Military Airspace: A Micro-Economic Reform

Australia may well be unique in that control of our skies is not a very well defined subject. The CAA is responsible for “operating an effective and efficient system of air traffic services to maintain a high level of safety for all users”. (Yet it is not doing so in areas controlled by the military. ) The RAAF is obviously charged with the air defence of the nation. It must therefore be in a position to maintain surveillance of the airspace and fly its aircraft wherever it wishes in pursuit of that objective. {Why though does it provide air traffic control at Townsville and Darwin airports? Ninety percent of the traffic there is civil. How is that part of the Defence effort?) The Army and the Navy have a need to train aircrew and fire their weapons, some of which can send projectiles to enormous heights. The amount of airspace reserved by the last two is insignificant compared to the RAAF so I will treat them all as one.

Where I say control of the skies is a badly defined subject, I do not mean that it is not laid down in a book somewhere. I am referring to the way it is handled and I have queried two obvious aspects of that between the brackets in the previous paragraph. In effect both the RAAF and the CAA control our skies. Air Coordinating Committees (ACC) are charged with negotiating the various divisions of airspace. On a day-to-day basis the CAA seems to come a poor second in such committees. Where the three defence forces represent themselves and see their own requirements as paramount, the CAA, in spite of being the only representative of civilian interests in fact seems only to represent itself. In other words, provided its own established airspace plans are not too badly affected, it does not complain.

Even then, the military, concentrated as it is around our capital cities, seems to have its own way. Testimony to that is the huge size of our Military Control Zones, and the plethora of red lines that adorn our navigation charts. While Regional Airspace P lanning and Coordination Committees (RAPACs) do exist in order to include the industry in the decision making process, it is my own experience that they have very little input into their local or national ACCs, the agendas or minutes from which are never presented to the RAPACs.

It is said that the camel was a racehorse designed by a committee. Similarly, we seem, by committee, to have created a camel of a system comprised mainly of barriers to flight. Instead of being able to fly essentially where we want, and being rerouted only when military operations require it, we are faced with an obstacle course of D Areas, R Areas and Military Control Zones, all highlighted on our charts in red and most requiring a clearance to enter. It’s no wonder that many pilots, once away from familiar territory, tend to fly circuitous routes just to avoid the hassle – and the Incident Reports!

The sixty-four thousand dollar question is, of course, does the Air Force really need all this airspace? I do not have all the facts needed to answer that question properly, but considering the combined size of our three forces and the number of flights they can generate daily, I would suggest not. Another question then springs to mind. When was the RAAF last called upon to justify the airspace it reserves? It is noticeable that the R Areas have not changed much since the Vietnam days. In my own backyard, Amberley has gone from operating the high level Canberra and F-4 Phantom, to low level F -111s. The Triple Ones never get much above twenty thousand feet and spend most of their training time outside RAAF areas at very low level. Yet the Amberley Restricted Areas still extend upwards to FL1500. Yes, that’s 150,000 feet! Use it or lose it, I believe, would be a good philosophy, for all involved in regulating or reserving airspace.

Our country is undergoing what is being called micro-economic reform. Getting rid of the inefficiencies in all our transport systems is to the forefront of that reform. Streamlining our airspace management can save the country millions of dollars per year. The CAA has, de facto, started a far reaching review of airspace allocation as it plans where each designation of ICAO airspace is appropriate. It has also recently announced a strategic plan putting in place a twenty-first century integrated control and communication system. To be truly integrated, Military air traffic control and all the airspace currently reserved by the Armed Forces should be included in that review and the CAN. s new plans. Whether they grant access to the airspace or not, a public audit of military airspace and its use is long overdue. Aeroplanes are aeroplanes, regardless of their paint schemes.

There is no particular reason why areas used by the military should not have the same designations and operate to the same rules as civilian airspace. In fact, there would not be any civilian or military airspace, the Sydney and Richmond Zones would look the same on your char t, the designations would be the same, only the callsign of the ATC Unit would give away the major user. At low level, increasing radar coverage should allow the flexibility of random operations through airspace surrounding military bases. Civilian aircraft should not be required to confine themselves to narrow transit lanes. Radar traffic advisories and, if needed, vectors to avoid a specific operation are much more flexible alternatives. The airspace structure in place now is a relic of the previous system, a system based on control without radar.

Great savings could also be made in the upper airspace. In the USA, home of the world’s largest air force, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), controls all airspace above F L180. If the military wants some of it they simply ask, and are given. Many of these areas are, of course, pre-planned. When the military are finished with the area, the airspace reverts to the FAA. All of this is transparent to the civil aircraft operator, there is no NOTAM action, there are no red lines on charts.

As well ashandling the military aircraft in transit between their base and the operating area, the FAA controllers simply route other aircraft clear of the area until the military operation has finished. Fairly obviously there is a great deal of planning done between the USAF and the FAA, but the principle is flexibility. The most efficient use of the airspace is the primary goal at all times. The savings are in staff, duplicated ATC facilities, time saved in coordination between ATC units, but above all time and fuel saved for aircraft operators. The right of the military in time of crisis to resume control of the whole airspace is not questioned. up in uniform if such a major crisis occurred. The peacetime status is that the FAA manages the national airspace resource on behalf of the nation. I believethat in theinterests of efficiency the CAA should have the same role inAustralia.

To follow up on that and take micro-economic reform one step further, let’s take a leaf out of the Kiwi book and ask another question. Why does an of ours, without overseas base commitments, maintain its own Air Traffic Control

branch? Similarly, why do the Navy and Army, with no aircraft carriers and minimal bases, maintain their own ATC branches? The classic answer would include different aircraft operating characteristics and the demands of their own service’s operations. That may hold good where there are economies of scale, as in Europe or America, but we are a small country in numerical and financial terms. Our forces have limited budgets and that

money might be better spent on what is unique to armed forces. Weapons, the means to deliver them and air defence radar units, nown as Control and Reporting Units (CRUs).

In New Zealand theAirways Corporation is contracted to supply air traffic control to the military. The CAf:, could be similarly contracted with the provision of ATC services to our Forces. There would obviously be a cost but it would not approach the cost to the Forces budget of maintaining separate training facilities, and the inevitable command infrastructure that must accompany a separate military skill.

Another perceived problem may be that civilian ATCs would not be responsible to the military Commanding Officer. The Kiwis solve that by enlisting the Controllers into their Territorial Air Force when they start work at a military base. I asked the president of the Australian Controllers Association, Mr Peter Curtis, if working on a military base presented any problems for his members. His reply was that as Air Traffic Controllers take

great pride in their profession and their country, he was sure that an agreement regarding the different working and 1ndustnal environment could easily be reached.

We are told that we must become a clever country. Micro-eco-nomic reforms are essential to that. While the subject I have broached in this article may not immediately spring to mind as part of Australia’s modernisation program, I would suggest that this ultimate reorganisation of Australia’s Air Traffic Control effort is just such a reform. It would inevitably have to be a marriage arranged by the responsible politicians, as I doubt that the will to amalgamate exists, particularly within the military forces. However if we as a nation are intent on a lean, efficient transport and military infrastructure, then we must continue to examine everything we do, and also question the way that we do it.