Caught in the JET wash

A Pentagon spokesmen downplayed the report’s findings, calling it a “pessimistic” scenario, while Lockheed Martin said the JET used “legacy based assumptions regarding the time required to deliver the remaining SDD (System Development and Design) aircraft, complete development, and conduct the flight test campaign,” and didn’t take into account the extensive modeling and simulation to be done as part of the test program. But critics of the program justifiably point out that, if the modeling and simulation is so robust, why the long delays in getting test airplanes from the end of the production line to the start of the flight test line, and why have only a fraction of the planned flight test hours been flown so far this year?

The Pentagon official added that the JPO is “much more optimistic” about the program (well, yes…they would be, being the program office and all), and that the trick will be to find a balance between the two assessments.

But one really must wonder whether the JET, essentially put together by the Pentagon to report on one of its own key projects, would really produce a worst-case scenario and thus potentially embarrass a host of senior Pentagon officers and political figures who have been cheerleaders for the project. Indeed, if anything one could reasonably assume that the reporting parameters were quite constrained and that there was considerable pressure to produce a report which leaned more towards a best-case scenario. Surely, any project manager conducting due diligence of any value would treat such a report as an average of forward estimates, and not write it off as a worst-case estimate.

If the worst-case were to occur, the JSF program would also risk running into a Nunn-McCurdy funding breach (named after the two US senators/representatives who wrote the law in 1982) where all work would be halted and the program subject to a top to bottom review. Such a review would likely take many months if not years, adding further delays and costs and possibly resulting in its cancellation if it were found it couldn’t be justified on grounds of national security. But national security may be the F-35’s saviour, as the implications of halting the F-35 program will likely be more harmful to the US military and its industrial base than continuing to pour additional money and time into it.

Indeed, the JSF has already been described in some quarters as “too big to fail”. This in part refers to the fact that the USAF has a dwindling fourth generation fighter force and will never have enough F-22s to shore it up, the US Navy will soon be unable to field complete combat air wings for all its carriers, and the Marine Corps already needed to start replacing its Harriers a couple of years ago. Add to that the billions Lockheed Martin and its partners have already invested in production and test facilities for the aircraft, and it is possible many of them, including Lockheed, wouldn’t survive the program’s cancellation without huge levels of compensation or subsidies.

In the meantime, the Air Power Australia group has written an open letter to Secretary Gates which contains an interesting matrix which pits the F-35 against the other 4.5 or 5th generation fighters either currently in service or in development including the F-22, Sukhoi’s current Su-35S and planned T-50 PAK-FA (F-22ski), and China’s planned J-12/J-XX.

In the matrix all the aircraft are given a weighting of 0 or 1 if they meet or exceed a capability one would expect to see on a fifth generation fighter, and a score of -1 if they fail. Capabilities such as the ability to supercruise, integrated systems, low observability, internal weapons carriage, thrust vectoring, situational awareness/datalinks, engine and airframe growth potential, combat ceiling, the ability to drop weapons supersonically, and other areas were looked at. Perhaps surprisingly, the F-35 fared worst when compared to the other four aircraft, scoring a -8 compared to the next worst score of +2 for the Su-35S and F-22.

Some may question whether an Su-35S could match an F-22 in combat, although this is not the specific purpose of the matrix comparison, and others may wonder who provided the capabilities of the T-50 and the J-12, both of which are still paper airplanes. But APA is confident in their numbers and their peer review process.

What if they’re right?