In transition

Further, one of the two QE2 class carriers under construction for the RN will likely never be commissioned as a carrier; the planned acquisition of the F-35B STOVL model for both the RN and RAF has been switched to the F-35C and the planned total buy of 138 aircraft is at risk; and the retirement of the Tornado strike aircraft and Sentinel R1 (Global Express) ISR platform, which has only been in service for three years, will likely be brought forward.

The decision to keep the Nimrod R1s in service was taken hastily, quickly diverting them from a planned late March retirement so they could participate in the Libyan no-fly campaign.

The R1s will be replaced by three upgraded former USAF RC-135 Rivet Joints from 2013-14, meaning the UK is seemingly prepared to wear a capability gap in the incredibly specialised ELINT/SIGINT domain of two to three years.

Billions will be saved under the austerity measures laid out by the UK’s SDSR in a nation that has suffered far worse from the GFC than most of us in Australia can imagine, but at what longterm cost? The retirement of HMS Invincible and Ark Royal and the conversion of HMS Illustrious to a helicopter carrier following the retirement of the Harrier, means the UK will have no fixed wing carrier capability until HMS Queen Elizabeth II and its F‑35Cs enter service around 2020.

But a decade long capability gap for such a specialised capability cannot just be picked up again when the ships and aircraft arrive. Many nations have learned that carrier-borne fixed wing aviation is a skillset that takes years or even decades to learn and refine. It is unlikely many recent Harrier pilots will still be around in 2020, and the few RAF pilots the UK is planning to put through US Navy exchange postings will not provide sufficient corporate knowledge to allow the capability to be quickly rebuilt.

But a lack of hardware is not the only issue. The lack of a capability means the people trained to operate and maintain that capability move on to other jobs or retire as part of the normal military posting cycle. You can’t just put these people in a deep freeze and thaw them out again once the capability arrives – it will take years to rebuild the workforce effectively without an undue burden on the training system, and without creating a ‘lump’ that will travel through the ranks for many years after.

The RAAF’s air combat force is also facing a similar, albeit not quite so serious (yet) dilemma. If the USAF’s F- 35A IOC slips to 2018 as has been mooted by senior USAF officials, and the RAAF’s IOC follows as currently planned 18-24 months after, there is a possibility the RAAF will have about 50 combat aircraft to call upon between 2018 and 2020, about half the number it has at present.

This will not only mean fewer aircraft will be available for operations, but it could also lead to one of three scenarios: classic and Super Hornet airframes fly harder and longer in order to maintain pilot currency, and thus wear the remaining classic Hornets out much quicker; the reduced fleet will fly fewer total hours, meaning those pilots will lose some currency and thus capability; or fewer pilots than planned will be recruited. This last possibility could mean a slower than planned ramp up and further delays to achieving JSF FOC, thus creating an even greater capability gap. Either way you look at it, it isn’t a pretty picture.

So, what’s the solution? We explore the options in more detail from page 30 of this issue, but in short, the RAAF can either extend the classic Hornets by performing more structural refurbishment work; it can put its faith in the JSF program and let the classic Hornet fleet wind down as planned; or it can acquire some more Super Hornets and consider operating a more balanced mix of F/A-18E/Fs and F-35s as the ultimate air combat solution.

But a decade long capability gap for such a specialised capability cannot just be picked up again.