ADF air power and critical mass

Experience has shown that it is extraordinarily difficult to master the full range of complex and demanding skills that underwrite professional mastery in the air.

That is why, since air power was first used systematically almost 100 years ago, only a handful of nations has been able to construct and sustain first-rate air power. Australia is one of those nations.

The essential building blocks of advanced air power were identified in the 1920s by Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, the first commander of the world’s first independent military air service, the Royal Air Force.

Trenchard understood that high-quality air power rested on the following foundations: • A cadet college to train the leaders.

• A staff college to give those leaders the finishing touches.

• A technical training system to provide the mechanics.

• A research, development, test, and evaluation unit for the technological edge.

• A central flying school to set and maintain standards.

• A robust, indigenous industrial base to support the air force’s technical demands.

Most importantly, his model also assumed the existence of an integrated personnel system of sufficient critical mass to support the highest professional standards.

Nothing has changed in the ensuing 90 years. Regardless of relatively recent modifications to the way air forces operate, such as outsourcing, downsizing, simulation, best practice, civilianisation, commercialisation and a host of others, Trenchard’s model remains valid.

It takes years to develop the Trenchard model. Should one or more of the components be neglected, the system’s inherent ‘lag’ effect means it also can take years for adverse effects to become apparent. Similarly, it can take years to repair a neglected system. Organisational degradation is an insidious process.

Without being alarmist, the Williams Foundation is concerned that there may be indications of systemic failure within the ADF’s current air power model. The most recent sign may be the fatal Army Chinook crash in Afghanistan last May, with the context and linkage being the fatal crashes of an RAAF Boeing 707 in 1991 and two Army Black Hawks in 1996.

The 707 accident occurred at a time when the RAAF had experienced a high pilot resignation rate for some years, to the extent that it had been the subject of a parliamentary enquiry. One of the consequences of the resignation rate was the gradual reduction in experience across the service, notably in the critical posts of flying supervisors and instructors.

The findings of the official inquiry into the 707 crash reflected that insidious process – and were startling.

The report tabled in federal parliament stated that the captain had initiated a demonstration of asymmetric handling that was “inherently dangerous” (which he did not appreciate), that the RAAF’s 707 training procedures, professional knowledge and pilot’s notes were “deficient” and that the captain’s understanding of how the aircraft might behave in the particular configuration was “inadequate”.

Five years later, the collision of two Black Hawk helicopters while in a formation of six aircraft exposed similar organisational failings. High resignation rates had diminished pilot experience, mission planning was poor, training was unsatisfactory and supervision was below standard. Many veteran combat pilots who read the report were alarmed by formation flying practices that apparently were common within Australian Black Hawk units.

The ADF responded to those crises with characteristic energy, particularly at the unit and individual levels. However, if news reporting about aspects of the Chinook crash in Afghanistan last year is accurate, it remains questionable whether the response adequately addressed organisational issues.

That reporting seems to suggest supervisory and experience shortcomings, as was the case in the 1990s.

The crucial point here is that it would be illogical to blame any such shortcomings on individuals or units. Organisational critical mass is the issue.

The ADF is a highly professional organisation, unquestionably one of the best military services in the world.

Nevertheless, because of its small size, it faces a constant struggle to maintain expertise across the exceedingly complex and diverse roles it must perform. And this is the crux of the matter.

No general or admiral would countenance any dilution of expertise within his infantry or surface combatant forces or other major combat capabilities.

Yet that is precisely what happens with ADF air power, which is split between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As a consequence, the Trenchard model is constantly weakened.

At the same time, it is a fact that management of the ADF’s air assets, especially the rotarywing element, remains a contentious subject. Consequently, next month’s On Target will canvass an alternative perspective.