A giant takes off

It is certain that on October 15, Singapore Airlines CEO Chew Choon Seng will be hoping that his airline’s experience with the A380 will mirror United’s success with the DC-8 as he accepts the symbolic keys to the first aircraft. Likewise for Airbus, the EIS for Singapore Airlines, and next year Emirates and Qantas, may well define the level of success for the A380 which has struggled to garner new orders in the past few years.

For many years, the A380 battled to get off the drawing board. Its origins can be traced back to 1988 and the AM-300, a joint venture between McDonnell Douglas and Airbus that would combine the MD-11 fuselage with an A340 wing. When that concept failed, Airbus started to focus on its own design and in July 1991, German shareholder Deutsche Aerospace revealed the A2000 which would seat between 600 and 1000 passengers. The concept was a three-decker with economy passengers on the top deck, business class on the main deck and first class on the lower deck, which would be fitted with beds and suites.

The Aerospatiale ASX700 followed which would seat 600 passengers in a three-class layout. It was to have a wider cabin (6. 76m) than the 747 (6. 10m) on the main deck and, being a circular con-struction, had an upper deck similar in cross section to a 767 with 2-3-2 seating.

At the same time, Boeing played around with 747-400 derivatives – all of which traded range for payload, which was of little interest to key Asian launch airlines such as Singapore Airlines.

And not to be left out, McDonnell Douglas floated the MD-12 double deck 600-seater which was to evolve from a partnership with Asia led by Taiwan.

In 1992 Airbus launched a competition between its shareholders – Deutsche Airbus, British Aerospace and Aerospatiale – to design what it termed an Ultra High Capacity Aircraft (UHCA). Airbus itself also started an in-house study, with then Airbus director of planning Adam Brown saying that “80 per cent of the seat miles pro-duced by the worldwide fleet of 747s were devoted to long-range, high density routes” with 50 city pairs justifying a 600-seater. Interestingly, Airbus’s initial study called for a horizontal ‘double bubble’ fuselage – a stark contrast to most double deck studies.

Early in 1993 the first reports of possible collabora-tion between Airbus and Boeing on the super jumbo emerged. Although collabora-tion was the aim, Boeing’s initial contact was with Airbus partners Deutsche Airbus (DASA) and British Aerospace.

Analysts all agreed that the market could not support two designs and the development price tag seemed to be beyond one single manufacturer. Boeing’s view at the time was that it could not deal with Airbus as it was a marketing entity and it did not control “physical or financial assets. ” However, the reality may have been that Boeing wanted to drive a wedge between the French and German Airbus partners.

Despite that, Boeing and the Airbus partners signed a collaborative agreement to ex-amine a 1000 passenger Very Large Commercial Transport (VLCT) in early 1993, while Airbus itself pursued its own more modest UHCA studies that focused on ovoid, circu-lar, clover-leaf and horizontal double bubble cross-sections.

Within six months, Airbus announced what would eventually become the A380. It claimed that it could not wait until the outcome of the VLCT study which was due in 1995, but in reality, it was worried about Boeing’s willingness to proceed at all. Airbus’s Brown put the situ-ation into perspective when he said that “Boeing was conducting its own stretch 747 studies while participating in the VLCT evaluation. ” At the time, Airbus envisaged a service entry date of 2003.

The VLCT was in fact proving to be “a monster” with in-flight refuelling and JATO rockets being mooted to get around the takeoff weight problems. Added to that, British Airways, the main driver for the giant jet at the time, had an extraordinary wish list that included: No noise/vibration in the cockpit or cabin; baggage and cargo offload better than the 747; no major maintenance for 10 years; maximum refuel time of 30 minutes; and, no corro-sion inspection for life.

By mid 1995 Boeing was talking to airlines about a far more ambitious 747 upgrade with a new wing. The 747-500X would have a modest 8. 54m stretch with seating for up to 487 in a tri-class configuration, and a range of 8150nm. The 747-600X would have a 14. 3m stretch with seating for 546 in tri-class and a 7200nm range. Both models would incorpo-rate considerable 777 systems.

Orders for more 747-400s from British Airways and United Airlines in 1996 carried options to swap to the new models, and the then high-fly-ing Malaysia Airlines said it wanted to swap six 747-400 orders for 747-600Xs. At the 1996 Farnborough Airshow, Boeing revealed the 747-700X which was a -600X with a wider fuselage to accommodate up to 650 passengers. This was seen by most analysts at the show as Boeing’s spoiler to Airbus’s increased activity on the A3XX. Boeing’s pitch to airlines was “buy the 747-500X/600X and then upgrade to the 747-700X in 2007. ” But Boeing baulked and cancelled the program in mid- January 1997, citing spiralling costs and a weak business case. Wall Street obviously loved the decision, as Boeing’s stock rose US$7 the day after the announcement. At the same time, Airbus also an-nounced that its A3XX design needed more refinement, delaying its launch date by one year. That refinement be-came muddled with the Asian currency crisis devastating key airlines in the region, which shelved any plans for orders for the A3XX or derivatives of the 747.

It was not until the 1999 Paris Airshow that super jumbo activity revived with the 747X development for 2006 delivery to counter the A3XX. But key launch airline Emirates did not buy the derivative story and in May 2000 ordered five A3XXs and took five options.

International Lease Finance Corporation Chairman and CEO Steve Udvar Hazy summed up the situation when he told media that “airline interest and momentum for the A3XX are undeniable. ” Virgin Atlantic’s founder Sir Richard Branson went further, describing the A3XX as a “quantum leap in passenger appeal. ” At the 2000 Farnborough Airshow, Emirates signed up for, and paid deposits on, seven A3XXs including two freighters, Air France signed a Letter of Intent for 10 A3XXs plus 15 options and ILFC placed an order for five. By late September, the flow of orders became an avalanche when Singapore Airlines ordered 10 A3XXs and optioned 15, all powered by Trent 900 engines. On November 29, Qantas broke decades of tradition of order-ing only Boeing jets when it signed up for 12 A3XXs and 13 A330s.

With the Qantas order, Airbus launched the A3XX as the A380 on December 19 2000 with a total of 50 orders and 42 options from six customers – Virgin Atlantic ordering six firm and six op-tions in early December.

The halcyon days of late 2000 are now just a distant memory for Airbus execu-tives, with production prob-lems forcing three changes of CEO. The past 24 months has been particularly difficult with the airline industry and both French and German governments turning a blow torch on Airbus’s manage-ment and production snafus. That scrutiny and a string of bad news announcements has given subeditors around the globe a field day. But perhaps in 20 years time, the A380 will be described with the same passion and affection as the Sydney Opera House or Paris’s Eiffel Tower – two of many global icons that were originally bedevilled with controversy. (Famous author Guy de Maupassant ate lunch at the Tower’s restaurant every day because he said it was the one place in Paris where you couldn’t see the tower!) Of course, in the airline industry there have been many aircraft that had difficult births. The DC-8, dubbed by many as DC-Late, eventually blitzed the 707 in perform-ance and forced Boeing to prematurely build the 747 to counter the Super DC-8s. And the 747’s (well docu-mented) birth pains almost bankrupted Boeing, Pan Am and Pratt & Whitney.

The industry has also seen many aircraft that have captured passengers’ imagina-tion with sometimes small features.

Boeing’s 377 Stratocruiser was a big favourite with passengers because of its intimate lower deck lounge, and the Vickers Viscount was Europe’s most successful airliner – up until the forma-tion of Airbus – because of its huge picture windows and prop-jet speed and quietness in the 1950s. The jet era and the jumbo era caused passen-ger numbers to soar because of speed, comfort and the lowering of airfares.

With the A380, the air-craft’s silky smooth handling qualities and double deck arrangement give it an edge. While there is no question that the A380 has been plagued by production prob-lems and thus bad press, there never has been any question about its flying qualities. And it is those flying qualities, giving an extremely quiet and smooth ride, which Airbus and its airline customers hope will win the hearts and wallets of the flying public. For, if the public flock to the giant jet, the millions of words and countless reports doubting the aircraft’s success will count for nothing.

That is what Emirates president Tim Clark believes, citing that very reason for tak-ing options on another eight A380s at June’s Paris Airshow. “We believe that once the A380 is in service, airlines will want to order it,” Clark said.

Working for Airbus is the giant jet’s status as the new flagship of some of the world’s leading airlines, which are at the cutting edge of market innovation for in-flight product – and none more so than Singapore Airlines. It boasts a host of firsts over the past four decades, including the first airline to give all passengers free drinks and not charge for headsets way back in the late 1960s under the guise of Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA).

Fast forward to late last year and in blizzard condi-tions in Seattle, Singapore Airlines accepted its first two 777-300ERs fitted with its latest “long haul interior” – an interior that once again raises the bar significantly and has been sending an icy wind through competitors’ board-rooms. The airline had hoped to premier the new look on its A380, but the delays put paid to that opportunity.

A major innovation, amongst many, are the new business class seats where the airline has designed significantly wider seats that are located closer together lengthwise than typical flat bed designs but, with clever angling, they turn into 190cm beds.

The Singapore Airlines interior product was four years in the making and has been researched to the extent of allowing passengers in premium classes to sleep in their natural position.

While the first class bed is a consistent width of 89cm, the business class bed narrows at the head and feet areas. But through clever design, it is 76cm wide where it counts – around the waist area.

In the first class cabin, Singapore Airlines has done away with all overhead bins with ample storage in the first class suites, while in business class the overhead centre bins have been removed.

Singapore Airlines, while acknowledging the same first and business class product will be on board the A380, is somewhat tight lipped on “additional features,” but CEO Chew Choon Seng claims with more than a little justification that new product “clearly positions the airline at the top of the very top of the premium market. ” The airline’s IFE system with screens that are 58cm wide in first class and 39cm in business class, and with over 1000 on-demand options, is certainly at the premium end of the market. It is in the IFE that Singapore Airlines and Airbus will be hoping that the airline’s early and sometimes painful introduction of IFE in the early 1990s will pay off with a seamless A380 debut. Reassuringly, it has been near perfect on the 777-300ERs.

The Singapore Airlines A380 interior fit was com-pleted in March, and shake-down testing commenced in early April. The interior product has a focus of giving passengers the ultimate in options on how they spend their flight.

Passengers in all classes can access office software for those without laptops but armed with a USB and, in the premium cabins, passengers can use their own keyboard. Chew said that the pre-mium class products on the A380 are the “most spacious ever to be introduced by a commercial airline. ” While the new product has had a shakedown on the 777-300ER, its integration on the A380 is yet to be tested, as is the A380’s interface with a tight airline schedule. However, an Airbus spokes-man points out that “the A380 has visited Singapore on three occasions and during each visit, Singapore Airlines has been able to build on its expertise through hands-on experience from flying and performance to ground han-dling and airport compatibil-ity. ” On each visit, the airline has been able, over several days, to “perform extensive operability testing. ” These visits have enabled Singapore Airlines to “famil-iarise more ground staff with the aircraft and test handling procedures – including those at the new Terminal 3 at Changi Airport – and bring forward a lot of the work we’d otherwise have to do after delivery. ” While this does not in any way make up for the two-year delay, it enables the airline to enter the aircraft into service only 10 days after delivery.

But in the real world of airline schedules, Singapore Airlines and all A380 operators will be able to benefit from real time monitoring of A380 flights by AIRTAC (AIRbus Technical Aog Centre) where any fault message is sent automatically from the aircraft to AIRTAC and the airline’s maintenance centre.

Airbus launched AIRTAC in 2003 and inaugurated its dedicated AIRTAC support facility in December 2005 to support all of its models with a 24/7 365 day response from specialist engineers.

AIRTAC takes Airbus from a reactive position to a proactive position with the A380, with onboard software monitoring every system and instantly sending an email to AIRTAC as soon as an anomaly is spotted. The in-stant the email is received, the part is ordered to be ready for arrival of the aircraft. Airbus has a “substantial parts inven-tory” in position in Sydney, Singapore and Heathrow to support Singapore Airlines.

Instant response will be es-sential for a smooth introduc-tion given the wide spread of deliveries for the first four A380s to Singapore Airlines. The airline will receive one A380 this year and three up to June 2008. Unlike its previ-ous models, Airbus engaged airlines from the outset on maintenance and design issues for the aircraft, as nearly every part for the aircraft is new and thus the operational experience is very limited.

But the real world is also unforgiving and airport compatibility is going to be a major challenge for the A380 and passengers’ patience. While many airports can indeed handle the A380 from a runway and taxiway perspective, gate access is another matter. This will not affect Singapore Airlines at Changi, Sydney or Heathrow but will, for instance, affect Qantas and six other airlines that plan to operate the A380 to Los Angeles, which plans only two A380 contact gates – Gates 101 and 123 – and four remote gates.

The problem is twofold – the number of aerobridges at A380 compatible gates, and then the number of A380 gates at airports. Remote parking may become com-monplace away from key A380 customer airports.

Changi will be a show-piece A380 airport, as will Dubai, and the A380 spent seven days at that airport in August conducting hot weather airport compat-ibility tests, including four flights with Emirates staff as passengers. Altogether, more than 2000 airline staff and 80 Airbus personnel were involved in over 100 tests that included taxiway, runway and ground support equipment tests, as well as docking trials at the terminal gate and in the Emirates Engineering Centre. Every aspect of the airline’s operation was tested with the A380, and Emirates also brought in staff from around the globe to interface with the A380.

And it is passenger inter-face with the A380 that will be the key to its success. Airbus and the airlines will be hoping that passengers will want to dine on the A380, not as Guy de Maupassant did be-cause he didn’t want to see the ugly Eiffel Tower, but because the A380 is the “best ride in the sky. ”