TAATS Decision Analysis

Dr Edwards’ general comments on the selection criteria

In his opening statement,Dr Edwards said that the CAA Board in setting. the project directives some twelve months ago, had made it clear that the emphasis was to be on modern proven technology and that controlling the project risk was to be at the forefront of the decision making process. It has been estimated that any blowout in implementing the project will cost the CAA $20m a year in staff and other costs, on top of which there would be the problems associated with keeping a 30 year old system going. Whilst it wouldn’t suddenly cease to function, there would be increasing loss of confidence in the system, with the attendant delays as separation standards had to be increased to cope with its failures. All this at a time of increasing traffic.

The Board had itself, consciously accepted the risks involved in cancelling projects such as the Radar Update (RADREP), to effect the quantum leap to the new system, but this had been done on the basis that TAAATS had to come in on time and function correctly. Hence the emphasis on limited risk, and proven, albeit modern technology.

Flight data processing

Dr Edwards then went on to state that the key to modern air traffic systems is F lightData Processing (FDP). Of the four companies evaluated, only two were acceptable in FDP terms and of these, Thomson was assessed as being of least risk This was because Thomson has 45% of the market share in ATC systems worldwide (outside North America) and has installed six generations of FDP systems, each building on the last, with each customer taking a sixth of the risk The largest step was with the Belgian system which was commissioned two years late. This is the FDP system on which Thomson has based its TAAATS proposal.

However, Dr Edwards was unable to comment further on the capabilities of the tendering companies in FDP terms on the basis that the evaluation process was not yet completed and no contracts have yet been signed.

Returning to the question of risk, Dr Edwards said that there were areas in the proposed Australian system where the CAA would have to take on some new development regardless of who was the successful tenderer. This includes the 90% of Australia which will not be under radar coverage where procedural control will be required. In this, Australiais very similar to the Canadian scenario, however the CAA expects to solve the problems involved before the Canadians.

Acknowledging that there are areas where risk has to be accepted, it is logical that in other areas, proven rather then unproven technology should be adopted.

Previous system failures

At this point the documented failures of Thomson in Australia were raised with Dr Edwards. These include the recent Cairns

incident where an aircraft was lost on radar and of course the problems with the Melbourne installation commencing in 1988.

Dr Edwards replied that all systems have teething problems and these were no different. In the C airns case the aircraft transponder had faulted to all zeroes which had exposed a problem in the system software causing it to blank the primary radar, this had been identified and would be corrected but there had never been a safety issue. The Melbourne problems had been rectified in time.

However, notwithstanding past problems, Thomson was well known to the CAA, and in any case could you be certain that another tenderer would be better than Thomson? Getting to know the competitors was a very large part of the evaluation process – to be able to compare apples with oranges.

There is a direct correlation between failure and the amount of development that needs to be undertaken; Thomson is well established inATC development and accordingly this lessens the riskA lot of time was taken in talking to other customers in the evaluation process.

The question of the failure of the NZ system was then raised to which Dr Edwards replied that it had been commissioned just 23 days after the date which had been planned three years previously, and it had come in under budget. He acknowledged that the system had failed one week after it had been commissioned and although the main computer had fallen over, the radars went into bypass and the controllers still had more information than under the old system. He maintained that these were teething problems which all new systems could be expected to go through.

In the New Zealand case, staff and management had worked together to bring the system online. Teething problems were a fact of life and the end product depended on whether your staff were part of the problem or part of the solution. If the staff wanted to point the flnger at management, little problems could be developed into big ones.

The controllers and the selection process

Dr Edwards said that the role of the controllers had been to assess the technical and operational capabilities of the four tenderers. They had done this and had advised that two were acceptable. Risk and price then became the issues which were management responsibilities. There had been undue emphasis on a statement within the CAA that the project evaluation would be operationally driven; this had led to a view amongst the controllers that they would be making the final decision. The statement had been an over reaction to engineering factors being dominant in past projects, leading to operational deficiencies. A comparison was then made by Dr Edwards with the selection of a new aircraft for an airline. Whilst the company’s pilots would be involved to a point, other factors such as cost would be a management responsibility.

He acknowledged that the controller’s association had publicly stated that Hughes should have been selected, but felt that their assessment was a short term one and that once again, management saw risk as the dominant factor.

He then went on to say that it was essential for the controllers to come back on side as the their role in the development phase was vital. No contracts had yet been signed and it didn’t help the CANs negotiating position if all didn’t pull together.

The next step was to develop well defined milestones together with absolutely water tight testing schedules. He believed that the test schedules were more important than the specification as they determined what would be delivered. If you get the test schedules 100% right that will ensure the end productis right. The contractor will then make certain that it passes all the tests.

Interestingly, Hughes is still involved as the standby contractor and will remain so until the final contract is signed.

The issue of industry development opportunities

It was then put to Dr Edwards that there was a very public perception that there was a strong difference of opinion between the CAA and DITAC on the question of industry development opportunities (offsets).

Dr Edwards replied that the CANs primary mandate was to the aviation industry as they were the ones paying for it, ie, that TAAATs was successfully brought in on time. It was the CANs responsibility as an arm of government that this was achieved. The question of offsets must be secondary to the primary aim; accordingly it was for the CAA to make the decision as to who should be the successful tenderer and for DITAC to follow up. He was mindful of the interests of Australian companies such asAWA and BHP, but these must be secondary to the actual choice of the TAAAT’s contractor. In his words “the CAA would continue to hold the tenderer’s feet to the fire” in the matter of offsets but it would not lose sight of the primary aim.

Dr Edwards stressed that because Thomson was offering a much more developed and proven product, less could flow to Australian industry in the way of industry development opportunities.

AA comment and conclusions

It was clear from the interview with Dr Edwards that the risk factor had played an adominant role in the final decision making process. The CAA cannot afford to have TAAATS come in late or with ongoing development problems. The CAA has assessed Thomson as posing the least risk and has chosen accordingly. In view of this, and the public criticism of the selection of Thomson, it would be logical to assume that the CAA has indeed done its homework and has no doubts that it has made the right choice.

On the matter of industry development opportunities there can be no question that the responsibility for the ultimate decision as to which contractor is to be chosen must lie fairly and squarely with the CAA. To have it any other way is to certainly put the cart before the horse. DITAC must understand that it will not be their neck on the block if the w rong contractor is chosen. This will only be known some years down the track at which time all the heat will be on the CAA; it is doubtful that the public wrath would then be wreaked on DITAC. The latter would be wise to remember that with authority goes responsibility.