Risky business

However, successful projects like this one are few and far between, with a litany of delayed and costly overrun acquisitions still to see the light of day, let alone enter active front-line service.

A quick run down the list sees the EADS KC-30B (formerly the A330MRTT) tankers pushed back by about 18 months from the original schedule of late 2007 due to delays in getting the EADS designed flying boom to work; the Boeing 737-based Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft delayed by 18 months due to systems integration issues; the Tiger ARH falling behind schedule due to certification delays from Europe, capability creep, and long term support issues with the manufacturer; the F/A-18’s ALR-2002 radar warning receiver recently being scrapped in favour of the originally recommended ALR-67(v)2 with a resulting delay of more than a year; the Navy’s ‘FFG-up’ project to fit forward-mounted vertical launch systems (VLS) to four of our six 1970s vintage Perry class frigates resulting in delays of more than 12 months and ships with reported sea-keeping issues; the F-111C’s AGM-142 stand-off missile which finally entered service in early 2006 after a nearly decade long integration process, and only four to six years before the aircraft is due to be retired; and perhaps the most public example of all, the Navy’s SH-2G(A) Super Seasprites.

Despite being ordered more than a decade ago, after the ship they were intended for was cancelled, and then being due to enter service in 2001, the Seasprites are yet to have many of their systems certified and have their ergonomics and quirky uncommanded flight control characteristics fixed.

That we usually eventually end up with great capabilities is not in question, it’s just the ‘methods in the madness’ of the processes in getting to service entry that appears to need review. All of these projects are examples where Australia has been or is the lead or sole customer for a very complex upgrade of an aging asset, or the introduction of a new and technically challenging capability.

The messages coming out of Canberra in recent years have been mixed; on the one hand our defence leadership says we are a “blue collar” defence force, which often cannot always afford the best equipment and must make the best of what we have and what we can afford; while on the other they have continued to recommend we invest in these hugely risky projects, often with predictable results! Defence Minister Nelson has been in the job for almost a year now and appears, on face value at least, to be getting a handle on many of these ‘legacy’ programs.

He has been seen to either distance himself from them by labelling them as such, or has been busy putting hedges in place in case of further slippages or overruns.

Nelson is undoubtedly ambitious and, if reports are correct, probably sees himself as a future Prime Minister.

Therefore, he will not want projects from his current tenure as Defence Minister coming back to haunt him if he makes a run for the Lodge in the years to come.

With that said, he has already cancelled the Hornet’s ALR-2002, and appears likely to cancel the Seasprite. (One Seasprite replacement option is buying a half dozen or so ex-USN SH-60B Seahawks to relieve the 16 operational S-70Bs of training and utility duties. ) Nelson has also asked the RAAF to establish an Air Combat Transition Office (ACTO) to study possible alternatives to the F-35 JSF, should that program be significantly delayed. No doubt it was no coincidence senior Boeing IDS (Integrated Defense Systems) managers reportedly met with highranking defence officials and senior politicians in early December to discuss terms and possible Australian industry opportunities for a ‘bridging’ acquisition of 24 to 36 Super Hornets under a plan Boeing has dubbed ‘Project Archangel’.

Whatever his motivations, Minister Nelson appears to be actively looking for ways, and putting processes in place, to mitigate risk throughout the ADF’s key projects, and that can’t be a bad thing. One can only hope he can succeed where so many of his predecessors did not.