RAAF F-111 Crash Report Implications

“Consequently, the aircraft pitched up at a slower rate than the pilot intended. When the pitch attitude of the aircraft reached approximately 20 to 25 degrees nose up, loss of a reliable signal to the Terrain Following Radar system generated a Tfr fail audio tone and probably caused the pilot to initiate a failsafe flyup at about 3g. The most probable sequence of events after the Tfr fail audio tone is as follows. The pilot depressed the autopilot release lever to override the Tf failsafe flyup and in the process took pressure off the bomb release button. He then decided to continue to fly the established egress procedure and rolled the aircraft to the right towards the planned egress direction.”

“As he initiated the roll, whilst possibly confused, he again depressed the bomb release button, then released it. He achieved a bank angle of a maximum of 140 degrees and possibly 150 degrees, although the normal maximum bank angle for the recovery phase of the manoeuvre is 110 degrees. He then reversed the roll and reduced bank angle to between 80 to 90 degrees”.

The report goes on to say the aircraft reached a nose-down attitude of greater than 25 degrees when it should have been level and that “apparently the pilot was not controlling the aircraft’s attitude by the attitude director but was flying instinctively. He could also have been suffering from channelised attention which may have caused him to focus on achieving the planned rollout heading to the exclusion of information from the other primary instruments.” The most probable cause of the accident was put down to “a loss of situational awareness”.

One of the factors which it was considered may have contributed to the accident was the fact that the pilot “had not practiced this particular kind of attack at night for the preceding five months”. The cockpit voice recorder provided no indication of any problem but significantly, the crucial eight seconds before the accident could not be retrieved for examination.

Flt Lt Jeremy McNess and his navigator Flt Lt Mark Cairns-Cowin were both highly skilled airmen; McNess had been the Dux of his F-111 Conversion Course and Dux of his Introductory Fighter Course. But he had only flown 1.3 hours at night over the previous three months. He had never flown with Cairns-Cowin in an F-111 before and the navigator was scheduled to depart for the Us the next day to help ferry one of the Raaf’s newly acquired F-111Gs back to Australia.

The fact that Flt Lt McNess was ordered to fly this mission with his lack of currency is concerning. Even in civil aviation pilots have to be properly checked out if they haven’t flown for some time, the limit being 30 days in the case of a commercial licence holder. How is it possible for the pilot to be so low in night currency? Surely a better way to build up currency would have been to start on a less demanding exercise, especially when taking into account the poor weather conditions on the night of the accident? Why is it that two crewmembers were teamed together when they had not flown in an F-111 before, and especially when both — particularly the pilot — were so low on night currency?

To its credit, the Raaf recognised some of these problems when the accident investigation had been completed and undertook to amend currency requirements for night flying and night weapons delivery profiles, review procedures for night weapons delivery, counsel squadron and wing supervisors on the need for effective oversight of crew currency and capabilities and their matching against mission difficulty, and to review the adequacy and efficiency of operational instrument flying training and currency.

Another area of concern is the fact that no proper protocol to inform the airmen’s families of the accident was apparently put into action. Some close relatives — who should have been fully informed before the press was — found out about the deaths of the two airmen on television. This is simply not good enough and adds even more despair to an already tragic situation. Aa has been told the overall impression gained by close relatives in this case was that the Raaf seems not to care overly much. This has a familiar ring to it — remember the Raaf 707 crash in 1991?

Any improvements to this and the circumstances which led to the accident won’t bring back the crew of A8-127 but might help others. Surely currency and crew rapport are the basis of safe flying in any form, whether it be in an F-111 at 540 knots and 400 feet or an airliner cruising serenely above the clouds. Because when something goes wrong…