiver pods, which provide emitter identification and location and a selective reactive jamming capability. The ALQ-218 pods are permanent fixtures on the Growler and replace the standard Super Hornet’s wingtip AIM-9X missiles and LAU-127 launch rails.

There are also various distinct antenna apertures on the Growler’s fuselage — a blade antenna for the AN/ALQ-227 communications countermeasures set (CCS) immediately behind the rear cockpit, a ‘blister’ fairing housing a multi-mission advanced tactical terminal (MATT) SATCOM receiver on the spine between the cockpit and tails and two long baseline interferometer (LBI) blister antennas on each side of the lower rear fuselage forward of and below the horizontal stabilisers. There are also two smaller LBI antennas on each side of the Growler’s nose.

Internally, the Super Hornet’s gun has been deleted and replaced by an avionics pallet that contains the ALQ-218 processor unit, the CCS receiver and an electronic attack unit. Further back, the mid-lower fuselage and leading edge extension avionics bays contain the interference cancellation system (INCANS) processor, the MATT terminal and an antenna interface unit.

The INCANS is a major capability differentiator for the Growler compared to previous EA platforms. It allows the crew to retain unimpaired communications during jamming operations without disruption to either communications or jamming, providing a huge boost in situational awareness for the Growler crew and other assets. This has been described as a ground-breaking capability in the AEA world.

In US Navy service, Growlers are typically configured with three ALQ-99 jammer pods — one on the centreline station six and one each on the middle wing stations three and nine. Auxiliary fuel tanks are usually carried on the inboard wing stations four and eight, an AIM-120C AMRAAM air-to-air missile on the starboard ‘shoulder’ station five and an ASQ-228 ATFLIR pod or another AMRAAM on the port shoulder station seven.

Growlers don’t carry AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, preferring instead to employ AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation (HARM) missiles on each of the outer most wing stations 2 and 10 for kinetic destruction of enemy air defence missions.

Jammers

However, the main ‘weapon’ in the Growler’s arsenal is the AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming pod. It normally carries two or three but can accommodate up to five. The ALQ-99 has been in service since the early 1970s, equipping initially the EA-6B in pod form and later USAF’s EF-111 Ravens in the weapons bay and a canoe-shaped fairing under the fuselage.

The pods are mission-configurable depending on the anticipated threat. Each pod has a ram air turbine generator for independent power supply, two selectable transmitter modules with associated antennas and a universal exciter interfaced with and controlled by the onboard system and aircrew. Despite its age, the ALQ-99 was designed with an open architecture core, which has facilitated transmitter upgrades and enhancements.

But the ALQ-99 has been out of production for over a decade and despite an ongoing transmitter upgrade program is becoming increasingly difficult to support in service. The ALQ-99 also is big and draggy, eating significantly into the Growler’s speed and ability to escort strike packages to a target without tanker support. Industry sources also indicate that the ALQ-99 will be no match for new generation ‘triple digit’ threats now beginning to emerge.

To this end, the US Navy is developing a next generation jammer (NGJ) in an effort to provide an airborne radar and communications jamming capability against emerging and future threats. The program initially received limited support but in 2009 funding was increased to industry to define the NGJ and to develop new technologies that it may use.

It is anticipated that, rather than having to carry up to five pods for a jamming mission, each of which is tuned to various frequencies, the NGJ will be scaleable depending on its host platform, will be more aerodynamic and possibly have low-observable shaping characteristics, will be modular in design and will be frequency adaptive in flight.

The US Navy has devised a two-phase development and acquisition plan for the NGJ. First will be technology maturation, which includes efforts sponsored by Naval Air Systems Command to design a system-level concept demonstrator and to mature the critical technological elements that will make the NGJ possible. Then a technology demonstration phase will take place so industry can demonstrate technology maturity through a series of laboratory and flight test demonstrations, after which there will be a competition for the production contract.

Planned US Navy initial operating capability for the NGJ is currently around 2018, initially on the EA-18G but with plans to possibly field it on the F-35 down the track.

Meanwhile, industry sources have indicated that due to the harsh environments in which existing jammer pods have operated, especially on aircraft carriers, and an increasing shortage of pods and spares available for operational EA-6B and EA-18G units, there has been talk of possibly reopening ALQ-99 production to ensure capability is maintained until the NGJ is ready.

Airborne Electronic Attack (Aea)

An airborne electronic attack mission is designed to degrade, disrupt, compromise or deny an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, often while enhancing a friendly force’s use of it.

The electromagnetic spectrum ranges from long-range surveillance radars and low frequency communications at the lower end of the spectrum to GPS, identification friend or foe, mid-range surveillance and acquisition radars and ground control intercept comms in the middle of the spectrum to long- and short-range fire control radars and AESA radars at the upper end of the spectrum. The EA-18G and its programmable ALQ-99 pods can cover the majority of the current spectrum.

The AEA mission came to the fore in the Vietnam conflict with the advent of USAF ‘Wild Weasel’ configured F-100s, F-105s, and F-4s and US Navy EA-6A Intruders for the suppression of enemy air defences mission. The second seat of these early AEA aircraft was occupied by an electronic warfare officer and the aircraft were fitted with a basic radar homing and warning system and sometimes podded jammers.

While the electronic kit on these aircraft was rudimentary by today’s standards, the mere presence of a Wild Weasel within a strike package often was enough for the North Vietnamese to shut down SAM battery radars for fear of a Standard or Shrike anti-radar missile being launched at them.

The later F-4G Advanced Wild Weasel, modified from the F-4E Phantom, was a significant advance over the first ones, having a more comprehensive electronics fit and sporting the then new AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile. The US Navy developed the four-seat EA-6B Prowler around the podded ALQ-99 jammers and later the ALQ-218 receiver, while the USAF converted 42 F-111As into EF-111A Ravens or ‘Sparkvarks’.

The carrier-capable EA-6B remains in service but is being replaced by the faster and more capable EA-18G while the USAF’s EF-111s were retired in the late 1990s, leaving that service without its own organic high-end stand-off jamming and electronic attack capability.

USAF F-16CG/DGs and CJ/DJs fulfil elements of the AEA mission in being fitted with the ASQ-213 HARM targeting system, thus being able to employ the HARM missile. Many also carry the ALQ-119 electronic jamming pod for added self-protection. The USAF also has developed a jammer version of its miniature air launched decoy, which can be employed by the F-16C/D and B-52H.

Other forces such as Israel and Singapore reportedly have added CG/CJ-like AEA capabilities to some or all of their F-16C/Ds, while Germany operates a dedicated AEA version of the Tornado, dubbed ECR, equipped with the HARM. The UK’s Tornado GR.4 fleet also has an enhanced organic EW suite and can employ the ALARM loitering anti-radiation missile.

An Australian Aea Capability

AEA can take a kinetic or non-kinetic form and a HARM equipped Growler or Prowler has the option of going for a hard kill of an emitter with the missile, or a soft kill by jamming or disrupting its signal. Frequencies may be specifically targeted, the entire spectrum may be jammed or reactive jamming of new threats can be performed.

In a soft-kill scenario, jamming can be employed subtly where specific frequencies such as mobile phone networks are targeted and mildly degraded to the point where adversaries may not even recognise they are being jammed. Alternatively, several Growlers equipped with multiple pods could be employed to shut down virtually the entire electromagnetic spectrum of an adversary. Future enhancements of the EA-18G’s AESA could see the radar’s aperture focussed not only as a powerful jammer but to effectively destroy the sensitive circuitry of adversary systems using a directed energy beam.

One scenario where a subtle jamming capability may be employed is in the anti-IED mission, especially where IEDs are commonly triggered by mobile phones. Such a capability is commonly used to protect convoys in Afghanistan,where a suitably equipped vehicle, helicopter or aircraft such as an MC-12 or a UAV will shadow a convoy and shut down mobile phone signals in the area the convoy is passing through to protect it from roadside bombs.

This also reportedly has been employed in urban settings for the protection of high-value targets from roadside bomb attacks. Sydney residents will no doubt remember the regular disruption to their mobile phone reception during the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit as leaders such as US President Bush were driven between their hotels and meetings in the city.

In the case of a potential regional conflict against a less capable adversary, AEA can be used to disrupt power grids, mobile phone networks and other communications and infrastructure utilities. It also could be used to facilitate insertion and extraction of an amphibious force or special forces elements and/or evacuees by sea or air.

But what is perhaps of most interest to the ADF is the force multiplier effect of an AEA platform, especially with its ability to operate as a signals, electronic and communications intelligence platform.

In an Australian scenario, EA-18Gs can accompany Super or Classic Hornet strike aircraft, increase a Wedgetail AEW&C’s ESM radius, operate as ESM ‘top cover’ to a naval and/or amphibious force or support convoying or even dismounted ground forces, providing all of these assets with substantially increased levels of situational awareness and having the ability to disrupt or disable most threats if necessary.

Defence insiders tell Australian Aviation that the establishment of an AEA capability within the RAAF will enhance the ability of airborne and ship combat assets by providing increased situational awareness.

USAF F-117 and B-2 stealth bombers rarely operate without stand-off EW support and critics have pointed out that the F-35 does not have full-spectrum stealth and may be vulnerable to low-frequency radars. However, a Growler can enhance that aircraft’s already low observability by providing electronic intelligence and/or by selectively degrading an adversary’s defences sufficiently for the F-35 to slip through unnoticed.

Importantly for the RAAF, a Growler won’t need a fighter escort if operating independently or in support of naval assets as it retains its AMRAAM capability and remains fully combat capable against airborne threats. It also retains the Super Hornet’s excellent APG-79 AESA radar, key crew vehicle interface features like the rear cockpit advanced crew station and joint helmet mounted cueing system , Link-16/MIDS datalink system, and digital memory device .

The decision to acquire a number of Growler kits will not be taken lightly with the cost of converting six aircraft conservatively estimated at $300 million. The first aircraft prbably would have to be converted by Boeing in St Louis and flight tested over electronic ranges in the US to prove the conversion is as sound as a new-build Growler, although Boeing is confident. The remaining aircraft could be modified by Boeing at Amberley if required. Each would need to be offline for about three months for the conversion work.

However, the path to operating a Growler is so much more than just converting the aircraft. The AEA capability is a whole new skillset the US has developed over decades of operations and technological advances, so it is unrealistic to expect the RAAF to be able to offer a full spectrum AEA capability the day the first converted aircraft is rolled out.

There is also little doubt the US would allow such a capability to be released without having significant insight and input into how it is operated and the already strong relationships built up between RAAF. And US Navy program managers and crews through the Super Hornet acquisition process and numerous exchange programs probably will be used to expedite the service introduction of the Growler.

Politically – and it is likely the RAAF and CDG has emphasised this point in their cabinet submission – the Growler also offers the Australian Government options to offer a high- value niche capability to allies for coalition operations without the pressure of having to develop rules of engagement for the conduct of kinetic operations or the risk of casualties.

While many see it as a fait accomplit , albeit a somewhat drawn out one, the only risk to an Australian Growler seems to be the government’s determination to return a budget surplus in 2013-14. There is no active project in the unclassified Defence Capability Plan for such a capability, so supplementary income will need to be found to fund not only the acquisition of the kits but also the development of the capability.