The case for more F-22s

But move forward two years and the goalposts have shifted somewhat. The F-35 program’s two restructures within a year have seen its planned IOC pushed back more than two years to the 2016 timeframe, and more than 200 F-35s pushed to the right on the planned build schedule since 2009 (and no fewer than 500 since 2006).

Then came the revelation that, of the 187 F-22s produced (itself a figure less than half the USAF’s stated requirement of 388 and far short of the original requirement of 750), only about 130 of these jets will ever be ‘combat coded’. This means the rest cannot support the planned (but barely funded) block upgrade roadmap with the latest software releases and capability enhancements, and are destined for a life as operational conversion trainers at Tyndall AFB in Florida, or as test aircraft at Nellis and Edwards. (Plus, two F-22s have now been lost in crashes. ) Against that, in early 2010 Russia flew a stealthy fifth generation prototype combat aircraft. Dubbed PAK-FA (for Prospective Airborne Complex – Frontline Aviation), the Sukhoi T-50 is a large combat aircraft in the mould of its Su-27/30/33/35 predecessors, but with low observable features and shaping in the forward quadrant, and small internal weapons bays.

And now China has also flown a fifth generation development aircraft, dubbed the J-XX or J-20 (see p36). This aircraft is also large and appears to have significant all-aspect low observable shaping and very large internal weapons bays.

It’s too early to tell whether these new aircraft are prototypes or just concept demonstrators, let alone guess what their capabilities in a production form may be. But the fact they have appeared at a time when the US air combat structure is waning and remains largely reliant on fourth generation F-15s and F-16s, many of which are getting long in the tooth, means a reassessment of the situation may be warranted.

One option is to accelerate F-35 development and production, a possibility which may have opened up following the most recent restructure which saw the STOVL F-35B’s development de-coupled from the F‑35A and C and pushed to the back of the queue. But in a time of trillion dollar deficits, US government funding remains questionable.

Another option is to reopen the F-22 production line and start development of an ‘F-22C’. More late Block F-22As could be built almost immediately to supplement those already in place, while development of an advanced derivative could be leveraged off many of the advances made in the JSF program, and this could replace those early F-22As which are not viable upgrade candidates in a decade or so.

The F-22’s air-to-air capabilities are superlative. It has all aspect, high end low observability which allows it to engage threats before it is detected, and its speed and high operational ceiling give its weapons a advantage in range almost double that of a lower flying, subsonic launch platform. So while the current F-22 is currently considered deadly to all-comers, imagine what a helmet mounted sight combined with high off boresight AAMs such as an AIM-9X, the F-35’s Distributed Aperture System (DAS) and Electro-optical Targeting System (EOTS), more supportable low observable coatings, better air-to-ground radar modes, and more modern stores and flight management systems, could do for the performance and longevity of this super fighter. Lockheed Martin is understood to already have some of these options on the shelf, ready to be dusted off if funding were to be made available.

And while the multirole F-35A has rightly been deemed sufficiently capable for Australia’s needs, the USAF’s concept of operations in a high-end conflict was always for the F-35 to be operated in a two-tiered structure alongside (or rather, underneath) the high-end F-22.

Just like the fourth generation air dominance mission has been handled by the F-15A/C, with the F-16 looking after the low end threats and strike missions, so it was intended with the next generation F-22 and F-35.

It is clear the strategic airpower environment is changing – in coming years the US Air Force’s ability to be asset ‘air dominant’ will be tested unlike at any time since the end of the Cold War.

More F-22s would help, even if the currently dire US budgetary situation makes that prospect unlikely

Only about 130 of these jets will ever be ‘combat coded.’