Back to the Antarctic

In his report, Justice Peter Mahon concluded, “In my opinion the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. That mistake is directly attributable not so much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative procedures which made the mistake possible. Neither Captain Collins nor the First Officer or Flight Engineer made any error which contributed to the disaster. They were not responsible for its occurrence.”

Though Justice Mahon’s unprecedented comments caused great embarrassment to the then government, who was the airline’s major shareholder, the focus on Air New Zealand’s administrative mishandling of Flight TE901 urged a major review of its navigation and flight operations, and a substantial improvement in the level of communication between management and aircrew.

Fundamental to the accident was that new navigation points that had been entered into the DC-10’s INS were incorrect. These new coordinates were intended to correct a previous mistake which had lain in the navigation computer for some 14 months before. On entering the new coordinates, however, a keystroke error created an inaccuracy of 2 degrees, equivalent to 27 miles east off the planned heading.

The desired track of 164° 48′ E would take the aircraft down the western coast adjacent to Victoria Land at FL160 to the US Navy base at McMurdo, after which the pilot could descend in VMC to FL060 around the Mt Erebus area for sightseeing excursions. This track was close to the established military route frequently used by US C-141s and C-130s. The INS information updated in the early hours of the morning, just five hours before the aircraft’s departure from Auckland at 0630, took the aircraft on a heading of 166° 58′, directly to the slopes of Mt Erebus.

Significantly, the aircrew was not advised of these changes by flight planning and performed a departure based on the headings and waypoints discussed in the briefing the previous day. After arriving in the area of McMurdo and adjacent Mt Erebus where a descent to FL060 had been flown as per normal operating procedures, Capt Collins and his crew became uncertain of their position as a result of the changed coordinates and weather that had quickly deteriorated around them. Mt Erebus was shrouded in cloud and not visible.

In the whiteout conditions experienced by the crew, the effects of which had not been explained to any of the crew during briefings, the lack of horizon and surface definition added to the crew’s disorientation. The captain’s sensible decision to climb to clearer air came 44 seconds before the aircraft hit the slopes of the volcano at approximately 1500ft with all three engines spooled up for climb out.

Investigations during the Commission showed that the radar aboard the DC-10 would not have provided the crew sufficient information on the terrain that lay ahead of them. Certainly they were not expecting Mt Erebus to be immediately ahead of them. Justice Mahon stated that the pilot could hardly be criticised “for not actually seeing an optical illusion.”

The professional conduct of the Civil Aviation Division of the Department of Transport also came under the scrutiny of the Mahon Commission. The CAD had approved Air New Zealand’s briefing material which had excluded information on whiteout, it had approved the flight plan and had not enforced a requirement for pilots in command to have had previous practical or observer experience flying in Antarctica.

TE901 had clearly become a victim of human factors, the most serious of which lay in the poor communication between flight crew and the flight operations management. There was certainly no one single contributing factor to the demise of TE901, but rather a combination of these human factors that together allowed a flight to progress into a hapless situation. Therein lay the foundation for Qantas’ planning for the resumption of charter flights to Antarctica on New Year’s Eve 1994.

Planning the Charters

Qantas immediately set about establishing a taskforce, comprising senior management captains and engineers, to consider every operational aspect of flying to and within the Antarctic region, and including those conditions known to be experienced aboard TE901. Some twelve months of planning was ultimately undertaken by this task force prior to the first charter.

Limiting the operational risks of the charters was paramount. Qantas Captain Trevor Jensen, Head of 747 Operations and the special taskforce, explains that many lessons were learned from the Air New Zealand accident of fifteen years ago, and the planning of the new charters considered all of the contributing factors outlined in Justice Mahon’s findings in the Royal Commission report.

“Quite obviously there are still quite a lot of memories of the last series of charters, and the unfortunate ending to them. However, you have to learn from mistakes – that is the message. What I assumed was that it doesn’t matter what caused the accident – every factor was the cause,” he says.

Arising from a thorough study of the Royal Commission documents and various publications that followed, the taskforce developed a checklist of known and potential factors contributing to the Air New Zealand incident. Around 50 specific items for consideration beyond the normal operational requirements were listed, including 32 major points outlined in the Royal Commission.

Progressively ‘ticking off’ each of these points answered airline and Civil Aviation Authority concerns about the operational viability of flights to the region. All that remained was ensuring that the flight planning was made in full accord with the issues raised in the ‘checklist’, and that the Qantas operating procedures that provided far greater safety margins, were strictly adhered to.

Each flight carried aboard an aircraft commander, a supernumerary captain, a first officer, a second officer and two flight engineers. Unlike the Air New Zealand operations of 1979, prior to operating as an aircraft commander the Qantas captain must have previously operated to Antarctica as a crewmember, to provide a practical familiarisation with conditions and the unique operating environment.

Flight briefings conducted prior to each flight included basic operational information such as the routes to be flown, weather and fuel calculations, in addition to the more unique aspects of cold weather altimetry procedures Antarctic meteorological phenomena including ‘whiteout’, emergency planning, communications procedures and notification of the minimum approved altitudes for each phase of the flight.

Concerns about the stress that would be placed on the limited resources of the scientific community in Antarctica in the event of difficulties were also considered in planning taking into account routes to be flown, fuel reserves and procedures under abnormal conditions such as engine(s) out and decompression.

Ensuring the widest possible input, Qantas sought further advice and information from the National Science Foundation of the United States, the New Zealand Antarctic Programme, Operation Deep Freeze, No 40 Sqn RNZAF, No 37 Sqn RAAF, Greenpeace, the Australian CAA and the Australian Antarctic Division.

A significant part of Qantas’ planning efforts was involved in preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty Act 1980, in which Qantas proposed that the charter operations would not adversely affect the environment of the continent.

Although the Australian Antarctic Division determined that the activity is likely to have no more than a negligible impact on the environment, it required that flights provide a sideline separation of no less than 1nm from all known penguin colonies. The penguins, like many humans, are taken to watching overflying aircraft, though their stature renders them incapable of remaining upright when gazing at a moving object immediately above them!

Greenpeace supports the overflight initiative, which it suggests is the most appropriate form of tourism to Antarctica given its minimal impact on the landscape. Trevor Jensen says, “The EIS was very much part of the planning. Hopefully we have put forward a document which can be used as a benchmark for tourism in the Antarctic.” Indeed the charter overflights create less disturbance on the ground than do the activities of scientific crew and their aircraft, and land and sea based transports.

Flight Planning

“All the routes we fly have been set in concrete,” affirms Trevor Jensen, explaining that there can be no variation to the flight plans and minima set out in the company’s operating procedures. The 16 flight paths selected by the taskforce for their scenic values were subsequently given to uninvolved supervisory flight officers for critical and objective appraisal before final determinations were made.

The six flights of the charter season alternated departures from Sydney and Melbourne, tracking via Hobart south via the great circle route to one of four Antarctic entry points: Cape Adare, Casey Station, Leningradskaya and the South Magnetic Pole (60S42). From the entry point, the flights tracked by one of the 16 sightseeing routes around the coast of the Australian and French territories according to the prevailing weather conditions before heading north to the Australian mainland via the great circle route once more. Each flight passed via the South Magnetic Pole, where each passenger could witness the magnetic interference with the compass they had been given as part of special souvenir packs issued after takeoff.

Each flight departed Australia with full tanks, which for the series 300 meant just under 160 tonnes. The safety margins provided in having full tanks ensured that in the event of decompression or single or two engine failure, the aircraft could return to Hobart or mainland Australia with around 30t of fuel remaining.

As Trevor Jensen explains, “We are in the fortunate situation where if we had a double engine failure over Antarctica, to improve the performance of the aircraft we should theoretically dump fuel; though we would not do that. This shows, though, the ‘fat’ in the limits with which we will be operating. If we got into a problem down there, then fuel is not one of the factors that is going to prohibit us.”

Emergency airports available to the aircraft in extreme cases included Invercargill and Dunedin on the south island of New Zealand, and in the most dire of circumstances, McMurdo Sound Station or the Italian Terra Nova Station.

Cruising was planned at optimum flight level for Minimal Cost Cruise, after leaving Hobart block altitudes/non standard flight levels could be requested until reaching 60°S, from which point the aircraft would be under the control of McMurdo ATC. Navigation south of 60°S is based on the Grid method of Grid = True + East Longitude. Though the INS performs normally south of 60°S and the probability of losing all three INS units aboard the 747 simultaneously exceeds one in a billion, all directions given by McMurdo Centre are provided in Grid.

Flight charts were specially prepared covering route segments in high detail, and clearly stating Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) and company approved limits (see example of strip map). The charts were developed to minimise workload and maximise immediate information.

ATPL

78% pass rate (last 15 months) 3.5 week course including CASA exam Max five students, no min number required Free second course, if needed 11 courses per year Instructor with 7 years ATPL experience Budget accommodation nearby Courses held in Adelaide CBD Fee $1900 (CASA exam fee $100 extra) For starting dates and further information, contact: AIRLINE GROUND SCHOOLS 240a Grote Street, ADELAIDE 5000 Ph (08) 233 6421; Fax (08) 231 6813

Australian Aviation December 1995

A Minimum Company Approved Altitude was nominated for each route segment in the Antarctic, of never less than Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA), and makes allowance for cold weather altimeter correction and various environmental requirements.

The MSA was calculated by taking the highest known elevation on topographic charts within a 100nm (185km) range of the segment, including a semicircular area of 100nm (185km) radius at either end of the segment, and applying a buffer of 2000ft. In the event of non VMC flying conditions and position uncertainty, an immediate climb out to FL250 became operating procedure.

Given differences between the cold Antarctic atmosphere and Standard Atmosphere, the altimeters would overestimate. For example, if the altimeter indicates 10,000ft in an environment that is uniformly 20°C colder than the ICAO standard, the actual altitude would be 9200ft.

Cruising during sightseeing excursions was limited to 250kt (465km/h) IAS or Holding +10kt (19km/h), with no flap extension permitted due to the possibility of ice accretion.

Communications between the aircraft and the Sydney Operations Center was assisted by Telstra (Telecom Australia), providing a dedicated link via satellite. Communications with bases on the Antarctic continent is via VHF and HF. Brisbane ATC provided primary guard on the SP network as far south as 60°S. McMurdo assumed guard from that point south on the Deep Freeze network in an advisory capacity only. No SELCAL is available in the Antarctic region. NDBs are located at Macquarie Island, McMurdo and Casey, while a VOR/DME is located at the French base of Dumont d’Urville.

Weather information was available to flight operations and the aircraft en route, supplied by McMurdo Station. Four analyses provided planners with the opportunity to select the best of the 16 available flight paths for sightseeing. Preflight weather reports including SATPIX were available at ETD -24 hours for the planning strategy brief and at -3 hours for the actual mission briefing. En route weather updates provided inflight tactical analysis, while the crew were advised of notable weather changes by Sydney Flight Operations as necessary.

All weather information supplied by McMurdo Centre is received in the American format, an example below is a forecast for 02DEC94.

NPX TAF 2121, GRID06005KT, 9999 SCT040, QNH2861INS; BECMG2301, GRID3401018KT, 9000 SG IC, BKN040 CIG040; TEMPO 0120, GRID 32012G20KT 3200 SG IC BLSN OVC020 CIG020.

Decoded, the forecast reads: South Pole forecast for 2100Z to 2100Z (Time Zulu), Grid winds 060 at 05kt, unrestricted visibility, scattered clouds at 4000ft, minimum alt setting 28.61 inches. From 2300Z to 0100Z, the prevailing conditions will change to grid winds 340 at 10kt the gusts to 18kt, 9000 metres visibility in snow grains and ice crystals, broken clouds at 4000ft forming a ceiling. There will be temporary conditions from 0100Z to 2100Z of grid winds 320 at 12kt, gusts to 20kt, 3200 metres visibility in snow grains, ice crystals and blowing snow with overcast clouds and ceiling at 2000ft.

Antarctica’s visibility is phenomenal given the lack of atmospheric contaminants, with visibility frequently in excess of 160km. The continent also holds the world’s lowest surface temperature record of -89°C, at Vostok.

The Flight – QF2602

For the flight on January 7, QF2602 would be taking the prime sightseeing route of Alpha 3, selected following a study of the projected weather based on SATPIX information from McMurdo Centre. An expansive cloud cell was clearing to the east, and it was expected that this clearing weather would provide some spectacular views of the mountainous areas of Victoria Land, with the area bounded by Cape Adare, Kalva and Leningradskaya containing peaks in the range of 6000ft to 9000ft; the region’s highest peak is Mount Minto at 13,658ft.

Route A03 (see map) departs Sydney on a track of 168°, thence directly to Cape Adare at FL330. Fuel onboard was 159,700kg, providing a TOW of 367,200kg, with an estimated elapsed time of 4.5 hours to arrival at the Cape at an average speed of 490kt (908km/h) TAS.

Windblown Macquarie Island, an Australian sub-Antarctic territory, devoid of any tree or shrub but home to thousands of migratory birds and sea mammals, gave passengers and the Antarctic experts aboard the aircraft, a rare showing: the island is apparently swathed in cloud for an average of 364 days a year!

A cockpit mounted video camera linked to the cabin monitors provided the first view south to the ice flows slowly streaming north from the colder Antarctic waters. Around 45 minutes out from Cape Adare, the site of the first Antarctic landing nearly 100 years before, the icepack below the aircraft has become thicker, stranding massive icebergs in the frozen sea. At this point the descent to a modest 19,000ft commences, allowing a safe though pleasing perspective of the land below. Approaching Adare, huge cliffs and craggy mountains up to 9000ft loom out of the clouds allowing an intermittent and tempting glimpse of Victoria Land. Veil-like clouds fall over the cliffs like a scene from a sorcerer’s tale.

Further north to Cape Hallett and another 25 minutes into the flight, more stark images of the coastline are visible, though the weather that had been forecast to clear had not done so, and a track to the west was commenced just north of Hallett, following the Admiralty Mountain Range northwest to the disused Russian base at Leningradskaya. Clear of the Range the aircraft was lowered to FL110.

The ensuing feeding frenzy of passengers at windows all keen for a long and lasting view of the coastline was well mannered, with everyone elated at what most considered a once in a lifetime opportunity. As the aircraft weaved its way within the 100nm (185km) width of the permissible flight path, all passengers were provided excellent viewing.

The charter organisers, Croydon Travel, arranged Antarctic expeditioners to speak on board, explaining the many fascinating natural attributes and life of the world’s windiest continent which is nearly twice the size of Australia.

Facts such as: Antarctica is the highest continent on earth at an average elevation of 2300m; in winter when the sea ice reaches its maximum extent an additional 20 million square kilometres of pack ice surrounds the continent; 90% of the world’s ice and 60 to 70% of its fresh water is locked up in Antarctic ice caps; only 0.4% of the continent is not covered by ice…

Travelling west along the coast to Cape Hudson en route to Dumont d’Urville provided clear weather and with the speed reduced to 281kt (521km/h), there were enough photographic opportunities to make any mini-lab happy. Becoming visible in the midst of huge spired icebergs, tinged with turquoise waters where the ice sinks to the depths of the surrounding ocean, was the highly developed French base with its controversial sealed runway, hangars and extensive service buildings. The immensity of Antarctica is apparent as the buildings and runway give some scale to the features of the surrounding landscape.

The flight continued west for a further 20 minutes to the Dibble Iceberg Tongue before heading for the South Magnetic Pole, giving passengers a chance to witness first hand the effects of the earth’s magnetic field.

At the official conclusion of the sightseeing programme, VH-EBV commenced its climb to FL370 for Hobart at a cruise speed of 487kt (902km/h) TAS (a ground speed up to 533kt/988km/h), though not before flying a figure eight round a huge tabular iceberg of a few square kilometres as a lasting vista of Antarctica for the passengers.

On leaving the South Magnetic Pole, the aircraft had used 94,300kg of fuel and it was calculated that upon arrival in Sydney some 12.01 hours after departing, 30,000kg of fuel would still remain, providing the safety margin and reserves that helped to ensure the flight’s wellbeing.

Upon return to Sydney, VH-EBV had set a place in the record books for having flown Australia’s longest domestic sector at around 11,400km. QF2602 had also contributed to the $50,000 raised for the Royal Flying Doctor Service from the current series of charters.

The Future of Antarctic Flights

The need for charters to resume to the Antarctic had long been recognised before Melbourne based Croydon Travel and Qantas joined forces to plan this new series of charters. With the general level of interest in Antarctica growing steadily after the Erebus incident eventually subsided, and tourism to the Antarctic continent growing in other regions of the world, overflights to the continent provide a cost effective and potentially much less harmful way for thousands of travellers each year to visit the white beauty of this largely unexplored land. Nearly 15,000 people are expected to set foot on Antarctica during 1995, the vast majority by ship from South America and a fewer number from New Zealand.

The sensitivity surrounding the environmental impact on Antarctica of human activities will continue to dominate tour company’s and airline’s plans for future excursions to the continent.

With the operational requirements taken care of through the intensive planning for the charter flights by Capt Jensen and his taskforce, the way is now clear for similar operations in coming summer seasons.

“I believe we have covered the risk element, and from a tourism point of view, the way we are doing it is protecting the environment and keeping it pristine”, Trevor Jensen says. “And by doing it this way, about 2000 people will have seen the Antarctic, without being able to write on a rock or steal a rock, or chase a penguin.”

Following the unqualified success of this season’s charters, Croydon Travel is already planning another season of up to 16 charters commencing November this year. One of the flights has already been booked out as a corporate incentive.

Certainly it is one of the more comfortable ways of seeing the world’s last great frontier, from the safety of an armchair with a glass of champagne in one hand, and a pair of binoculars in the other. The boarding pass with Sydney to Antarctica printed on it serves as a more tangible reminder that, together with photographs, will add to the striking memories of a unique day away.

The author wishes to thank Capt Trevor Jensen of Qantas and Phil Asker of Croydon Travel for their assistance in compiling this report. Further information about the tours can be obtained from Croydon Travel on (03) 9725 8555.