Examining the logical option

But Defence insiders tell AA that, rather than going against the advice of ADF and RAAF leadership in 2006, when he asked the question about whether a bridging capability would be required in the wake of the 2004 decision to retire the F-111 in 2010, Nelson was actually told “maybe, but not yet”.

It is now history that the F-35 has suffered further delays, meaning the RAAF’s originally planned initial operating capability of 2012 has slipped as much as six years. On face value, it appears Nelson’s decision turned out to be a prescient one, but the RAAF had been maintaining ‘watching briefs’ for several years on the Super Hornet’s capabilities, and had the option of a bridging capability sitting ‘on the shelf ’ almost ready to go should it be required. Ironically, the then Labor opposition criticised the Super Hornet decision, and promised a review after Labor took power in 2007, a review that subsequently proved the decision was a correct one.

This time around, the ADF is again confident the JSF will be delivered before the RAAF’s classic Hornets expire, and that no further bridging capabilities will be required.

The upgraded classics remain a potent capability in a regional and global context, a fact which was proven most recently at Red Flag Alaska where 3SQN Hornets “held their own” against the red air element.

Feeding this confidence is the perception that, if F-35 test flight and test point progress made in recent months is any guide, new JPO head VADM David Venlet appears to have built more than sufficient padding into his re-baselined test schedule for the aircraft.

Compared to his predecessor – MajGen David ‘Duncan’ Heinz – Venlet appears far more conservative and unlikely to repeat some of Heinz’s mistakes which saw him fired in early 2010.

The F-35’s latest grounding highlights the need for just why padding is added to the schedule.

During a recent visit to Australia, Lockheed Martin’s JSF program head Tom Burbage briefed Australian media on the program, and spoke of the recent grounding of the test fleet following an “explosive event” with one of the aircraft’s integrated power packs (IPP).

Outside of a brief and sketchy statement by the JPO, this was the first official detailed comment on the grounding and the reasons behind it.

But interestingly, all the other Australian media at Burbage’s briefing seemed more focused on the program’s cost, an issue which bears little real relevance to the Australian program.

That cost figure, sprouted by some elements as being an acquisition and sustainment cost of more than a trillion dollars over the planned 50 year life of the US program, has no significant bearing on any Australian JSF buy, nor does the US$120m+ per unit cost of early low rate initial production (LRIP) build runs, which total fewer than 40 airframes.

Australia has committed $3. 2 billion to its first 14 aircraft, a figure which also includes basing infrastructure at RAAF Williamtown, training in the US, technical publications, ground support equipment and numerous other items associated with introducing a new aircraft type. Both Burbage and New Aircraft Combat Capability (NACC) head AVM Kym Osley are adamant that Australia’s full F-35 complement can be fulfilled within the Air 6000 budget.

The real issue remains the F-35’s development schedule, and whether there is sufficient padding to accommodate groundings following ‘discovery events’ – that are common during flight testing – such as the recent IPP failure. More on this schedule will be known in late October following the US Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting, after which the USAF is expected to confirm its planned operational test (OT&E) and initial operating capability (IOC) schedules. n