Seizing the opportunity for more C-17s

The C-17 has tremendous utility. Following New Zealand’s recent Pike River mine disaster, a C-17 could have lifted outsize specialist machinery direct to Greymouth’s tight 1091m runway. While much closer to the RAAF C-17s’ Amberley home, they were of high value in the recent major floods, and then excelled in the Cyclone Yasi evacuation of 255 Cairns hospital patients to Brisbane – the nation’s largest aeromedevac. Two C-17s fortunately available lifted the bulk.

Typically, each can lift around 55 patients – from critical high dependency to low need litters, needing a cabin medical crew of 35. Infinite combinations exist.

But as the RAAF’s four strong C-17 fleet approaches heavy maintenance and upgrade periods which will reduce on line availability, one undergoing a heavy maintenance check and for example two away on Middle East or exercise deployments would leave just one on line in Australia available at short notice for any contingencies.

There is a clear need for extra C-17s, but there is only a small window for action, as existing orders will keep the recently slowed C-17 production line open only until 2013.

But how to fund the acquisition of another, say, two C-17s in an environment of competing defence priorities and federal budgetary pressures? Some lateral thinking does yield some interesting options.

The C-17 backlog includes a last buy of 10 for the USAF which it didn’t want but the US Congress funded anyway, forcing the USAF to instead cut back C-5 relife upgrades.

The USAF claims it has sufficient C-17s – which it used as a C-141 replacement – whereas it badly needs all the longer range, higher payload C-5s slated for rebuild.

So with the USAF set to receive more C-17s than it wanted, perhaps we could buy two of these ‘surplus’ aircraft? Or perhaps we could look to the UK for a similar opportunity? The RAF has just received its seventh C-17 (after starting with an initial fleet of four) and needs three and even five more, given the UK’s Afghanistan commitments and the need to cover upcoming maintenance downtime.

Amazingly, RAF C-17s flew 1500 hours per annum each compared with the RAAF figure of 850 hours. That suggests the RAF’s older C-17 will have passed through heavy maintenance “hump” before the RAAF’s need to. Plus the UK’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in the stated 2013 timeframe and the forthcoming A400M could see the RAF’s need for the C-17 diminish, which could open a unique window for Australia, given the UK’s cash strapped state.

It is an out of the box suggestion, but perhaps Australia could buy two of the C-17s the RAF needs, and then lease them to the UK through until 2013 while that country gets through its Afghanistan deployment and C-17 heavy maintenance ‘hump’.

In such a scenario the RAF’s utilisation could be restricted to protect these leased aircraft, as was the case with the RAF’s first four C-17s, which were leased before being purchased outright – with the proviso that Australia gets a new build replacement for any machine that has its limits exceeded.

While civil transports have fixed weight limits and longer airframe lives, the C-17 was specced at weight/payload numbers ranging from 2. 25G (77 tonnes load) to 3G (36 tonnes). Combat departures and approaches, short takeoffs and landings, and the C-17’s amazing ground manoeuvring capability are hard on aircraft. But routine flying is not in these categories and C-17s leased to the RAF could fill less demanding roles, save the UK the $400 million purchase price, and result in Australia getting two as new aircraft whose purchase price had been offset by lease revenue.

Despite horrendous taxation revenue losses and recovery costs of the present disasters – and Tropical Cyclone Yasi could have been far worse casualtywise – Australia can’t afford not to buy two more C-17s – either outright or via leasing.