Mosqultos Over Korea

He served with 1 RAR until the unit returned to Australia in March, 1953. He had completed about 5 of his 12 months when it left so he still had 7 months to go. It was replaced by 2 Battalion fresh from Australia as a total unit. He went to it again as a platoon commander but had only been with them about two weeks when he heard that a posting to the Americans was in the offering. His was one of three postings. The others went to Lt B G F Boys and Capt L K Hatfield. Bruce Boys, who had been in the same class as Breen at Duntroon, was also in the same Company now, ‘B’ Company. Keith Hatfield was a Second World War veteran and he received his posting from 3 RAR which was one of the other battalions in the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade.

The Australians were sent to the 6148th Tactical Control Squadron which was part of the 6147 Tactical Control Group. Chunchon, from where they would soon be flying, was at that time a fair sized town in the centre of Korea, about 5 miles (8km) from the 38th Parallel and north of Kapyong where the Australians had won the American Presidential Citation for their action on April 24/25, 1951, only about 10 miles (16km) down the road.

Altogether, there were three squadrons in the Group, the 6148th, 6149th and 6150th Tactical Control Squadrons. Two of them were operational units and the third one flew C-47s, radio mother ships which cruised along from west coast to east coast all day monitoring the radio communications going on between the ‘Mosquito’ Forward Air Controllers (FACs) and their ground controllers. The job of the FACs was to carry out front line reconnaissance flights along, or just behind, the main bomb line. At the outbreak of hostilities the USAF had no FAC units in either Korea or Japan and it was not until late in 1950 that the first came into being. If enemy activity was found, the FAC immediately contacted the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) in Seoul so that a flight of fighter-bombers could be called in. At this stage, while the war was mobile and lines of communication were stretched, radio transmissions from the FAC were sometimes too weak to be picked up by the either the JOC or the incoming fighter-bombers so a C-47 radio relay plane was employed to circle high overhead and relay the necessary details. T he call signs used for these were ‘Mosquito Mellow’ and ‘Mosquito Godfrey’. By 1952, the FACs had grown into two squadrons, the 6148th and the 6149th. For the job they were equipped with modified North American T-6 Texan (Harvard) aircraft, probably the most universally used military training plane of all time. Powered by a 550hp (410kW)

Pratt & Whitney R-1340 Wasp radial engine, it could fly at 206mph (330km/h) at 5,000 feet (1,525m) and cruise up there at 170mph (274km/h). With a service ceiling of 21,500 feet (6,555m) and a range of 750 miles (1,207km), it was able to remain patrolling over its allotted area or direct a strike for two and a half hours. It was a reasonably tough and manoeuvrable machine and readily available for use due to its widespread employment as a trainer. Because Korea’s terrain was rugged and tactical air control parties on the ground were rarely able to visually direct close support strikes, it had become normal for Mosquito FACs to direct and coordinate almost all fighter-bomber operations up to a depth of 6 miles (10km) into enemy territory. For this they were equipped with 2. 25 inch (5. 7cm) rockets to mark targets, 12 channel VHF radio equipment and SRC-300 infantry radio sets for direct communications with front line ground troops.

The crew of a T-6 consisted of a pilot and an army observer most of whom were American but the 6148th Squadron often had army observers from other UN units posted to it. T he first Australian known to have served in it for a three month tour was Captain John McCalmont Crofts between January/April, 1952, and at various times it contained a mixture of British and Canadians officers. New Zealander, Lt William Watson from Christchurch was there between May/August, 1952 and legendary stories are told of a fiery Scotsman who used to have his pilot fly low so he could toss hand grenades down at the enemy. In April, 1953, beside the three Australians, there was also a British officer, Lt Peter Fanshaw, a young Sandhurst graduate previously attached to the 1st Royal Tanks, in the 6148th. In the 6149th Squadron there was a mixture of American pilots with Korean and US observers. T he Korean presence eased communication difficulties whenever the ROK Air Force, flying Mustangs, was engaged in close air support work.

The Australians did a week’s ground training where they were briefed and shown exactly the role they would play. Then they started flying. Gus Breen recalled:

“Our initial call sign was ‘Shoe Black’ when I went on my first flight. You might be ‘Shoe Black Sugar’ , but the codes changed on a regular basis.

“The procedure was to check the Ops Room Notice Board each evening for details of your mission number, pilot, briefing and takeoff time. T he first mission was a pre-dawn takeoff with a twenty minute flight to the front, arriving at day break. Strike briefing took place prior to takeoff or, in the event of a target of opportunity appearing, by the TACP personnel upon checking with the ground controller. Our role was close air support and we operated from the enemy front line positions back to a distance of some 5 to 6 miles (8-10km). “IX Corps, where I flew, was an area of very heavy fighting, particularly around Papa San, Triangle Hill, Sniper Ridge and Kumwha. In some places the Chinese were only about 50 yards (45m) from the South Korean troops who had the US 3rd Infantry Division in support. We directed strikes up to 200 metres in front of the ‘friendly forces’ so accuracy was critical.

“Across the Korean front during the static war there were five Army Corps with the 1st US Marine Division on the left or western flank. In order from left to right followed I US Corps, IX US Corps, 2nd ROK Corps, Xth US Corps and the 1st ROK Corps on the east coast. I flew IX Corps sector in the centre of Korea, highlighted by the Chorwon Valley. Back in history this was Genghis Khan’s invasion route in his conquest of Korea. The valley ran north-south and was about 20 miles (32km) long and 8 miles (13km) wide. It was new territory for me as the British Commonwealth Division, from whence I came, was part of I Corps.

“The pilot flew the aircraft while the observer’s role was to map spot, identify the target and carry out all radio communication with the TACP and fighter-bombers. Target marking was done through the ground party and a supporting artillery unit which fired coloured smoke on request. The colour of the smoke was nominated and passed on to the fighter-bombers who would orbit the area at 15,000 feet (4,600m). Not always being familiar with the area, the jets relied heavily on the Mosquito, his target map reference, description and, of course, the smoke round. The Chinaman too was a wily bird who was not adverse to placing similarly coloured smoke canisters on neighbouring hills to confuse the issue. In such cases, we’d ask the jets to identify us and follow our rocket run. The Mosquito’s white phosphorous rockets then became the target identification medium. We’d pull out and hasten ‘mighty speedily’ across to our own lines. Each jet was directed onto the target with aiming point corrections being given from the preceding aircraft’s bomb burst. Normally four fighter-bombers participated in each strike. The Mosquito concluded proceedings by carrying out a post strike reconnaissance to estimate damage. ”

Bruce Boys and Peter Fanshaw flew I Corps sector while Keith Hatfield and Gus Breen flew IX Corps. They flew with different pilots on each mission, some more regularly than others, although there was no pattern. Gus Breen recalls Duane Billmeyer, Jim Sullivan, Bob Brown, Earl Marsh, Hal Roth, Willie Roob, ‘Bud’ Barnam, Frank Spieldenner, John Branch, ‘Dad’ James, Frank Lila, Danny Real, Bill Voelker and Frank Winner as some of those pilots.

Like the Australians, American aircrew completed a 12 month tour of duty in Korea. During that time they spent 3 months with infantry or artillery units at the front acting as a Tactical Air Control Party (fACP). There were TACPs in various parts of the front, familiarising themselves with the ground war, acting as the liaison man with the army and carrying out ground to air communication. In the remaining 9 months they flew a total of 100 missions.

“Briefings were thorough whether they were given preflight or inflight from the TACP. Information given consisted of the ground activity, target map, reference and description, flight call sign, number of aircraft, type and bomb load, direction of approach to the target area, colour and pattern of ground identification panels, location of the nearest friendly troops and emergency airstrip and recommended direction of attack for the fighter bombers.

“I suppose, in retrospect, it was a somewhat ‘hairy’ existence for the Mosquito crews but it never seemed to worry us. We’d

North American T-6s of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron. regard it as a daily routine. We’d fly at about 6,000 feet (1,830m) but areally ‘juicy’ target would see the Mosquito ferreting around a lot lower than that. The pull-out height after a rocket run was around 1,000 feet (300m) by the time you cleared the target. ”

The greatest danger to the Mosquitoes came from the large amount of small arms fire which came up from communist troop positions which were usually cleverly concealed. Often there were deliberate flak traps set up to catch unwary fighter-bombers or low flying FACs. Operating as they were just over the front lines, encounters with enemy aircraft were almost nonexistent but it was on record that on one occasion in 1952 aT-6 of the 6148th was attacked by a North Korean Yak-9. The US pilot, Lt Richard Meade, threw his plane into a tight circle and stayed in it until he at last found himself on the tail of the Yak. He was in a good position but was unarmed except for his smoke rockets which he fired. They did not hit but they were enough to force the enemy fighter to break off and head north.

Because the Mosquitoes flew so low, often below hilltop level, the Chinese sometimes lured them into traps by stringing a web of cables across from one hill to another, enough to catch an aircraft’s wing or tail with disastrous results. On rare occasions incoming ‘friendly’ artillery or mortar barrages could also pose a threat if the T-6 was caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. As far as the Chinese were concerned, if the Mosquito could be knocked out, the air strike would be knocked out. They were the eyes for the entire operation and without them the fighter bombers were blind.

Enemy ground fire was also deadly for the incoming fighter bombers, as Gus Breen recalls:

“The Chinese threw up small arms fire in front of the oncoming aircraft. They didn’t have to try and hit the planes because they had to fly straight through it. You could see the flashes coming up as the jets dived. I’ve directed strikes where they’ve never pulled out, three in the time I was there didn’t make it. They were obviously hit and never pulled out. One was an Able Dog off a carrier, the USS Lake Champlain. I saw one Sabre crash-land and actually flew RESCAP on him. He came down in the middle of the Chorwon Valley and they transported him out by helicopter. He was quite safe although in a minefield:The Chinese were back in the hills. He was sitting on the wing of his Sabre and in clear radio contact with us. We directed the chopper. Another Sabre just went straight in south-west of Papa San with no chance of survival. ”

Daylight fighting in the Chorwon Valley was rare because it was simply too dangerous to move. Each side used to mortar the other during the day and then at night there were raiding parties. Knolls and hills in this area changed hands almost every night. From the air, care had to be taken when putting in close strikes in case the particular knoll in question had been overrun. “Ground identification panels, large sheets of material, were spread out on the friendly positions. Their pattern would change daily, ie, being placed in the shape of a ‘T’, parallel lines, and so on . . . We were briefed on the code panel of the day before each flight.

The Mosquito had quite an arsenal he could call on. Gus Breen and his companions operated mainly with the US Marines, the US AF and the US Navy and only on one occasion each did he actually fly with the South Africans, who were using F-86F Sabres, and the Meteor F. 8s of the R A AF. The American fighter bomber types included F-80 Shooting Stars which were just being phased out; F-84 Thunderjets which had taken over the F-80s’ role; F9F Panthers off the carriers; Skyraiders ( Able Dogs) also from the carriers and the Marines flew Skyraiders from a base down south; and F4U Corsairs. The Thunderjets and Sabres were usually armed with two 1,000Ib (454kg) bombs, the Panther jets carried a mixture of loads and the Able Dogs could carry a massive load of two 2,000Ib (907kg), two 1,000Ib (454kg) and eight 250Ib (113kg) bombs. On the day Breen flew with the Australians, the Meteors were using rockets.

Another thing which had to be watched carefully was that after the jets came in they had to break away over the North Korean side of the lines in case there was a hung bomb. The danger if this happened with them coming back over friendly territory was obvious. It was part of the Mosquito’s job to check and clear the fighter-bombers before they turned for home. Then he would go back and re-circle to wait for the next aircraft to dive.

For the close support strikes he directed between April 1 O and April 22, 1953, Gus Breen was awarded the US Air Medal and after conducting similar operations from the middle of April to the beginning of May both Keith Hatfield and Bruce Boys received similar awards. It was in May, however, that the Australian Mosquitoes found themselves on the receiving end . . .

At 4. 30pm on the 26th, Gus Breen’s American pilot was 1st Lt Danny Real:

“We’ve never really been quite sure what happened. We were flying over on the western side of I Corps and had put a couple of strikes in and had had a fair amount of flak. Whether we took a hit or not was very hard to tell. Anyhow, we were certainly in trouble and radioed back to say we were coming in for an emergency landing. The engine was coughing and spluttering but we knew where the location of the nearest emergency strip was, so we headed for that. We were losing height as we came in over our lines and turned into the wind. It was just a dirt strip and there were a lot of Korean workmen working on either side of it. I guess the pilot was working overtime . . . I’m sure he was!

“As we came around into the wind, we floated on the final approach and the damn thing wouldn’t sit down. We hit about half way down the strip and went hurtling down the runway. A T-6 lands at about 80-90 knots and we were much too long in our approach. The pilot was doing his best to pull it up. I said, ‘We’d better go around, Danny,’ and he hit the power. Up we went, just clearing cables which were about 20 feet (6m) up. We were just starting to gain some height when at about 30 feet (9m), she died, just like that! Down we came from 30 feet (9m)- crunch. The fuselage was smashed right behind the back seat and the impact tore the wheels off and tore one wing off. We actually came down like astone,quite flat and stopped almost dead- in a very old paddy field. She only slid about 10 yards (9m). I yelled out, ‘Get out Danny,’ and by the time I got out he was already on the ground!

“I used to always fly with the canopy slightly open and the crash blew all the glass out. I got out of it so fast I didn’t even open the canopy. Not a bad effort with a parachute on. Danny was cut across his forehead. Actually we came down near an American artillery unit. Once we hit, people came from everywhere, Americans, Koreans – everybody came charging over the hill. Of course, we were a little punchy but not badly hurt. We spent the night there and were flown back to K47 the next day.

“The identification number of the plane I went down in was LTA-571. ”

Keith Hatfield was flying in LTA-555, the ‘Triple Nickel’, as it used to be called, when he was shot down in flames early on the morning of May 17. Frank Winner, his pilot, was a veteran of the Pacific War and he reacted quickly by hurling the burning plane over onto its back. There was no chance to bail out in the usual way by jumping towards the starboard wing. Hatfield iust dropped. This, the first parachute jump he ever did, was to jump for his life. He came down about 400 yards (366m) out in front of the UN positions but his troubles were far from over because he had landed in a minefield! Frank Winner was still in trouble too. He came down further out. He was very badly burnt and his parachute was caught up on a cliff. Fortunately, the South Koreans were able to launch an immediate rescue mission. They went out and brought him back in broad daylight.

As for Keith Hatfield – he just started to run. He actually ran straight through the minefield and up into the UN lines! As he scrambled uphill over rocks, he suddenly became aware of searing pain. It was then that he realized his hands and legs had been burnt raw and there was no skin on his right ear. His flying suit had burst into flames and practically exploded but luckily the Australian’s long woollen underwear had protected the remainder of his body. On top of the hill he could see ROK troops shouting to him to “Hubba! Hubba!” and to “Hurry! Plenty Fast!” until at last a South Korean officer pulled him into cover behind the ridge. Hatfield’s burns kept him from flying for three weeks.

On June 10, a few weeks after he returned to operations, Hatfield demonstrated that his experience had not quelled his enthusiasm. While on a tactical control mission near Kumhwa, he carried out a voluntary search for a fighter-bomber pilot who had bailed out after his plane had been destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. The general area was heavily defended and visibility was poor but he and his pilot continued to search for over an hour. The unarmed T-6 was struck at least three times by intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. They did not abandon the

Remains of Gus Breen’s LTA-571 after his crash landing on May 26, 1953. search and stayed to lead a rescue helicopter into an area where the downed pilot had been sighted. For his part in the exploit, Hatfield was awarded the US Distinguished Flying Cross.

Two weeks later, on June 23, Gus Breen made a low level reconnaissance of his allotted target area north of White Horse Mountain and found an enemy strong point which consisted of 6 caves, 7 personnel shelters, 8 bunkers, 3 automatic weapons positions and 4 mortar positions. He contacted three flights of fighter-bombers which were orbiting the area and, because there were dense layers of cloud about 3,000 feet (900m) above the ground, he led them through onto the target. The fighter-bomber pilots could see fire from small arms and automatic weapons being directed at the little T-6 as it flew low and guided them in. In spite of repeated warnings, Breen and his pilot continued with their work until the strikes were finished and then they checked the results. The bombing had effectively closed 4 caves, damaged 3 bunkers, all of the personnel shelters, 2 mortar positions, 2 automatic weapons positions and 75 yards (69m) of the heavily trenched strong point.

On another occasion, although poor weather had grounded the fighter-bombers, Breen and his pilot had to go up spotting for the ROK artillery. Flying below the limited ceiling and peering through the mists and cloud, they surprised two hundred enemy troops in the open on the lee slope of a hill miles behind the front lines. Breen called up the artillery which inflicted many casualties.

For his work, Gus Breen too won an American DFC.

Shortly afterwards, it was Bruce Boys’ turn. On the 26th, while on a tactical control mission, he was instrumental in thwarting a heavy communist attack. He expertly directed four flights of fighter-bombers in attacks on a series of strong points from which an estimated 10,000 enemy troops were attacking friendly forces. After making a low level reconnaissance of the area, Boys contacted the fighter-bombers and led them to the targets. For over an hour and a half he and his pilot remained at low level over the area directing the 16 attacking planes in their bomb runs regardless of intense and accurate ground fire. The strike effectively wrecked 12 bunkers, 7 personnel firing bays, 4 personnel shelters, and also damaged 2 mortar positions, 5 caves, 200 yards (180m) of trenches and severed a vital supply road. In this way Bruce Boys completed the trio of DFCs.

But the Australians’ time with the Americans was drawing to an end. Gus Breen left Chunchon on July 4 and he recalls that it had been hectic but satisfying work:

“Each mission took about 21/2 to 3 hours by the time we got up and back and had a couple of hours over the target area. In that time you’d probably put one strike in. Sometimes you’d fly a mis- sion and not put any in, other times you’d put three in. It depended on what was going on. I flew two sorties aday on quite a few occasions. I flew 76 missions in 3 months and I had one week off for training and another week off after my crash landing. It was also in the wet weather season so we missed a number of days. When you fly for 5 hours, particularly in this sort of stuff, it could be pretty exhausting at times.

“We lost four fellows while I was there. You’d have breakfast with them in the morning and they weren’t there at lunchtime. I got hit twice and there was that crash landing so I had three close shaves. ”

The American pilots flew 100 missions in 12 months, less the 3 months they were up on the front lines with infantry or artillery units acting as a TACP. Hatfield, Boys and Breen all did 75 missions or more in three months.

Breen returned to 2 RARas a platoon commander. He arrived back in the morning and took the company advance party onto the Hook, which was down on the left hand end of the Commonwealth Division, in the afternoon, so he hardly had time to get his feet back on the ground. He spent the last three weeks of the Korean War on the front line as an infantry officer and was on the line when the war finished with the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953.

During the war the airborne ‘Mosquito’ Forward Air Controllers had more than proved their worth but the lessons that they demonstrated were soon to be overlooked. It was believed by both the USAF and the US Army that the absence of hostile air activity over the battle area allowed the UN air forces to provide much more close support than was normal. T he argument put forward was that in future wars the army would undoubtedly have much more supporting artillery and would require less close support than was provided in Korea where the rugged nature of the terrain forced the Mosquitoes to direct most of the close support strikes because TACPs on the ground simply could not see the targets. Likewise, it was said that the air force would probably be more occupied with fighting a battle for air superiority and would therefore would be less able to provide such close support as had been the case in Korea. T he anomaly of employing slow, unarmed training aircraft in such a role in front line battle conditions was obvious and deemed highly unlikely to occur again.

Twelve years later, over the steamy jungles of South Vietnam against the elusive Viet Cong, when the techniques of airborne fire control had been almost totally abandoned, it did occur again.