Airbus A3:XX and the Super Jumbo Battle

Believe they did though and by the end of that decade not only the heavy lift Lockheed C-5A Galaxy (from which military programme the Boeing product evolved) but the smaller though no less technically challenging TriStar and DC-10 trijets had been launched in company with Boeing’s 747 flagship. Consequently, in the mid nineties there is no great problem in appreciating that certainly by a decade’s time there will most definitely be a need for a long haul 700 to 800 passenger airliner.

The long term requirement for an eventual 747 replacement has been on the airframers’ mind for a decade now. Boeing has often floated the idea of a 747-500, essentially a slightly stretched and rewinged version of the existing -400 only with the upper deck extended the full length of the fuselage. This aircraft though, whilst having something in the order of a 500 to 550 three class pax capacity, would not have the very long range capabilities that so endear its predecessor, the 747-400. Indeed, it is this ultra long range capability whilst carrying around 400 pax that makes the -400 the success that it presently is. A larger 747 would be obviously required in the years ahead, though to be a long term success it must have a max pax range at least equal to the existing Boeing flagship.

Around a thousand nautical miles south of Seattle lies Long Beach, the home of McDonnell Douglas. MDC played for a long time with the idea of building a high tech competitor/successor to the 747, designated the MD-12. This aircraft achieved considerable attention through the 1992/93 period when it was hoped that the government of Taiwan would become involved with MDC as a major partner. Like a lot of big money technically ambitious projects that have been mooted with the Taiwanese it all came to nothing, and with struggling MD-80 twinjet and MD-11 trijet lines the folk at Long Beach obviously thought there were better ways to spend the several billion dollars of development money needed just to get their megajet to the flightline and so have quietly dropped the project. Though not in the VLA category, this aircraft would have been in reality less capacious than Boeing’s projected 747-500 and available at considerably more cost.

Thus with Boeing coy about pushing the -500 at a time of rapidly falling sales amid a world of unprofitable airlines struggling in a sea of red ink and the MD-12 declared a non-runner, the door was left open for Airbus Industrie on the other side of the Atlantic to begin talking aggressively of taking on Boeing in its very heartland – the domain of the megajet, a market ruled unchallenged by Boeing for a quarter century.

The Boeing response naturally was to crank up interest in its own 600 to 800 passenger megajet whilst keeping the -500 in mind if a lower cost, lower capacity solution should be preferred by its customers, who after all are the people who dictate at the end of the day what is successful and what is not. The airframers build the planes, the airlines buy and fly them and we passengers make our fiscal votes of confidence at the check-in counters. Get that equation wrong and you are out of business!

So, through 1993 both Airbus and Boeing were working quietly on their own versions of what a megajet should be. Both dishing out just enough PR to keep each other at bay in terms of one manufacturer taking over the running in the eyes of the media, and thus the world. About the only thing that both truly agreed on was that, like the next generation supersonic transport, there could only be one single project if it was to prove a financial success.

History is indeed full of rivals going to market with competing aircraft types that at the end of the day ensured neither made money; the DC-10/L-1011 battle of the seventies was not that long ago to remain fresh in the minds of those within Airbus and Boeing’s corridors of power.

However, through 1993 it would be Boeing that would dictate the running due to some very clever maneuvering that for a time had its Toulouse rival well and truly hedged. Later that same year Boeing scored a coup against Airbus when it neatly signed up most of Airbus’ members to become involved with it in defining their ideas, both marketing and technical, of what the megajet, or Very Large Aircraft (Very Large Commercial Transport, the original designation, has since been dropped) should become.

Obviously caught out on a very thin limb, Airbus Industrie itself agreed to join the research programme in early 1994. Consequently, the partners in the VLA study have just completed what was a very busy two years study embracing precisely what the VLA should be. Comprising Boeing, Airbus Industrie, Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, CASA, and Daimler Benz Aerospace, the team will now refine its deliberations with the aim being to have a concise report on the future of the VLA issued in the first quarter of 1995.

In the meantime both Boeing and Airbus have their own interpretations of what the VLA should look like. Whilst Boeing has been fairly low profile on its aspirant, the opposite is probably true for Airbus. The European consortium doesn’t mind these days giving its US rival a boot where it hurts as the competition between the two mounts as Airbus heads towards challenging Boeing later this decade for overall supremacy as the largest civilian airframe manufacturer in the world.

The European giant just pipped Boeing in sales value last year with around 30% of the world total thanks principally to the large number of A330/340 sales recorded against Boeing’s numerical concentration on the much cheaper 737 range. Airbus foresees a total world airliner market worth $US1,000,000 billion over the next 20 years and aims to get at least 50% of the market where it has aircraft types available.

Thus if Airbus proceeds on its own with the A3XX (as it is dubbed) and Boeing doesn’t respond either with a 747-500 (more on that later) or a VLA of its own, then Airbus will do the same to Boeing through the first two decades of the next century as Boeing did to MDC and Lockheed during the seventies and eighties with the all-conquering 747.

A3XX-100 Cabin Layout (3 Class)

10+8 abreast Economy class: 569 seats (298 economy class, 24 first class, 101 business class, 146 economy class).

Seat pitches: First 60″; Business 38″; Economy 32″.

I don’t need to tell you that Boeing cannot afford to let this happen, so be prepared for some interesting VLA orientated fisticuffs between the two in the coming year or so unless an agreement to co-operate is forthcoming as a result of the VLA group’s studies.

The Airbus A3XX is indeed an interesting aircraft, though notably conservative in its design from an engineering point of view. Our graphics better tell the A3XX story, though essentially the aircraft will be available in two fuselage lengths. A -100 standard fuselage design will lead the programme (if it proceeds) and a stretched -200 will provide greater capacity whilst sacrificing range, though a later high growth weight model will later recapture the range of the smaller -100 once the market demands this extra capacity. A simple approach to ensuring that you have enough growth in your basic model to be able to cater for the needs of the airlines a decade after they make their first order.

The -100 provides long haul three class seating for 550 passengers against a typical 410 for today’s 747-400. In a two class medium range configuration, typical of routes within Asia, North America, Europe and the trans-Atlantic, the -100 can accommodate around 650. For short haul ‘domestic’ operations, such as those used by the Japanese with their 570 passenger single class 747SRs, the -100 can accommodate up to 850 at a tight 30″ pitch. In either configuration it will have a max takeoff weight of 476 tonnes (1,049,000lb) for a range of 7400nm (13,710km) whilst also carrying up to 30 LD3 containers or 10 pallets of underfloor cargo. The passenger numbers can also be boosted by incorporating underfloor galleys and restroom facilities, thereby freeing the main deck purely for passenger accommodation. This is an option presently being offered on the A330/340 and likely to be taken up by more than one customer in the coming year.

Meanwhile, the stretched A3XX-200 will carry between 650 in a three class configuration and upwards of 966 in an all economy arrangement. The -200 will have a max takeoff weight of 519 tonnes (1,144,000lb) and be capable of taking 38 LD3s or 12 pallets of underfloor freight. The remarkable thing regarding both variants is that the present generation of big fan engines used for the A330 will suffice, with the -100 requiring four engines of 66,000lb (270kN) thrust and the heavier -200 requiring powerplants of some 71,000lb (320kN). The present day Rolls-Royce Trent, Pratt & Whitney PW4000 series and General Electric’s CF6-80E all comfortably provide this power with proven economy, performance and reliability.

Launch model would be the baseline A3XX-100 (designated A350) which would be followed by the extended range heavier gross weight -100R offering a max pax capability of 8400nm (15,565km), fully a 1000nm (1850km) increase over its already long ranging brother. At about the same time the stretched -200 would be in development, offering greater passenger uplift with the 7400nm (13,710km) range of the smaller baseline -100. Finally the -300 itself will benefit by an increase in takeoff weight and additional thrust to boost its passenger capacity at a marginal decrease in range. Carrying 700 passengers in a three class configuration, the A3XX-300 will have a range of some 7000nm (12,970km).

As the accompanying graphics show, the A3XX is a two deck airliner with the main deck being only marginally wider than the top deck, which unlike that on the present 747, extends the full length of the fuselage. The cabin is slightly wider than that of the 747 and thus can accept economy class seats one inch wider than usual. Airbus did this with the A320 and it helps to provide a better standard of comfort for the economy class traveller. In the end it’s the little things like this that allow an airline’s marketing department to really make use of the forward thinking of the original design team when passenger comfort is placed high on the list of priorities.

Upper deck access is by way of two staircases, one fore and one aft, whilst typically the aircraft would be configured to embark/disembark passengers via three forward jetways and perhaps one rear airstair. It is envisaged that this procedure must be undertaken in the same timeframe as that presently accepted for the 747. Greater use of computerised multi channel boarding pass processing perhaps accompanied by sequential loading will certainly assist in this regard. The A3XX is also being designed to be fully compatible with present generation airport servicing equipment with turnaround undertaken in the same timeframe as presently experienced in today’s operating environment.

The A3XX has also been designed to fit the classic 80m square box that is the operational jetway benchmark for all present and future airports. Roughly the same length as the 747, the new Airbus giant would only be radically different in jetway handling when its greater wingspan is taken into account, 77m versus 65m for the 747-400. Undercarriage footprint is also well within that required by ICAO and in fact expected to be less than the pavement loading requirement of the 747-400.

In an aircraft of this size though, one of the many technologically significant challenges to be overcome will simply be designing a complete undercarriage system that provides the necessary support whilst being as light as possible. Airbus is looking at a multi bogie arrangement of some 24 wheels. This in itself would constitute a structural weight in the region of 20 tonnes, roughly the equivalent to 200 passengers and their baggage. Consequently, it might well be viable to employ high cost, high strength, low weight titanium alloy in the landing gear as a trade off between design weight and cost.

It is interesting to note that Airbus has discarded the possibility of offering folding wingtips to increase the span, and thus the aerodynamic efficiency of the A3XX’s wing. When the A300 was designed back in the late sixties it had an aspect ratio of 7.7:1, today’s A330/340 boast something in the order of 10:1, whilst if this was applied to the A3XX the span would exceed 85m. The aerodynamics of such a long span aircraft would be superb, only problem is that it wouldn’t be able to operate into many of the world’s airports, either present or planned. This obviously is not an ideal scenario. Airbus has thus opted for an aspect ratio of 8.2.

Another interesting aspect of aircraft this large is the wake vortex created by their mere passing. Airbus is consequently conducting research studies on the use of small wingtip generators and turbines that break up the tubular vortex traditionally created at low speed by heavy jets. Wake vortex considerations already create enough problems at airports both in safety and ATC timing delays, and if the new generation of megajets further complicate this problem then much of their potential benefit could well be nullified by this design peculiarity. So far AI research with the wingtip turbines has shown a decrease in wake vortex in the region of 70% compared with a design without wingtip devices. A useful byproduct of these small turbines is that they could also provide a nil cost secondary source of electrical and hydraulic power.

Another problem to be solved that is created by the sheer bulk of the aircraft is its effect upon noise during the approach phase of its mission. An aircraft this large with flaps and gear fully extended will create an enormous shockwave of energy that will be difficult to quell. Whilst the A3XX will have absolutely no problem meeting the most stringent Stage 3 noise requirements, it may well find itself in difficulties if the often mooted Stage 4 requirement ever becomes fact early next century. On the other hand, many would contend that an aircraft this size actually reduces noise overall due to the fact that three of these services, for instance, could well replace five or so regular 747 movements, thus reducing the real time noise factor considerably. However, environmental agencies and their supporters may well not be as enthusiastic at interpreting our example with the optimistic endorsement that perhaps we have given it!

Aerodynamically the aircraft is little different from the 747 in terms of frontal drag area. However, Airbus is working hard to reduce airframe drag to its minimum by way of a number of novel methods. Laminar flow is being examined for the vertical tail. If this is successful it could translate to savings of between two and four per cent of fuel burn – a fortune looked at in the context of a year’s operating cost. Airbus is thus planning to trial a laminar flow fin on one of its existing airline customer’s aircraft which in day to day operation will be able to verify if this complex technology is worth persevering with.

Another possibility for drag reduction is the use of already proven 3M anti drag riblets (which were used initially to help Dennis Conner win back the America’s Cup off Fremantle in 1987). The 3M riblets have already been extensively flight tested using a Lufthansa A310 aircraft and show the potential for a saving of up to 1.5% in fuel burn with a 70% coverage. A more conservative application on the A3XX, avoiding areas where the film is prone to damage in operation, could save about 1% in fuel burn. Whilst this on the surface may not sound a lot, put together it can mean the difference between getting that extra hundred kilometres in range out of a fully loaded aircraft battling into an unforeseen headwind or at the least hundreds of thousands of dollars saved each year in reduced fuel usage.

McDonnell Douglas, suffering from a range deficiency on the MD-11 a few years back, conducted an extensive review of the aircraft’s aerodynamics which revealed that something as simple as eliminating the finned wiper stowage area beneath the windshield saved a ‘massive’ 1% in fuel burn. When it comes to getting the most out of a design it is the eventual sum of many small parts that ultimately delivers the meaningful fuel savings that makes an airliner commercially viable against its competitor.

To beat the square cube law (where structural weight increases faster than useful area as the aircraft gets bigger) Airbus is looking to employ advanced composites throughout the design where possible. Compared with using traditional aluminium, as airframers would have 30 years ago, this should offer savings in the region of more than 40 tonnes. Airbus is looking at employing composites heavily in the tailplane, cabin floor beams, pressure bulkhead and perhaps even in the outer wing. Again, all these little things add up – the dry weight difference between the 747-400 and its predecessor for instance is a startling 11 tonnes, all achieved by replacing metal with composites, lighter avionics and associated systems and dozens of other myriad but important design alterations.

Airbus is also exploring the use of an aluminium/glass fibre laminated composite known as GLARE, for the fuselage skins. This material offers a 15% weight reduction for fatigue sensitive applications. It also offers up to five times as much resistance to burn-through, which may speed up its application. Lithium based aluminium alloys also allow a weight reduction of up to four tonnes at low technical risk, though the issues of long term damage tolerance need to be resolved.

So there you have it, the A3XX is Airbus’ answer to what it perceives as the next generation of very large airliners. If a full project launch was given in 1997, then Airbus predicts that the first A3XX-100 will become operational around 2003/4. However, to be viable in any context the aircraft must firstly achieve two goals. One is a per seat fuel burn at least 15% better than the existing 747-400 and secondly there must be something in the order of 50 firm orders to guarantee a launch.

Airbus CEO Jean Pierson recently stated publicly that despite a year of roadshowing the A3XX concept to dozens of airlines there were only two, British Airways and Singapore Airlines, that were keen enough to take the concept seriously in terms of looking at placing some form of notional Letter of Intent. BA, for instance, is claiming that it requires a per seat cost reduction in the region of 20%, not the 15% that AI speaks of. Further, both BA and SQ are few amongst an international airline community that are sufficiently financially endowed to be able to afford the new generation of megajets that will cost an estimated $US200m each, against$US150m for the 747-400.

Ironically, earlier this year Airbus released its Global Market Forecast for the 1995-2014 period. This document edicts a market for some 920 megajets of greater than 500 passenger capacity. Spread over two decades this translates to just 46 aircraft per annum, though in reality would be more like 60 per annum as sales wouldn’t be forthcoming till later this decade at the earliest. That is simply not enough action for two competing airframes, though more than enough for one profitable programme which in itself would nicely generate sufficient surplus funding to ensure development of the base model into future variants as the industry requires them.

Asia Pacific based airlines alone are expected to treble their capacity through to 2014 to take over a third of the world’s RPKs. Whilst growth is bullish with this year’s world RPKs expected to have doubled by around 2003/4, you have to be careful to not get carried away with the figures and instead look to where the seats are actually going.

Take the past decade for instance. During the early eighties if somebody had told you that the North Atlantic would double in RPKs by 1990 you would undoubtedly have been impressed. You might have replied that that would certainly be a lot of extra 747s plying the airways. Logically you were right but factually you would have been very wrong, as what happened was that EROPS [Extended Range Operations, or more fondly known within the industry as Engines Running or Passengers Swimming!] came into being and nowadays more than three quarters of all North Atlantic traffic is carried in twinjets – Boeing 767s and Airbus A310s and to a lesser extent A300s, whilst even the single aisle 757 nowadays gets a look in on what was once 747, DC-10 and L-1011 territory. Markets evolve and as the latest generation of big twinjets bring a plethora of secondary long haul nonstop sectors together, offering higher frequency with widebody comfort and extended range, then the market that was traditionally held by the 747 has changed.

This has been one reason why there has been a slowing in 747 sales in recent years; much of the growth internationally in the routes they were serving has been taken over by the new generation twinjets. More recently, the A340 has also entered the equation and that aircraft will in time also change airline thinking over what would have once automatically been designated as a 747 route.

As an interesting sidelight, Qantas, for instance, would probably make more real bottom line profit flying high gross weight A340-300s from Sydney to Los Angeles than it does with its 747-400s. The simple reason is that it would be still carrying all the premium full fare passengers it does now while dropping much of the very low yield deep discount holiday package/backpacker market. Qantas could even return to the San Francisco market and look at other US ports (New York/Tahiti/Sydney?) as well as tapping the potential of the South American market.

It sometimes is smart to have your airline carrying the profitable traffic whilst you leave it to your competitor to carry the numbers. They may crow at the time about their great market share, but at the end of the year it is the full fare premium passengers that determine the colour of an airline’s balance sheet.

Consequently your megajet may well find itself between a rock and a hard place in this very difficult and often moving feast of yield management due to its sheer size, initial cost and significant crew requirements. On the other hand, growing major airport and major route airways congestion may well dictate a decade from now that most of the world’s present top 30 or so airports are slot controlled, and this is where the VLA will ultimately come into its own. Like everything, the battle is getting the launch timing of such an aircraft right.

The ultimate battle of minds over what will precisely occur next year in terms of the immediate future of the VLA concept will also be fundamental to which manufacturer rules the airways through at least the first two decades of the 21st century. For instance, imagine if the VLA consortium reports that it doubts that the market presently can take such an aircraft and consequently the consortium drifts apart, leaving Airbus and Boeing to resume their traditional adversarial roles. Either will have to do something if the other begins to take this market seriously. Ironically, the market is probably too small overall for both to profitably share, though if one deliberately chooses to ignore this market then it will most surely watch the other rapidly fill the void.

History is full of such occasions – McDonnell Douglas failed to develop the then hot selling DC-9-30 in the latter seventies when the US deregulated and consequently saw Boeing achieve incredible success with its 737-200, whilst inversely that manufacturer let MDC gain many sales of its MD-80 twinjet through not strapping CFM56s onto a stretched 737 earlier. This also prompted Airbus to proceed with the A320 family, which has now sold almost 900 aircraft, aircraft that could have come from either Seattle or Long Beach. Douglas is well and truly out of the picture nowadays and this is a fate that the folk in Seattle most certainly don’t want to face a decade from now if Airbus should proceed with the A3XX and they opt to do nothing.

However, Boeing has a wild card up its corporate sleeve, and it might well be an ace. Boeing has so far sold almost 1200 747s since the late sixties. The aircraft is unarguably the “Queen of the Skies”, the very flagship of every major long haul carrier in the world. Airlines replace early 747s with later generation -400s as a virtual foregone conclusion. Boeing can, at about a third the development cost of producing an all new VLA, develop its long mooted 747-500 in a timeframe several years earlier than an all new aircraft like the A3XX. The aircraft would be considerably cheaper in real terms and would certainly offer per seat kilometre costs 15% less than the present aeroplane. Whilst it would only offer a passenger uplift capability similar to that of the initial baseline A3XX-100 it would be a known quantity.

Boeing essentially already has all of the world’s airlines as its existing customers for this latest variant of probably the most successful airliner ever built. Whilst Boeing wouldn’t be able to compete with the developed versions of the Airbus product, it will always have a successor to the present fleet of 747s. Even in 20 years time there will still be a big demand for a 500 passenger long ranging jetliner.

It makes you think, and certainly the folk at Toulouse won’t be rushing ahead quickly to invest billions of Euro dollars in a new megajet that may well battle to see sales of two dozen or so airframes a year over the coming two or three decades. We certainly have an interesting year ahead.