Seaview Sparks CAA Crisis

Claim And Counter Claim

Criticism of Seaview Air and suggestions that its operations were less than safe began very soon after news of the crash was released. These criticisms soon developed to the point where they encompassed not only Seaview but the charter/commercial side of general aviation as a whole. One of the first to speak was former Seaview chief pilot Greg Matthews, who outlined claims of cost cutting and maintenance shortfalls in the operator’s aircraft. Mr Matthews was sacked by the company in March this year following criticism of him by the Caa.

Similar claims were made by others and allegations of overloading, poor maintenance and even that Seaview’s passengers were under the impression they were travelling on regular public transport (Rpt) rather than charter flights followed. Federal Opposition transport spokesman John Sharp added to the criticisms, under parliamentary privilege claiming that Seaview was “operating dangerously” and “putting people’s lives at risk”. He mentioned previous allegations that Seaview had operated aircraft in an overloaded condition and overwater flights were lacking liferafts and vests. Mr Sharp’s allegations had started well before the crash, dating back as early as May.

Caa Director of Aviation Safety Regulation at the time of the crash, George Macionis, responded by saying three separate enquiries into the allegations had revealed no substantiation of any of them.

Caa Response

The Caa’s immediate response to the accident was to launch an enquiry into the safety of the Turbo Commander series generally, although no details were forthcoming as to what was specifically being looked at. (Interestingly, the Us National Transport Safety Board has recently reported that investigations into three accidents involving Commander 690s may have resulted from inadequate inspection or lack of compliance with aileron control rigging specifications while a 690 was lost off Sydney earlier this year in mysterious circumstances). All 78 piston and turbine engined Aero Commanders in Australia were checked for structural corrosion and fatigue problems last year, particularly in the critical wing spar area, and eight were found to need attention. Vh-Svq was not one of them.

The Caa issued a media release on October 7 which tried to clarify the situation at Seaview regarding its chief pilot and the upgrading of its Air Operators Certificate from charter to Rpt in July this year, something which had received criticism from some quarters before the accident. Caa regional airworthiness manager Bob Hoy has been quoted as being one of them, stating deficiencies in Seaview’s operations manuals and other problems.

In the Caa’s media release, George Macionis pointed out that: “In the course of normal surveillance [of Seaview] in December last year, and further surveillance on January 12 1994, a number of deficiencies were revealed. As a result, on January 18 this year, the Caa wrote a strong letter to the then chief pilot, Mr G Matthews, detailing the deficiencies, all of which were his responsibility as chief pilot, demanding immediate remedial action and expressing doubt as to his suitability to be the chief pilot. During late January and early February, airworthiness and flying operations audits were conducted. These were generally found to be satisfactory although there were concerns about some matters for which the chief pilot was responsible. On March 4 1994, the Caa was advised by the company that … there would be a new chief pilot, Mr Clive Mciver. On May 13 the district office reported that Seaview were operating satisfactorily … as a result of formal application, dated April 28, to upgrade from Charter to Rpt, over a period of three months the Caa worked closely with the operator to continue with and fully conclude the upgrade to Rpt. In view of events earlier in the year and the allegations by Mr John Sharp in the parliament in May, a number of independent ramp checks were carried out …”

These ramp checks were to subsequently play a large role in the government’s lack of confidence in the Caa, as the relatively clean bill of health they (and others later conducted) apparently showed were not entirely true.

Revelations And Reactions

A series of sometimes startling events then quickly followed. Minister for Transport Laurie Brereton got the ball rolling by having George Macionis transferred to “other duties” within the Caa, saying he’d lost confidence in Mr Macionis but not the Caa itself. Mr Macionis announced his resignation from the Caa on the same day and was replaced by John Pike of Basi.

Further revelations from former Seaview passengers on alleged ‘horror trips’ they’d had with the operator followed (with a lack of life jackets for overwater trips heading the list) with the result that John Pike announced the technical grounding of Seaview by revoking the approval of its chief pilot Clive Mclver. “Ongoing concerns about aircraft maintenance, safety equipment and administration” was given as the reason. This was in direct contrast to what had been said about Seaview by the Caa a few days earlier. Seaview was in effect able to resume operations within a few days, however, under a perfectly legal cross charter agreement with another operator.

A major decision announced by Mr Brereton at the same time was that a new, separate and entirely independent statutory authority would be established, the Aviation Safety Agency. This was in effect a strong vote of no confidence in the Caa by the Government and according to Mr Brereton “…will eliminate any possibility of safety regulation being compromised by industry cost recovery of Caa functions under the present arrangements”. At the same time, Mr Brereton noted that he thought the user-pays system of air safety regulation had been a mistake (something the industry knew all along) and announced the government would lift its contribution for aviation safety regulation from the previous indexed cap of $22.8m per annum to over $29m. Approval was also given to increase the maximum compensation to passengers in the event of an accident from $180,000 to $500,000 per passenger.

Under normal circumstances, that might have been the end of it apart from the results of the accident investigation and the steps taken after that. But more revelations were to follow: that the pilot of the doomed aircraft apparently did not have a current medical certificate and was therefore not legally able to fly; that there was doubt cast on the ramp check reports on Seaview aircraft mentioned earlier; that some within the Caa actually recommended that Seaview’s upgrade to Rpt status be refused; and that there were hints of impropriety in the relationship between some Caa staff and Seaview Air.

The latter — a sensational revelation — prompted the involvement of the Australian Federal Police, ordered by Mr Brereton at Caa chief executive Doug Roser’s request. Mr Roser had called for investigations into allegations of a corrupt relationship between a senior Caa officer and Seaview as early as April this year but the Caa reportedly took no action. And still the story escalated with its implications for Australian civil aviation administration growing with it. Allegations of misleading statements from the Caa about Seaview’s standard of operation continued until Mr Brereton announced just before this issue went to press that a Judicial Enquiry into the Caa’s dealings with Seaview was planned, with Sir Lawrence Street in the chair. This enquiry will have all the powers of a Royal Commission and will be separate from the Australian Federal Police enquiries.

The Federal Opposition has called for a purge of the Caa from the top down and also for Mr Brereton’s resignation as the minister ultimately responsible. Regardless of the eventual outcome, this accident will undoubtedly have far reaching effects on the Australian civil aviation scene than we’ve witnessed for many years. The Seaview tragedy and other problems currently facing the beleaguered Caa will probably see to that. Allegations that aircraft have been imported with fake documentation and that the Caa had not taken notice of a bushwalker’s reporting of an aircraft crash in the Blue Mountains last year (plus a deplorable past record of search and rescue fiascos over the past decade) have also taken their toll on the public image of the Caa as have the bungled Taaats, Naips and the 11/11 airspace projects.

Certainly, the Minister responsible for the key years, Senator Bob Collins, should also now be a key feature of any enquiry as all Ministers must realise at some time that they are indeed accountable for their actions and cannot just go on apportioning blame on their senior bureaucrats in a way which leaves them free of responsibility. The real crux of this issue is that in private the Government has always taken the line that it prefers to take more from aviation than it gives and today is beginning to pay the price for such a short sighted and greedy attitude.

It is now time for the Government to at last face reality and do something positive about rebuilding the Caa. Since its inception in July 1988 the Authority has had no less than three chief executives, four chairmen and five safety chiefs. The fact that too many of these people have departed in controversy is something that the Government cannot continue to ignore. In setting up the Caa the Government primarily set out to develop a cash cow (like the Fac) that it has enthusiastically milked to boost its own revenue base. This absurd and short sighted attitude towards our industry as nothing more than a milch cow has got to stop. The industry cannot afford it and neither can the Government if it indeed wishes to maintain some semblance of long term credibility amongst the electorate.

The bottom line is perhaps the fact that the days when the old Department of Civil Aviation (at least prior to 1973) was run by people who actually knew about aeroplanes and their operation are long gone. Perhaps bringing their kind back should be the next move.