Analysis-Eurofighter 2000

Concurrently, France had also been studying replacements for its Jaguars and early model Mirage F. 1s and IIIs and Dassault Breguet had under development a design known as the Avion de Combat Experimental (ACX). The two aircraft designs, though conceived separately were of a remarkably similar configuration, that of a close coupled canard delta twin, the only major differences being the positioning layout of the air intakes and the number of vertical fins. It was these two designs that formed the basis for a European multination collaborative fighter programme during the early 1980s. Initially, official support was not forthcoming, though BAe was successful in gaining approval to design and construct a joint industry and government funded fighter type experimental aircraft, resulting in the EAP of 1986 (Experimental Aircraft Programme). It is remarkable to reflect that the EAP, using the ACA as its basis was flying in barely three years, which has similar performance characteristics to the Eurofighter 2000 Talks over a European fighter did continue however, leading to time consuming prefeasibility and feasibility studies for the multi nation fighter. By October 1984 a European Staff Target had been signed for a five nation programme involving France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. It was envisaged that such a programme would involve the production of 250 aircraft each for Britain, France and Germany, while Italy would take 150 aircraft and Spain 100.

Considerable compromises were made by the participating countries to accommodate each others’ requirements, one of the biggest, and ultimately most damaging was that of the new aircraft’s weight.

In particular the UK required a larger, more capable air- craft, while France (given its export success with the Mirage family) pushed for a smaller more exportable fighter. The governments and air forces involved were prepared to compromise to meet the common goal, although discontent, particularly among BAe and Dassault Breguet lingered over who ultimately should have programme leadership. BAe pointed to the success of the leaderless Panavia Tornado programme, while Dassault felt is should be given programme leadership to due its experience with the Mirage 2000.

Ultimately France and Dassault-Breguet left to single handedly develop the ACX derived Rafale, despite the 1985 announcement that country would take a 5-10% share in the programme. This questionable decision has sadly resulted in expensive and wasteful duplicity. Both the Eurofighter and Rafale are now more expensive than they otherwise need be, and Europe will end up with two fighter aircraft of similar performance capabilities.

The Turin Agreement, which was signed in August 1985 formally launched the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) and the Eurofighter project definition study was completed by September 1986, by which time both the BAE EAP and the Rafale programme demonstrator had made their first flights. Both of these types debuted at the 1986 Farnborough Airshow, participating in the flying programme and providing an interesting comparison between the two types. That same year Eurojet Turbo Gmbh was established to design and develop the Eurojet 200 (EJ200) powerplant for the new aircraft.

The Eurofighter programme then enjoyed a period of relative stability, with official go-ahead for full scale development given in May 1988 and engine and weapon systems contracts signed in December of that year. The radar development contract was awarded to GEC Ferranti for the development of the all new ECR-90 pulse doppler radar in May ’90.

The year 1992 though will go down as the Eurofighter’s most turbulent, climaxing in the German decision to withdraw from the production phase of the programme that June. German objections to the aircraft as it then stood were primarily based on price and the defense minister Volker Ruhe went so far as to propose an all new Jager Light (light fighter) as a replacement to be developed by the EFA partners.

The ensuing crisis resulted in a three month study involving the partner nations on how best to reduce the aircraft’s costs. This project looked at a wide range of alternatives coming under the NEFA (New European Fighter Aircraft) umbrella. These ranged from an all new single engine aircraft using the EJ 200 to only minor changes to the then current design. While some single engined alternatives were found to be cheaper in some aspects, these alternatives did not find favour due to their expected prolonged development and ultimately later entry into service.

Britain in particular strongly objected to the rather silly notion of designing a completely new lightweight fighter, the delayed entry into service, loss of capability and the wasted funds spent on the existing programme being compelling reasons to proceed with the existing design, if a European aircraft was deemed at all to be important.

The most favoured derivative was a reduced capability version of EFA. Principally the required 30% reduction in costs was to be achieved be reducing the aircraft’s electronic and defensive aids, new workshare arrangements between the participating countries and a revision of Germany’s conservative logistics requirements. In fact it was found that a more efficient revision and allocation of workshare practices could save 13%. Individual air forces are then able to specify a level of equipment fit capable of further reducing the aircraft costs to a total reduction of 30%.

For a time it was considered that Germany and possibly Spain and Italy would consider fitting the Hughes APG-65 radar off the shelf in place of the ECR-90, but this has now been dismissed. More likely candidates to be left off for savings include the Defensive Aids Sub System, laser warning receivers, RWR and jammers. In short, everything the modern combat aircraft requires to be a survivor in the modern era air war! Furthermore, it is this originally high level of defensive equipment this is one of the main benefits of the Eurofighter design.

Once again the go-ahead for a European fighter was given on December 10 last year with the agreement of all four involved defence ministers to continue development of the revised aircraft, now formally known as the Eurofighter 2000. The Eurofighter as it now stands is essentially unchanged as to what it was at the beginning of last year, retaining the EJ200 engines and the ECR-90 radar, both of which were purpose designed from the outset and are optimised for the aircraft. Escaping the latest round of cost cutting measures basically unscathed, the base Eurofighter should now retain almost all of its combat effectiveness, retaining its integrity as an aircraft system.

This has not come without cost though, with only the UK likely to retain the full systems suite originally designed for the aircraft, while the entry into service has been pushed further back to 2000. This is 17 years after the staff target outlines were first signed and the programme was officially approved, and almost a quarter century after it was first conceived.

Although in fairness the Eurofighter/EFA programme has suffered a number of delays due to it being a multi national programme with the barriers and problems that implies, other recent programmes have enjoyed far shorter gestations. The F-15 Eagle for example entered service nine years after development began. Furthermore the F-15 possessed far greater capabilities than anything before it, something that despite its high cost the Eurofighter simply does not.

Eurofighter 2000 Explained

From the outset the Eurofighter was designed as an inte- grated system whose primary role was that of air superiority. To this end the aircraft features a low set high aspect ratio low loading delta wing. The all moving foreplanes or canards, high thrust to weight ratio, digital fly-by-wire and inherent longitudinal instability together with the high wing area allow high instantaneous and sustained turn rates.

The previously mentioned defensive systems; radar warning receivers and active jammers in each wingtip pod, laser warning receiver, towed decoys and missile approach warning are all integrated into the aircraft as a single defensive package, improving it’s survivability. As mentioned it is these items that could still be deleted or replaced with off the shelf items to achieve cost savings.

The primary aircraft sensor is its ECR-90 radar. The radar has been under development by a four nation consortium led by GEC Ferranti and is a multi mode pulse doppler unit. Also of importance is the passive infrared set which can search for and track targets in the air-to-air mode.

Within the cockpit considerable emphasis has been placed on reducing pilot workload and improving the pilot and Proven in combat, the F-15F perhaps most closely matches the capabilities of the Eurofighter 2000. Licence production of the type in Europe would ensure the retention of military aircraft production facilities and minimise damage to the balance of payments. (MDC) machine interface and on allowing the aircraft to be safely for modern fighter designs, inside the cockpit will be three multi function head down displays and a wide angle HUD display. The pilot will also wear a helmet mounted sight, while the Eurofighter will also make limited use of direct voice inputs for some functions.

flown to the limits of its envelope. As is now the convention Aircraft armament consists of an inbuilt 27mm Mauser cannon, medium range AIM-120 AMRAAMs and short range missiles. There are a total of thirteen external stores stations, three of them plumbed for tanks.

The Eurojet EJ200 engines for the Eurofighter were developed by the Eurojet consortium consisting of Rolls-Royce, MTU, Fiat Aviazone and Spain’s Industria de Turbopropulsores. The powerplants are rated at 13,490lb dry thrust, developing 20,250lb in afterburner. A later develop ment could produce 26,300lb thrust in afterburner.

Justifying the Eurofighter 2000

As it stands, the Eurofighter should prove to be a highly capable fighter, equal or superior to anything currently in service or undergoing development except for the Lockheed F-22. The aircraft should prove to be highly agile, which combined with its state of the art radar and modern missile armament should make it a potent air superiority fighter. The defensive systems and measures to reduce cockpit workload will also improve the aircraft’s chances of survival. Having said that, it is still hard to see the justification in spending so much money $9bn ($A23bn) in development costs alone, for an aircraft that does not offer a significant advance over anything currently available.

The Eurofighter was conceived in the dark days of the cold war, when the threat to European security was perceived as being very real. Under these circumstances, the justification for such an aircraft was quite clear. There was a real threat to peace that needed to be countered. In the reality of the new world order and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the situation has radically changed with the immediate threat removed.

Currently, Europe is largely without a modern and capable air superiority fighter. Germany is still equipped with the venerable, but nevertheless ageing and nearly obsolete F-4F Phantom, which, despite undergoing a new upgrade programme (involving the installation of the APG-65 radar) is now out of date. Italy is also equipped with old equipment, the obsolete F-104 Starfighter. Spain and the UK do fare better, although both the F/A-18 and Tornado F. 3 are recognised as being less capable than the Su-27 in a dogfight, an aircraft which the Eurofighter is designed to counter.

Clearly then, as gaining air superiority is one the major objectives of air forces and of critical importance in any major conflict (as illustrated by the Gulf War), there exists a need for a new air superiority fighter. Many feel that despite the end of the cold war there are bound to be new conflicts emerging in the next few decades. Regional conflicts such as the Gulf and Falklands wars were both unpredicted, and in both instances there was a pressing requirement for an air superiority fighter (in the case of the Gulf War, a Eurofighter type multi role aircraft would have been of far greater value than the essentially bomber destroyer Tornado F. 3, though this was principally due to Iraq’s ability to use its air assets properly).

Further justifying the need for a new air superiority fighter are obligations to various alliances such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the United Nations. In most of these instances the recognised threat would be in the form of modernised variants of the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker which Russia is now openly exporting to almost anyone who can afford them.

Thus having recognised a need for the major European powers to possess a capable counter air fighter it still needs to be asked does it have to be European designed and developed. Leaving the large cost aside, there are three primary arguments for Eurofighter 2000 development. A major benefit from designing and building the aircraft in Europe is retaining the professional experience in the field of high technology military aircraft. The discontinuation of such aprogramme would undoubtedly result in the loss of much of the knowledge and skills accumulated in building military aircraft. However, these skills are only important if there is actually a need for them.

Two other points in favour of building a European fighter are largely economic, the most politically important of these being employment. It has been estimated that some 60,000 people are or will be directly employed on the Eurofighter ment. What this argument does not take into account though programme and cancellation would result in their unemploy- is that many of these people would be employed building a licence built fighter in place of the Eurofighter (presumably such an aircraft would be assembled in Europe rather than be imported). On the other hand, these workers could theoretically be employed in other areas of the economy producing goods and services more beneficial than a fighter to that country One last factor in favour of the Eurofighter is that it is exportable, although one would realistically expect that any export sales would only go a small way to amortising the cost of the programme.

The strongest argument against the Eurofighter consequently is cost. The total cost of Eurofighter development has now been placed as high as nine billion pounds sterling ($A23 billion), of which over 60% has already been spent and all but one billion pounds contracted for. How justifiable is such a huge sum, especially when the aircraft does not offer any real benefits over contemporaries such as the F/A-18E or F-15? In the current situation such expenditure surely cannot be appropriate. What then are the alternatives? Probably the most obvious alternative, insofar as meeting the Eurofighter requirement is the MDC F-15F. The Eagle is a combat proven design and has been the USAF’s primary air superiority fighter since the late seventies, boasting an enviable combat record, accounting for more than 70 plus kills to no air-to-air losses. Eurofighter’s owns studies reveal that the improved F-15F would eliminate technological and logistical problems with the F-15C and that the Eagle closely matches the Eurofighter in a number of areas, and even surpasses it in others (ie range and endurance).

Closely matched in radar and aerodynamic performance, the Macair machine has better range and endurance, and a larger payload (given its greater size) while the Eurofighter’s canard delta configuration, fly-by-wire and naturally unstable design bestows it greater close in agility. No doubt McDonnell Douglas would be more than accommodating in allowing the licence assembly of the F-15 in Europe.

The other alternative that most closely fulfils all of the Eurofighter requirements is the F/A-18E (incidentally, the development cost for the E model is $US9bn), probably the only area in which the Eurofighter would be significantly better than the E is agility, while the F/A-18E clearly has better payload radius performance than the Eurofighter. One could reasonably expect, given a large scale USN production run that the unit cost for an F/A-18E would also be considerably less than the Eurofighter’s. Despite this however, Eurofighter and Luftwaffe assessments rate the F/A-18E and the earlier and smaller F/A-18C as somewhat inferior to Eurofighter.

In some ways a more palatable alternative (much to the angst of BAe though) would be the Rafale, as it both approaches the Eurofighter in terms of size and capability and it is a European design. Concerns have however been expressed about the Rafale’s air-to-air capabilities, given that few details have been publicly released and the Armee de l’Air will be using two seat Rafales optimised for ground attack missions leaving the air defence mission to the service’s Mirage 2000s whilst the French navy will however operate a single seat air defence fighter version.

The other European alternative is Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen. The lightweight Gripen has largely been able to avoid the high development cost problems that have dogged both the Rafale and Eurofighter programmes, and has already entered Swedish air force service, six years before its European contemporaries. That said though, the Gripen’s small size limits its performance and capabilities, other week points believed to include modest sub and supersonic performance and basic radar. Maintainability, low purchase price and Eurofighter comparable range and endurance could see the Gripen adopted (even as an interim type should the bottom fall out of the Eurofighter programme).

A development of the Tornado F. 3 has also been touted, featuring the ECR90 radar and EJ200 engines designed for the Eurofighter. Despite the significant improvements in performance these changes would offer, studies have shown that an improved Tornado would still fail to approach many of the Eurofighter’s performance parameters. Furthermore substantial development funds would need to be spent updating the Tomado, which would largely defeat any benefits from programme cancellation.

Less likely Eurofighter substitutes include variants of the F-16 (some observers believe the Falcon could have great potential in its F-16XL form with new avionics and a more powerful engine) and the MiG-29 and Su-27 in updated ver- sions. German experience with the MiG-29 has found a number of shortcomings ranging from lack of multiple target engagement capability, poor avionics standards, low airframe life (2500 hours as opposed to 6000 for Eurofighter) and high rates of maintenance. While not being range deficient, it is reasonable to assume that some of these same criticisms apply to the much larger Flanker.

As has been shown, there are a number of viable alternatives (F/A-18E & F-15F) to the Eurofighter. At this late stage though (failing an expensive and unforeseen problem) it would be of dubious logic to cancel the programme especially as so much of the development money has already been spent. Assuming it survives in its current form, the Eurofighter 2000 is despite being able to take advantage of the latest technological advances open to a number of criticisms. Many regard its failure to incorporate post stall manoeuvre technology, and thrust vectoring (as demonstrated by the Rockwell/ DASA X-31) as a major error, while very few areas have been designed with stealth in mind. (It should be noted though that the USAF’s choice of the F-22 over the more stealth influenced F-23 seems to suggest that the trade off of stealth technology and agility is too great). Because of these reasons unlike previous generations, apart from its canard foreplane arrangement, it does not represent a substantial jump in capability, to an extent merely a reinvention of the wheel. The entire EFA/Eurofighter programme has also been extremely torturous and protracted being first conceived two decades ago, and now already two years behind schedule for its first flight. The number of development studies in the programme’s formative years attests to this. Programmes that have been running on contemporary time scales are all more advanced in terms of development, with the Gripen now being delivered to the Swedish air force, and both the Rafale and YF-22 having successfully made their first flights earlier in the decade.

When the air forces of Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK eventually take delivery of the Eurofighter 2000, there is little doubt that the aircraft they will receive will be highly capable. It is unfortunate however that they had to reinvent the wheel to achieve only an incremental improvement in capability over earlier types at such an enormous cost.