Air Defence Versus Close Air Support – The Haaf Dilemma

Put simply, whenever an air threat arises, and the air commander has limited assets, close air support for the troops on the ground goes by the board. This is perfectly understandable but it is head in the sand to ignore it. Many times the Grunt on the ground has been heard to remark that he would prefer artillery in support because he knows that when he needs it, it will be there.

There is a similar problem in providing air defence over fleet units which was brushed aside when the fixed wing element of the RAN FAA was given to our little neighbour. The cry was that the RAAF would provide it, however once again the limited number of aircraft available, compounded by the distances normally involved, makes a mockery of the concept as a valid part of our defence philosophy. (The author well remembers a Mirage coming on task as air defence for a certain destroyer only to announce after exchange . of call signs “I go one minute!!)

During exercise Kangaroo Three in 1979, an air threat was deliberately introduced at a critical point to expose the fallacy of the one aircraft type carrying out both tasks. Close air support was immediately denied to the ground forces whilst the Mirages sat on the ground at alert readiness. Some forty eight hours were spent in an impasse until the threat was removed to allow the exercise to proceed.

The trouble with exercises is that nobody gets killed, no assets are destroyed and perhaps more to the point, politicians are not brought to account for denying the country an adequate defence. This is not to suggest that our defence planners, and in particular the RAAF are not aware of the problem. Current planning envisages a lightweight fighter/advanced trainer to replace the Macchi. This is being code named as the ‘Day Fighter’ in an effort to exhort army support for such a project.

However the point being argued is that multi role aircraft are fine and dandy until the chips are down and a shooting war starts. A decision then has to be made as to which role the aircraft is to be employed in. This is particularly true when the two roles areas diverse as an advanced trainer and day fighter/close air support aircraft. The problem is further exacerbated when their are limited assets available. As a side issue, one could ques tion the current role of the Macchi as a “lead in fighter”. Is there a genuine need or is it a case of finding a role for an asset which has been made redundant by its replacement entering service? It would not be the first time that a role has suddenly manifested itself for surplus assets, the Wessex was a classic case. When its time was up as the front line ASW helicopter, having been replaced by the Sea King, it suddenly found itself in the utility role.

Awkward as it might be to answer, the question must be asked, what filled the “lead in fighter” role prior to the demise of the Macchi in the training role? At the same time one could argue whether time spent in an old advanced trainer, albeit a jet, is really of any value instead of getting down to it in the real thing.

However the purpose of this article is not to debate the need for the “lead in fighter”but to examine the conflict which will inevitably arise in attempting to provide close air support for the ground forces with yet another “multirole” aircraft.

If the “lead infighter”is essential for training, how will it be able to support the ground forces in time of war? Will it depend on the expected length of the conflict? Will a decision be made to stop training so that it can be employed in its other role?

There is no question that it is an intolerable position to be in when somebody else is providing the support you need, when they have the final decision as to what asset will be provided and how it will be employed when a conflict of interests arises.

A classic case of just such a situation was the RAF being responsible for providing aircraft and pilots for the Royal Navy F leet Air Arm prior to the Second World War. The result was that the FAA entered that conflict with totally inadequate aircraft and had to turn to the USN for help. To the RAF, the FAA was a nuisance which it couldn’t quite control, consuming assets which it, the RAF had to provide at the expense of fulfilling its true role of projecting land based air power.

Returning to the Australian scene, a very sensible decision was made to give the helicopters to the army as it was recognised that the land force must be able to control the assets necessary to meet its priorities. Perhaps a similar case could be made for any future close air support aircraft being owned anct operated by the army. It might sound outrageous and cut across received airpower dogma, but if we are serious about providing the land force with timely, credible close air support, perhaps it is worth a thought!

It will be interesting to see what happens in K92, however as it is a much smaller exercise than the last one, and being carried out in the “wet”, perhaps the problem will not arise in noticeable proportions. Lets hope that the matter is addressed in the

exercise wash up