Defence Update

(Just how the RAAF can make greater use of Reserve aircrew, especially on fast jet combat aircraft like the F/A-18 and the F-111, given that the Force Structure Review aims to extend the life of such aircraft by lesser use, is unclear. However the fact that the RAAF intends to form a ground airfield protection unit of 450 over five years under the FSR and not attempt to give former pilots regular training on the fast jets is a matter of considerable debate in Defence circles. The first problem, of course, is the availability of resources, ie money. )

The Sub-Committee’s Report on the Australian Defence Force Reserves was long in coming to fruition, having started under the previous Parliament in 1990. Commenting that day on the Report presented to Parliament on 28th November 1991, the Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee, Mr Ted Lindsay said it was the culmination of a complex inquiry, “which addressed, among other things, the Reserves’ structure and capabilities with respect to priority tasks set out in DOA87 (the Defence White Paper of 1987 which followed the Dibb Report on Defence Capabilities in 1986) and “existing types of Reserve service, priorities for the further development of Reservesand the net resource implications of any changes to the structure or capabilities of the Reserves. ”

Mr Lindsay, the ALP Member for the Townsville based seat of Herbert, also said, “The Committee has no doubt that the military capability being generated currently by the Army Reserve is grossly inefficient. In Army, Ready Reserves (which were first inducted in January, 1992) will be introduced at the expense of one of the Army’s only three Regular Brigades (then 6th Brigade at Enoggera, Brisbane) and essentially without any consideration of 26,000 General Reservists.

“The Force Structure Review has reduced these Reservists to ‘ThirdX1 status”‘, Lindsay said. “The lack ofArmy Reserve operational readiness is the weak link in the concept of defence-indepth. In particular, the manifest inability of ADF ground forces to secure the bases required for deployed maritime forces jeopardises the objective of defence self reliance,” he added.

Lindsay also said that, notwithstanding the more than 20 years and $100 million spent in its development, an operational ADF mine countermeasures capability is still at least seven years off. “That is bad enough,” the Chairman said. “The Force Structure Review, however, reversed a long standing policy of employing auxiliary minesweepers manned largely by Reserves to complement our minehunting capability. ” It was then that Lindsay said the Committee believed strongly that the RAAF needed to make much greater use of Reserves and made related comments.

“During this inquiry it became progressively clear to the Committee that there were five key issues which all have to be addressed in order for the ADF’s Reserve forces to become effective and efficient,” he said. “First, military employability of Reservists has to be approached in a more flexible way.

“Second, widely held assumptions about the capability and notice components of readiness need to be reviewed. Next, capability gaps can be overcome by adjusting the disposition of certain force structures to open the way for Reservists to make a substantially greater contribution to the performance of ADF functions, roles and tasks. ”

Lindsay continued, “Fourth, Reserve deployment needs to be managed within the total force concept. Finally – and noting that the differential between the financial assumptions made in DOA87 (the Defence of Australia White Paper), and actual defence expenditure in the period 1987/88 to 91/92 is in the order of $5bn – additional resources will be required, particularly for the proper development of Army’s General Reserve forces.

“The central challenge is to redress the failure of the force development process to adjust the military capability of Reserves in response to evolving Australian strategic thinking and the Government’s Defence policy,” Lindsay added.

In the statement tabled in Parliament, it was outlined how the inquiry attracted a great deal of interest from ADF personnel, defence academics and the general public. This followed the Defence Minister’s referral on 17th March 1989 for an inquiry into the issue of the structure and capabilities of ADF Reserves.

By the dissolution of the 35th Parliament in February 1990, more than 120 submissions had been received and four public hearings held. The Terms of Reference were rereferred to the Committee on 13th June 1990, following its reappointment in the 36th Parliament. The Auditor General’s Report on the Army Reserves was added later through referral by the House of Representatives.

During the present Parliament, the Committee received a further 130 submissions, totalling some 2,500 pages, and conducted nine public hearings, amassing over 1,500 pages of oral evidence. It travelled extensively to Service establishments around Australia to inspect facilities and discuss issues of concern with both Reserve and Regular members of the ADF. Further the Committee decided to delay the finalisation of its proceedings to take account of the Force Structure Reviews’ outcome which was announced on 29th May 1991. This allowed for comment on the impact of the FSR on ADF Reserves.

The Committee found that Naval Reserves contribute only indirectly to readiness, but that they were performing current roles effectively and that the estimated annual cost of some $17 million was being applied efficiently.

The Committee said that Army Reserves made a major and direct contribution to ADF readiness. “The operational roles concerned relate mainly to surveillance, protection and logistics. The Committee found that Army Reserves provide marginally effective surveillance, ineffective vital asset protection and an ineffective level of logistic support.

The broad costs of the ARs include equipment worth some $268m with planned near term acquisitions of about $100m; facilities worth at least $180m and recurrent funding of $500m a year. “The Committee has no doubt that the military capability being generated by the Army Reserve is grossly inefficient,” the report says. “Ready Reserves will be introduced at the expense of one of the Army’s only three Regular Brigades – and essentially without any rigorous consideration of 26,000 General Reserves.

The reports says that Air Force Reserves contribute only indirectly to the performance of many operational roles at an estimated annual cost of some $12m and that this is cost effective.

“The RAAF’s most serious operational weaknesses are its low aircraft to aircrew ratio and the relatively few technical and other personnel to support operations at forward deployment airfield. The Air Force plan to introduce Reserves as Airfield Defence Guards is considered sound and will now be enabled by the Ready Reserve Program.

“However, no serious attempt has been made to extend RAAF operational effectiveness by widening the application of integrated Regular/Reserve force elements,” the repor t argues. “We believe that Air Force should introduce an integrated structure in at least five or six operational squadrons employing a mix of Reserve and Permanent air and ground personnel. ”

The Committee strongly recommended that the Defence Department develop a Corporate Plan for the Development of ADF Reserve Forces.