Can CASA help, not hinder?

However at a whole-of-industry level the picture may not be so rosy.

Let us look again at the second sentence: “Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. ” Can anyone say with conviction that this describes what we see daily within CASA, or in relations between CASA and the industry? The answer, sadly, must be “no”.

Within CASA, our members frequently see tensions which clearly demonstrate that a lack of shared perceptions and mutual trust exists between the various levels.

All too often what we see is, in effect, a state of rebellion between the field offices and the policy making parts of the organisation. In our dealings with the field offices we also too often see a lack of shared perceptions of the importance of safety and mutual trust between the industry and CASA staff. On those occasions, the field offices are seemingly determined to concentrate on outdated processes, administrative nitpicking and, occasionally, sheer bastardry instead of safety outcomes, regardless of the cost either to the industry or to CASA’s reputation.

The Queensland Coroner reported on just such a lack of shared perceptions and mutual trust between CASA and the ATSB in relation to the Lockhart River accident.

The Minister, in his Statement of Expectations dated March 12 2007, tasked CASA with being “a firm regulator focused on safety related functions and responsibilities, while permitting the orderly operation and growth of the Australian aviation industry. ” The second part of this statement is probably the closest that any Minister has come to requiring CASA to “foster aviation”, which was a responsibility given by Congress to CASA’s US equivalent, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but which was resisted by government during the drafting of the current Act.

While it cannot be argued that CASA is currently not “permitting the orderly operation and growth of the Australian aviation industry”, it can be argued that CASA is unnecessarily holding back both the operation and growth of the industry through inexcusable lengthy delays in the performance of routine regulatory functions.

Such approvals are often aimed at enhancing safety through the introduction of better aircraft, equipment or new staff, and the CASA delays consequently prevent their introduction and thereby arguably have a negative safety outcome for the duration of the delay.

The cost of routine regulatory functions can be ridiculously high. But the direct cost in terms of CASA fees is just the start, to which must be added the cost of distraction from normal management functions and of not being able to use the new aircraft, equipment, or staff during the period of the delay. These costs are becoming unbearable, and, coupled with the unacceptable attitude of some CASA officers, are creating within the industry a degree of frustration which has the potential to become a significant safety hazard in its own right.

We as an association enjoy a generally good relationship with CASA as a whole.

Nevertheless we feel that a ruthless review of what it is that CASA does and how it does it is needed to eliminate useless or marginally useful practices in order to free up the resources necessary to achieve a positive safety outcome in a realistic amount of time and at a realistic price.

It is time for CASA to put in place a management structure which promotes a positive safety culture within its own ranks, and which removes those officers who can not or will not conform to that culture. o Australian Aviation is proud to be the official supporting journal of the Regional Aviation Association of Australia. The views in this column are those of the RAAA, and not necessarily Australian Aviation’s.