The numbers game

Before examining General Leahy’s assertion, some context may be helpful.

Australian defence policy officially acknowledges that “the principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia”. Despite the fact that any such aggression seems unlikely in the near to medium term, this is as it must be.

The world of the 21st century remains a dangerous place, intelligence estimates remain notoriously unreliable, and international relationships can change overnight. It will be decades before any government might confidently determine that Australia does not need an independent military capability to protect its approaches, territory, and people.

Some commentators seem to have lost sight of this imperative.

Perhaps their perspective has been unduly influenced by the nature of Australia’s wars of the past half century.

Specifically, our participation in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan has perhaps confused popular perceptions of how Australia should be defended.

Three crucial points need to be made regarding our expeditionary wars of choice in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. First, each has been a military and political failure. Second, many senior British and American officials now believe that the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased rather than diminished the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the West. And finally, in relation to the direct defence of Australia, their emphasis on land operations is misleading.

The key to the military defence of an island continent has always been the ability to dominate the maritime (sea and air) approaches. The most powerful armies can achieve nothing if they cannot reach their objectives. For centuries, Great Britain’s navy, and then its air force, validated this geographical truism.

The essential start point for contemporary Australian strategy must be the capability to shape events in our region to serve our broad national interests, and to deter potentially aggressive behaviour that may be inimical to those interests. This implies not only the ability to apply decisive military force if necessary, but also to know what is happening in our area of strategic interest.

Three core missions for the ADF thus define themselves: • Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) dominance; • Maritime (air and sea) control; and • Long range precision strike.

Prosecuting those missions will require an integrated combination of advanced air and naval capabilities, supported by suitably structured land forces.

Which leads back to the question of the numbers game.

General Leahy’s claim that about 50 strike-fighters will meet Australia’s security needs was based on his contention that three combat squadrons and one training unit, each with 14 aircraft, would be sufficient. However, a more rigorous study reached a very different conclusion.

The authors of the Kokoda Foundation’s analysis of Australia’s strike-fighter requirements (Kokoda Papers, No 2, Oct 2005) started from the long standing operational principle that in order to have 12 fully mission capable aircraft online, a combat squadron needs an establishment of at least 16. A significant proportion of a squadron’s assets is invariably consumed by scheduled maintenance, training, test and development, unserviceabilities, weapons and systems trials, and the like. Attrition is another consideration.

The Kokoda paper also factored in the unique features of the F-35 JSF that will comprise the ADF’s fleet for the next 30 years (the paper pre-dated the Super Hornet acquisition decision). As the authors astutely noted, once the exceptional capabilities of those aircraft’s sensors, data fusion, and networking systems are appreciated across the ADF, the broader national security community, and the region, demands for the fleet’s services will increase substantially.

The paper examined three indicative force sizes against a range of contingencies – three combat squadrons plus one operational conversion unit; 4 plus 1; and 5 plus 1.

The conclusions reached were that the 3 plus 1 model, comprising 75 aircraft, would not offer the government sufficient options and would be inflexible; that the 4 plus 1 (97 aircraft) would be effective, but would permit operations in only one theatre; and that the 5 plus 1 (120 aircraft) would best allow the ADF to meet its principal task of deterring and defeating armed attacks on Australia.

Against that background, the Defence White Paper’s assessment that the ADF needs a fleet of some 100 advanced strike-fighters represents the lower end of a credible force structure.

Numbers in themselves can never provide an answer to a strategic question. At the same time, any strategic determination is likely to benefit from the application of proven practices to the classic ends-ways-means calculus.

More than any other single Defence capability, the ADF’s fleet of advanced strike/fighters will shape our security environment for the next three decades. In this instance, numbers are important.