Defence Update

The three year Phantom lease provided a suitable transition capability from the subsonic Canberra to the Mach 2+ capable F-111 and maintained an effective deterrent in what was then a politically unstable region. It is now history that the F-111C has been a superb strike asset for Australia over the years.

Thirty-seven years later, the RAAF is again looking to acquire an interim or ‘bridging’ capability, as a hedge against potential delays in the development of the F-35 Lightning II JSF , the anointed successor to the RAAF’s F-111 and F/A-18 combat force.

Former Defence minister Senator Robert Hill and former Chief of Air Force (CAF), now Chief of Defence Force (CDF) Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston repeatedly publicly stated that the unique regional strike capability offered by the F-111s would not be relinquished until a series of new capabilities and force multipliers had been put in place. These included the Boeing Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft, the new EADS KC-30B tankers, the 400km+ range JASSM missile and the JDAM precision weapons for the Hornet, and the Hornet’s ongoing structural and capability upgrade program (HUG). Now, several of these ‘single points of failure’ are experiencing delays of up to two years and the Hornet’s centre-barrel replacement (CBR) is under threat due to program partners Canada and the US Navy halting their own CBR work.

Eight years after the program started and nearly six years after the first aircraft were delivered under Phase 1 of HUG, the program is still far from finished and many elements of risk are still to be overcome. Indeed, the HUG process is not due to be completed until 2011, 10 years after the first upgrade phase commenced, and just four years before the F/A-18A/B fleet is due to start being drawn down.

Now, it appears Defence has, rather than retain the F-111 for a few more years which, opted to replace them with Super Hornets. This is despite many in industry and F-111 operators saying its operational life can be extended with minimal risk.

Although one doesn’t need to dig too deep to realise that many within Air Force aren’t too happy with the move, it appears Defence Minister Nelson has not only agreed to ditch the F-111 hedging strategy in favour of the Super Hornet, but to also press forward with an early retirement of the former and a rapid acquisition of the latter.

So, where did this change of tack come from, especially in light of evidence given to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, defence and Trade (JSCFADT) in recent months from both the operators of the jet and from industry that the F-111 is in good condition and probably more reliable than it has ever been? One minute the RAAF is adamant about moving to a single-tiered, stealthy, fifth generation air combat capability, and the next the service appears to have instead accepted what is basically a re-invention of the current Hornet, albeit with slightly greater persistence.

That the ‘Super’ is in many ways more advanced than the RAAF’s current Classic in terms of its crew situational awareness, its ability to put different types of precision weapons simultaneously onto specific targets, its capacity to conduct offensive counter-air (OCA) missions at beyond visual ranges and, perhaps most importantly, its ability to be a key ‘node’ in a networked ‘system of systems’ is beyond question. Additionally, there are probably operating economies to be had in acquiring the Super through the relationships and support channels already in place with both Boeing and the US Navy, as well as some of the aircraft’s systems similarities with those of the Classics.

However, many of the advanced systems being installed in the RAAF’s Classics under the HUG program mean these differences aren’t as great as perhaps Boeing’s marketeers would have us believe.

One major advantage in going to Supers now is that it will ease the pressure reportedly currently being brought to bear upon the ADF (and other SDD/PSFD partners) by the USAF and JSF Program Office (JPO) to take early Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), partially developed Block 2 F-35s from 2012 at upwards of US$100m (A$125+m) each. This would then allow the RAAF to wait a couple of years until Block 3 or even Block 4 ‘all up round’ jets become available from 2017.

These later Blocks will not only be much further down the development path and therefore more combat-ready and easier to introduce but, due to their later positioning in the build run, should also be cheaper than the Block 2 jets, provided current planned build numbers are not drastically reduced.

Further, the Super’s APG- 79 AESA radar, advanced open architecture backbone, integrated and network-able systems, low observability characteristics and other advanced make it a good stepping stone from the fourth generation Classic Hornets to the fifth generation fully integrated F-35.

All of these arguments are supported by Boeing marketeers, who go on to add that a Classic pilot only requires five rides to convert to the Super. But being proficient in the circuit and being an accomplished combat rated pilot on a type are two very different realities, therefore many of the issues involved for aircrews in converting from the Classic to any new type would also apply to the Super. Similarly, although some of the aircraft’s systems are common, the Super’s maintenance manuals and technical documentation are no doubt very different to those of the Classic, as will much of the aircraft-specific tooling and ground support equipment.

Boeing reportedly first presented its Super Hornet-based Project Archangel proposal to a receptive Dr Nelson as recently as last September after previously being given little official encouragement by his predecessor and Air Force hierarchy. It appears Boeing officials were asked to come back with a firm proposal, and in early December during the visit to Australia by Boeing Integrated Defense Systems head Jim Albaugh for the RAAF’s first C-17 delivery, he was purported to have addressed the government’s National Security Committee and presented a letter of offer which included a negotiated agreement in principle with the US Navy to release sufficient early Super production slots for RAAF jets within 18 months.

Sources claim the price offered for the jets was about 10 per cent lower than the commonly quoted US Navy’s unit recurring flyaway cost (URFC) of about US$54m (A$69m), in line with Boeing’s stated goal to get the URFC price of the Super Hornet down to as low as US$45m (A$57m) a copy. It should, however, be pointed out that this URFC price quickly rises to a more realistic US$80m+ (A$100m+) unit procurement cost (UPC) when the nonrecurring cost component for production (tooling, engineering support, quality control etc) is added to make up the unit flyaway cost (UFC), and then such items as technical publications, contractor services, support and training equipment, factory training and initial spares stocks are taken into account. Then there are the costs of any new basing infrastructure, ground support equipment, type-specific tooling, simulators, computer-based training hardware and courseware, and other ancillary equipment.

The whole Project Archangel strategy, which was based in part on the premise of an early F-111 retirement, must have been a difficult pill for Boeing Australia to swallow.

On the one hand, Boeing head office had the opportunity to place shiny new Super Hornets with the RAAF with high confidence of follow on orders if the rival product from its main global defence competitor, Lockheed Martin, slips.

However, Boeing Australia also currently employs about 450 highly skilled engineering, technical, trade, maintenance, logistical and support staff at its Amberley facility which, in the past decade, has defined and developed a sole-operator support, maintenance and upgrade capability for the complex F-111 fleet. If the Super sale goes ahead, it’s likely much of this national asset will begin shutting down from 2008, with much of the expertise built up on the jet over the past few decades either moving on or lost to Australian industry forever.

Meanwhile, this ‘Cuckoo in the Nest’ as the Super Hornet has been dubbed by many elements within industry and on Russell Hill appears, on face value at least to have been forced upon the RAAF by a Minister who is anxious to cover the looming capability gap early next decade, seemingly without much foresight into what future implications it may have for the F-35 or any other fifth generation options in Australia. Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd was reportedly in Washington in late January to explain to Lockheed Martin, the JPO and the USAF of the likely Super acquisition, and was unlikely to have been given a warm reception, as it’s fair to assume that these organisations, all of whom probably see Australia as ‘their turf ’ by virtue of our participation in the F-35 SDD and PSFD phases, are aware of the potential longerterm repercussions of an Australian Super Hornet sale to their F-35 ambitions.

However, the whole Super vs F-35 debate may become immaterial if the F-35 slips much further to the right and, as many expect, the upgraded Classics are unable to keep pace. In that case the RAAF is likely to require more than just the 24 Super Hornets currently being talked about in order to be able to maintain an effective combat force, a proposition which no doubt Boeing is banking on. Such a scenario may therefore have severe budgetary ramifications on the JSF budget, reducing the overall number of F-35s the RAAF could eventually afford. At this stage the RAAF says that funding for the first batch of Super Hornets will not come out of the JSF budget, but this may not be the case if any followon Super orders are placed.

Air Marshal Shepherd told Australian Aviation last August, “we need to get out of the F-111 business to get us the head space to get into the JSF business”. But at least some of that ‘F-111 head space’, including human and monetary resources, will now likely be diverted to Super Hornet business.