Another Super sale?

Now it seems that, despite strenuous denials from the Minister’s office, ‘chatter’ about an additional buy of Supers seems to be gaining momentum. So, with 24 aircraft already coming and as many as 24 more reportedly being considered, will the F/A-18E/F claim a more permanent place in the RAAF’s air combat line-up than its currently planned decade long ‘bridging’ tour of duty? Doubts continue to linger over the ability of Lockheed Martin and the JSF Project Office (JPO) to deliver a Block 1 F-35A to USAF operational test and evaluation (OT&E) units from 2012 and to partner nations from 2014, let alone the combat capable Block 3 variant. While the aircraft itself continues to promise much, the ongoing program budget debate between the Pentagon and the US Congress remains of concern, while the aircraft’s development schedule appears to be just too compact for the comfort level of many observers.

To be added to this is reported mounting risk within the RAAF’s Air 5376Hornet Upgrade program (HUG), specifically the Phase 3. 2C plan to replace the centre-barrel (CBR) fuselage structures on between 42 and 49 of the RAAF’s most needy F/A-18A/B ‘classic’ Hornets. Following work on the first prototype CBR aircraft in Canada (which is scheduled to return to the air as we go to press), it was discovered that the stocks of necessary spares and new components acquired by the ADF for the work to be conducted in Australia were vastly inadequate. And with the Williamtown based Hornet Industry Coalition (HIC) workforce, comprising Boeing, L-3 & BAE Systems employees, already fully engaged in other phases of HUG while at the same time managing the Hornet fleet on a day-to-day basis, there are doubts whether the HIC has the capacity (let alone the will) to do the CBR work.

So, the RAAF has a decision to make – does it persist with the CBR and perform the bulk of the work in Canada, with all the inherent logistical issues and costs that go with it, or should it dump HUG Phase 3. 2C altogether? And if the latter option is taken, will the RAAF have the courage to re-certify its classics for a longer fatigue life of around 8000 hours instead of the current 5000 as Canada has reportedly done with its 80 best Hornets, and then undertake extended proactive and reactive discrete structure and component renewal and refurbishment under an extension of that done under Phases 3. 1 & 3. 2B? If not, this is where a follow-on buy of Super Hornets may come in.

The Kokoda Foundation think tank’s recent paper titled Australia’s Future Joint Strike Fighter Fleet supports some elements within Defence who reportedly think that 100 F-35 JSFs, to be acquired under a one-for-one three phased Project Air 6000 next decade, may not be sufficient to meet Australia’s future defence needs, and that five full combat squadrons totalling up to 130 fighters may be required.

Kokoda says three factors will ultimately influence how many combat aircraft the RAAF acquires: that the future “fleet is large enough to cope with potential change in strategic policy, while retaining a high degree of strategic utility against conventional and unconventional threats”; that it is likely the fifth generation JSF will provide transformational capabilities never before seen in the ADF that may see it “become an ‘indispensable weapon’ for operations across the spectrum of conflict”; and whether a larger fleet can be adequately supported by a suitably sized and “sustainable fleet of force multipliers, including AEW&C and airborne refuelling aircraft” and that “Australia has enough of the right people to crew and maintain the aircraft. ” The Kokoda paper says the risks in not having sufficient combat aircraft include “constrained strategic options, an inability to cover the range of tasks that the government wants the ADF to perform concurrently, a low potential to support for maritime and land operations, and an inability to rotate forces”; risks which all significantly decrease with the addition of two extra combat squadrons.

If the RAAF were to acquire additional Super Hornets, such a move may allay renewed concerns over Australia’s future air combat capability and airframe capacity, will further reduce the risk involved in the timing of the F-35 introduction next decade, will spread the fiscal pain over a longer period (with follow-on benefits when the next replacement cycle comes around in the late 2020s), and will provide a technologically compatible hi-lo combat force mix.

How the RAAF could man another fast jet squadron though is a topic for a separate column!