Joint Strike Fighter

Schedule

The JSF’s program schedule has been a tough one to follow. Initially thought to have been overly aggressive and therefore, highly likely to slip to the right, these fears have been realised several times and in small and subtle increments over the past few years.

When the Lockheed Martin X-35 was selected as the successful JSF bidder in 2001, the first operational aircraft was set down for delivery in the US’s FY2008 (Oct 07-Sep 08). Today, some 12 months after that notional delivery date, the first operational aircraft is unlikely to be delivered before 2012, and then with the relatively immature Block 2 operational software load.

By 2003, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps F-35B had already slipped to 2010, the USAF F-35A to 2011, while the US Navy, RAF and Royal Navy were to follow in 2012. In 2009, these milestones are now unlikely to be realised inside two years after these 2003 dates.

No doubt the aircraft’s development schedule was cruelled by the need in 2004 to redesign many parts of the aircraft after the F-35B STOVL variant blew out more than 3000kg over its designed empty weight, while the F-35A and F-35C models had also put on weight. Lockheed Martin was forced to take weight out of the aircraft in several areas, the largest design change being the change from a one piece upper wing surface to three main components and a different fuselage attachment arrangement.

And 2009 has not been a good one for the program either, leading to further questions about the development schedule. A September 2008 briefing slide shows no less than nine F-35s were to have joined the three current flight test aircraft in the air this year.

Of the three current flying aircraft, AA-1, the first F-35 but the only one not built to the revised post-2004 specification is due to end its flight test program at China Lake Naval Air Station early next year, amazingly becoming a live fire target to assess the aircraft’s ability to sustain battle damage. BF-1, the first production representative aircraft was due to fly to Pax River on the east coast by now to start vertical flight trials, a step Lockheed Martin had originally intended to have completed almost 12 months ago. But BF-1 is reported to have had several gremlins which have kept it grounded in Fort Worth until September. At last report, the first vertical landing for BF-1 was scheduled for late October, although this now seems to be unachievable due to the careful ‘build-down’ test flight process to vertical flight.

BF-2 is also at Fort Worth and is due to join BF-1 at Pax River in late October.

Of the nine aircraft due to join the program in 2009, BF-3 was rolled out late last year and, despite being scheduled to fly in May this year, this has now slipped to October. BF-4, the first F-35 to be loaded with Block 0.5 mission system software was rolled out in January and was scheduled to have flown in March, but is now not due to fly until December. AF-1, the first production representative CTOL model which is scheduled to move to Edwards AFB next year for pilot training, was also to have flown in May after being rolled out late last year, but this has slipped to October.

Both AF-2 and AF-3 were rolled out in January and February respectively, but the first flight of AF-3 has slipped from June to December, while AF-2 has been moved back from August to December.

CF-1, the first carrier capable JSF was rollout out in July, two months later than planned, and its first flight has slipped from October to early 2010. Three other aircraft, CF-2, CF-3 and BF-5 were also to have flown by the end of 2009, but these have now slipped to between March and May 2010.

Taken as single cases, none of these first flight slippages are particularly concerning, but when all 12 development aircraft are slipping concurrently, this indicates there may be some kind of systematic problem which requires additional post production work and checks on the flight line before first flight.

JPO head Major General David Heinz says there is sufficient slack in the flight test program for these delays to be caught up in time for the F-35’s service entry. At a media briefing at June’s Paris Air show Gen Heinz said even if an average of only nine or 10 of the 12 flight test aircraft were available during the five year program and allowing for between 15 and 25 per cent ‘re-flies’ on some missions, the fleet should rack up its 5000 planned test sorties within the scheduled timeframe.

Costs

In FY2001, the ‘then year’ flyaway cost estimate for the aircraft was US$37m (A$40.9m) for the F-35A, US$46m (A$53.2m) for the STOVL F-35B, and US$48m (A$55.6m) for the US Navy’s F-35C carrier variant. Perhaps more representative was the estimated average aircraft procurement unit cost which came in at US$69m (A$76m).

In April 2002 the US Navy, concerned about the costs of the aircraft, reduced its requirement from 1089 F-35Bs and F-35Cs for Navy and Marine Corp, to 680.

Program development costs blew out by as much as 12 per cent to US$38bn (A$42bn) late in FY2003. The additional costs were mainly attributed to technology development, adding new capabilities, and the addition of anti-tampering technology to prevent buyers replicating sensitive systems. Money was also set aside as a hedge to further unforseen changes or development problems.

Just one year later, program development costs had increased further to US$44.8bn (A$49.6bn) due to what the program office described as efforts to achieve greater international commonality, optimise engine interchange ability, refine the estimating methodology, and extend the schedule for unexpected design work. But perhaps most significantly and as mentioned above, more than half the increase was attributed to the need to redesign large elements of the aircraft due to an increase in weight which had severely degraded the aircraft’s key performance capabilities. As of early 2005, the estimated average aircraft procurement unit cost for each aircraft across all three types was approximately US$100m (A$110m), while the total estimated cost of ownership over the aircraft’s life cycle for one aircraft had grown 11 per cent to US$240m (A$266m).

It’s not hard to see what observers and commentators (and possibly prospective customers) get easily confused about what their aircraft are going to eventually cost them, especially as much of that depends upon the US DoD acquisition process which is yet to be settled, and at what point they buy their aircraft in the protracted production process.

Australian military and political leaders have quoted a variety of vastly different prices for an Australian F-35 over the past few years as well. In late August, DMO head Dr Stephen Gumley told the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that the estimated price hadn’t risen much since his 2008 testimony. “As I sit here today, JSF is affordable. I don’t have any significant issues with the cost. I would be surprised that we would be paying more than about $75m (A$83m) a copy for the aircraft, measured in 2008 US dollars.”

But this amount appears to be wildly optimistic considering the USAF’s own estimations. Perhaps the most reliable guide for Australia is the USAF’s projected cost analysis which sees each one of their planned 1763 F-35As costing an average procurement unit cost of just under US$100m (A$110.7m) each in 2008 dollars.

Lockheed Martin and the JPO, to their credit, have been doing all they can to keep the price for partner nations as low as possible in the absence of any solid guidance from the Pentagon. In 2008, the company proposed a ‘consortium buy’ of about 370 JSFs for many of the partner nations before the US’s own Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) process kicked in. This was to give partners some budgetary surety and so they wouldn’t be slugged a premium for buying early build Low rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft, instead paying a similar price to that envisaged for the first US MYP.

But Lockheed says its suppliers weren’t ready to give it accurate enough prices so it could establish a consortium price that early in the process, so it says it will go back to its suppliers when it releases its RFP for the LRIP 5 build run next year, and have embedded in that the potential for a long term contract for partner nations. Lockheed’s Tom Burbage called it a “sort of son of consortium buy” when he spoke to AA at the Paris Airshow in June. As recently as early September, the CEO of Australia’s DMO, Dr Stephen Gumley was reported as telling a parliamentary committee that the delay in establishing a consortium price may see Australia push back its JSF order by two years in order to avoid paying the LRIP price.

Capability

The question of whether the F-35 will have sufficient capability in order to be relevant against forthcoming Russian and Chinese systems is not as easy one for a layman without access to classified test data to analyse. There have been numerous claims by program doubters who say the Russian Su-30MK, 4.5 generation Su-35S and fifth generation PAK-FA and multi-spectral weapons will be more than a match in the air-to-air arena for the F-35, whilst China’s recent efforts to improve its indigenous J-10B and to possibly acquire the Su-35S as well as to develop its own fifth generation fighter are also of concern.

Analyses from think tanks such as Air Power Australia claim the F-35 will not have the range, power to weight ratio (‘kinematics’), manoeuvrability, and weapons load to be able to engage these new adversaries on a one-to-one basis let alone at a numerical disadvantage, and that the JSF’s very low observability characteristics will soon be compromised by Russian low frequency radar systems or infra-red trackers currently under development for ground based SAM systems and airborne systems such as AEW&C and even fighters.

But in Lockheed Martin’s and the JPO’s defence, these are claims which are not easily countered without revealing classified data.

Simulations using actual JSF flight software claim to have consistently shown a considerable advantage to the F-35 against current and ‘near future’ adversaries, despite the capabilities of the near future adversaries still being unknown quantities. In an age of extremely sensitive radars and high probability of kill (Pk) air-to-air missiles, one-on-one dogfights are almost assuredly an exercise in mutually assured destruction, and future engagements will likely be fought at near or beyond visual ranges using passive or low probability of intercept sensors and weapons.

Therefore, the simulations used to prove the F-35’s capabilities rarely if ever match aircraft and similarly trained crews against each other in a traditional one-on-one, nose-to-nose engagement. Rather, like the wider definition of stealth being more than just shaping and aircraft coatings, the simulations take into account the quality of US and partner pilot training and concepts of operations, weapons and their employment, AEW&C, ISR, jammers and other airborne assets, sortie rates, and other ‘big picture’ scenarios.

An example of some of the F-35’s advanced situational awareness methods is the onboard Electro Optical Targeting System (EOTS), a system which provides a 360 degree ‘god’s eye’ view of situational awareness around the aircraft via several apertures that will allow its pilot to identify and defeat ground based and airborne threats sooner than other aircraft. Northrop Grumman, the manufacturer of EOTS even claimed at the Paris Air Show that EOTS has made manoeuvrability “irrelevant”, although Lockheed Martin officials were quick to stress they “don’t agree with that premise.” Interestingly, the aircraft’s detractors say that, because the F-35 won’t have the manoeuvrability or power to defeat many of these threats, EOTS will do little more than let the pilot know exactly when he is going to die!

But in the context of this and similar arguments where little flight testing and been done and no classified data is available, mainstream and industry media has little choice but to listen to and report on the PowerPoint presentations given by the marketeers, and take comfort in the fact that the ‘true believers’ within the ADF and 10 other quality air arms around the world apparently believe the F-35 has the goods to defeat current and near future threats.

Still, the fact that more than a few current fighter pilots still extol the virtues of speed, altitude and manoeuvrability in an engagement, skills the F-35 will likely remain inferior in compared to some current fighters let alone emerging capabilities, makes one think.

The Australian Context

Australia’s current position with the JSF is that the government continues to publicly make positive noises about the aircraft and its ability to meet the RAAF’s needs in the future, and that the approximate requirement remains at about 100 aircraft to initially replace the F/A-18A/Bs and then later the F/A-18F Super Hornets.

Having survived the White Paper and Defence Capability Plan (DCP) processes earlier this year, the government is scheduled to hand down its second pass approval on the project before the end of this year. Whilst not a contract for the aircraft, second pass is a virtual commitment to go down that path by providing a “formal approval …of a specific capability solution” and sets out firm contractual, in-service and operational milestones.

But recent reports suggest that the government may elect to further delay its intake of the F-35 by up to two years from the original schedule of 2014, ostensibly due to financial pressures on the defence budget but more likely because of uncertainties in the program and the US processes. Such a move would place considerable pressure on the current F/A-18A/B Hornet fleet which will be struggling well before then with fatigue and availability issues.

With an initial intake of Australia’s first F-35As in 2016, it would be unlikely that an operational squadron could be stood up at Williamtown before early 2018, with subsequent squadrons following at roughly 12 month intervals. Defence sources have told AA that there is no way the ‘classic’ Hornets, despite a massive systems upgrade in recent years, will make it that far in any appreciable numbers, thus opening up another potential capability gap of about five to eight years from early to mid next decade.

Critics of the F-35 have also pointed out Australia’s geo-political situation is likely to become more tenuous in the next few decades as countries in our region begin to covert our seemingly unlimited natural resources, and the effects of climate change and over-population become more acute. Therefore, they say we should be preparing for these eventualities by building a military strong enough to deter any territorial aspirations they may have, and that the F-35 just won’t cut it in a post 2020 scenario.

But there are no real alternatives available. The Super Hornet, although relatively affordable, capable and available now, is probably close to reaching its capability peak and will suffer against fifth generation adversaries in the 2020s. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale are of a similar generation to the Super Hornet and although not quite as far along the development curve, will similarly be at a disadvantage against emerging threats. According to its proponents, only the F-22 Raptor can defeat these future threats, and therefore should be requested for foreign sale release as soon as possible.

But as of this year, F-22 production for the USAF has been capped at 187 units, and the aircraft in its current form will cease production in 2010. Moves by US Senate factions to repeal a 1998 law banning foreign sales of the F-22 have so far become bogged down. Even if successful, it is estimated approximately US$2bn (A$2.3bn) would be required to redevelop the aircraft for international release and to re-start the production line, and then a limited production run of about 100 aircraft would result in a unit cost of approximately US$200-250m (A$221-277m) per aircraft with deliveries beginning seven to nine years after production recommenced.

Despite what opportunities may have passed the ADF by in past year, it is clear there really are no alternatives to the F-35 this late in the game.

Wait & See

Other issues continue to hamper the F-35 program. There is the ongoing second engine debate in the US, the funding for which at time of writing was still bogged down somewhere between the joint House and Senate committees and the White House.

Then there are the efforts by US defence leaders to quash the ‘next war-it is’ thinking of previous administrations in favour of developing capabilities to win the current wars, while rumours of massive reductions particularly in the USAF F-35A requirement continually surface from reputable sources.

With partner nations and potential foreign customers waiting in the wings with budgets in place but no way of committing to the aircraft until they know when they can get it and how much it will cost, there appears little alternative but to wait and see.