AA Makes A Happy Hundred

The Two Airline Policy And Early Years

Civil aviation of course in those years was immensely boring thanks to the constraints of the Two Airline Policy. Essentially the TAP ensured that Ansett and TAA were the only two carriers that could fly interstate routes. What’s more they could only offer the same seating capacity between two ports so obviously neither was inspired to launch into an expensive discount fare campaign, between say, Melbourne and Coolangatta, when its rival would simply walk in and pick up half the traffic. If ever there was an impediment to the growth of air transport in Australia by the seventies then the TAP was it. If we had, for instance, been able to deregulate a decade ago how many more Australians would have holidayed within Australia instead of spending their Oz Dollars in Singapore, Britain or at Disneyland. A lot, that’s for sure.

But of course this was the late seventies and the most exciting thing happening was perhaps the muted hope that East West Airlines might actually buy a 737-200 to use on its better NSW routes. Exciting stuff! Airline employees in those days knew exactly what each day held while their jobs were largely deemed to be on a lifelong basis. TAA and Ansett even had their headquarters almost next to each other with the offices of each in full view of the other. How all that has changed! In those days the unions really ran the show. The AFAP was the pilots’ voice and muscle and told the two airlines what it wanted and expected to get. The TWU and a number of other unions ran everything else and airline management largely tried to make it look good and keep it all together. Air fares would increase as and when required, and of course in total harmony; not for one millisecond would airline A even dare to charge more or less than its ‘rival’, while profits were guaranteed via an act of parliament.

Remember those days, a thousand things happening and all of them exciting. The Mirage replacement project was in full swing with almost everything that could fire a gun in the running, as was a replacement for the Macchi, Concorde, the Big Racer, idles out to Heathrow’s runway 27L for another Mach 2 dash across the Atlantic. Living this mission from the cockpit was undoubtedly your editor’s most memorable aviation experience these past 17 years. Today the airlines are probably about three times more efficient per employee than they were when AADR was first around. Sure, computers and larger aircraft have helped but certainly today’s airline employee works to the beat of a different drum than did his or her predecessor. The benefits are of course that we have one of the most efficient air transport environments anywhere in the world, that flying is now affordable by most Australians and that we now enjoy load factors and growth rates (despite a debilitating recession) the envy of the world. The downside of course is that long term job security is largely now the realm of fairy tales though this is also a situation that really affects all Australians, government employees included.

I remember AA (the mag’s title was shortened to simply Australian Aviation in early ’82) reporting on various aspects of the frustrating futility of the Two Airline Policy, which had really outlived its usefulness by the time we arrived on the scene. For instance, remember parallel scheduling? That was when a port had three jet services a day and both airlines arrived precisely in formation, putting an immense strain on the airport facilities, taxi services and passengers alike. They would then crank up together and depart in formation to, you guessed it, the same destination.

Deregulation And The Compass Era

A Compass I A300 rotates out of Sydney with a full but probably profitless load. Aircraft too large, inadequate frequency, makeshift terminals, single class operation and a lack of start up capital all contributed to the demise of Australia’s first post deregulation carrier. Compass II meanwhile would have most definitely, in hindsight, been better off if it had remained with its Southern Cross titles. By the time it became airborne as the ‘Son of Compass’ the general public had gone off the idea of supporting new entrants after much of the fighting spirit of the original airline had been replaced by scepticism and fear of ending up with worthless airline tickets. A real tragedy as the second Compass had righted most of the wrongs of the first in operational terms except that it was still without adequate startup capital and in the end inadequate load factors.

The rest of the time the terminal would be deserted and the ATC people would count the birds and occasional lightie. And they wondered why people didn’t bother flying to their next holiday destination! Another black spot on domestic airline innovation of the era was the lack of point to point nonstops offered. Whilst range of the aircraft in those days did offer some practical limitations, it was still rare to find such things as a Melbourne/Brisbane (or Coolangatta) nonstop let alone a Brisbane/Cairns service that didn’t deliver everything except the locals’ milk! The airlines always told us that these services weren’t wanted by travellers. That everybody loved, just loved, transiting Sydney and Timbuctoo to get from A to B. They even insulted our intelligence by defending their parallel schedules with the throwaway line that they only flew when people wanted to travel thus this is why they had the schedules they had. What a load of bulldust!

The Rise Of Qantas And General Aviation Changes

It was also the era when Qantas was withdrawing from its worldwide network as it replaced more and more 707s with the ultra large 747. At the time Qantas was proudly planning to become an all 747 airline, to my memory in fact the only one in the world, for a reason that was soon to become obvious. Along came the recession of the early eighties and presto load factors on the huge 747s dropped to where airline management look upon a migraine as a source of light relief. Requiring something smaller the airline invested in two brand new 747SPs (nowadays affectionately referred to as Heckyll and Jeckyll) instead of something like second hand Tristars at a third the cost. The SP was at the time designed to be the longest ranging airliner in history and yet Qantas purchased them initially to fly one of its shortest and least profitable routes – Sydney/Wellington.

The early eighties was also the era in which General Aviation as we had lovingly known it began to die. The evils of unrestrained and mostly illogical product liability legislation in the US combined with recession were sadly to prove the death knell for light aircraft production as we knew it. When we began publishing in 1977 the US manufacturers produced just over 17,000 light aircraft and directly employed more than 50,000 people. By 1993 that output had dropped to just 3000 and this year it will be battling to be a tenth of that.

Military Re-equipment And The Hornet

On the military front of course all was go. This was the heady period of a number of large air force re-equipment programmes coming to fruition. As history records the excellent McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet won the Mirage replacement battle. Minister Beazley said at the time that the project cost was about 7% more than for the rival F-16C, certainly not much of a premium on what is a significantly more capable aeroplane. Indeed it was the Hornet programme that literally transformed Australia’s aerospace manufacturing capability.

The 1989 Pilots’ Dispute

Without doubt though, the saddest period of Australian aviation for me was of course the pilots’ dispute of 1989. It is difficult to write about this disaster even five years later without reliving the emotions of the time. A union that had always won precisely what it demanded took on the Government, the airlines and even the ACTU with a claim that was way beyond what was deemed politically and socially acceptable at the time. The AFAP claim basically was for a 29% pay rise.

As the first pilots were effectively sacked the next day the AFAP quickly launched its doomsday initiative and rather than buckle under to their employers or at worst be sacked, all 1640 pilots resigned en masse. In one fell stroke they had totally removed themselves from the very dispute that concerned them more than any other group in the community. From that moment on they became mere spectators in what was for many to prove to be the sunset of their careers. The airlines themselves lost several hundred million dollars each during the period and about the only winners in the short term were GA commuter and charter operators who along with the RAAF saved the day through the latter period of a bad news 1989.