Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum

What is unique to the Fulcrum is the FOO protection mechanism, which uses inlet blocking doors and dorsal louvres. On the ground at low speed the inlets are closed and air ingested from above the aircraft. This arrangement is almost certainly an exercise in fudging an existing design which probably had far greater fuel capacity and lower empty weight, but had a FOO problem when operated under typical Soviet field conditions. As a result, most of the Fulcrum’s 9,000lb of fuel will be in fuselage/ carapace fuel cells.

The aircraft’s variable geometry intake almost certainly uses the FOO door as a single normal shock ramp, to provide acceptable inlet performance at Mach 2 speeds.

The undercarriage is of conventional design, with a dual nosewheel retracting aft and single mainwheels retracting forward, the mainwheels rotating flush into the wing roots.

The vertical tails are very large in area to ensure controllability at high AoA without the use of fly-by-wire control.

Roll control is via outboard ailerons and differential stabilator, with aileron control probably phased out at high speeds. Half span trailing edge flaps and full span leading edge flaps are used for landing and takeoff, there is no indication of their usage as manoeuvre flaps. The wing has three stations for pylons, typically carrying two BVR AAMs inboard and dogfight AAMs outboard. Up to four wing mount drop tanks may be carried, with quoted capacities of up to 800lb of fuel.

The Fulcrum is powered by a pair of lsotov RD-33 low bypass ratio afterburning turbofans. The engine uses a twin shaft arrangement, with a conventional variable area exhaust nozzle. The engine is rated at 18,300lb maximum afterburning thrust, with a specific fuel consumption of 0. 77Ib/lb. hr and weighs in at 2,700lb.

The high thrusVweight ratio of the RO-33 has a penalty in poor durability, although this would not be seen as a problem in the Soviet logistical system which is structured about complete engine overhauls at several hundred hours.

Avionic Systems

The core of the Fulcrum’s weapon system is the N0-93 Flash Dance coherent pulse Doppler look-down shoot-down radar, which is integrated with an Infra-Red Search and Track/Laser Range finder (IRST/LR) system. The radar has a quoted detection range of 54nm against fighter size targets, no information has been released on its target tracking capability. The IRST/LR and radar are slaved such that the inactive sensor tracks the bore sight of the active sensor, which allows radar silent IR stalking of targets under VFR conditions with automatic switchover to radar if infra-red lock is lost eg by cloud cover. Soviet engineers claim the IRST/LR is extremely accurate providing more precise gun solutions than the radar in visual engagements. What is not stated is that this arrangement can defeat the jamming of the fire control radar by switching to IRST/LR to complete the engagement. Littlehas been published on the Fulcrum’s defensive suite, although it is known to carry a Sirena 3 (or possibly later generation design) Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and upward firing flare/chaff dispensers in the vertical tail root extensions. It is not clear whether defensive trackbreaker ECM is carried, this is however likely given the presence of unexplained dielectric patches on the strakes and tailbooms. Other systems known to be carried are a radio altimeter and radio equipment for tie-in into the ground control intercept environment.

Cockpit

The cockpit of the Fulcrum more than anything illustrates the limitations of Soviet technological capability, as it is at the best comparable to late sixties Western technology. The layout is rather conventional, with a left hand console mounted throttles, centre control stick and a far left positioned switch bank. The AH, load factor, AoA, altimeter and DG are left of centre, the ASI, VSI and engine gauges to the right of centre. The upper right panel area is filled with a shrouded radar/lRST scope and a block of telltale warning indicators. A dual flat combiner Head Up Display (HUD) is fitted, the HUD camera optics are fed via optical fibre bundle. A Helmet Mounted Sight (HMS) can be carried, its output is fed together with IRST and radar parameters to the fire control computer which drives the HUD and missile seekers.

The canopy is relatively low and thus provides inferior rearward visibility in comparison with its Western counterparts. The pilot sits on a K-36O zero-zero seat which was inadvertently demonstrated to work very well at last year’s Paris air show. (Refer p33 Sept 89 AA)

With a cockpit much like sixties vintage Western fighters, the workload will be substantial where the pilot must rapidly switch weapons modes and manipulate systems, eg during a close-in engagement. While this would be considered a disadvantage in the West, it was another compromise accepted by the Soviets to keep the design as simple, maintainable and easy to produce as possible.

Performance and Weapons

With a combat weight of 30,200lb and installed engine thrust of 36,600lb, the Fulcrum is a very agile fighter. It has a wing loading and thrusVweight ratio which allows sustained 9G turning and excellent acceleration, including the ability to accelerate in a vertical climb at lower fuel states. The Fulcrum is redlined at 2. 3M or 809kt and has a sea level maximum RoC of 65,000fVmin, which is respectable performance for the dash to intercept mission. In the fighter escort role the Fulcrum offers an unspectacular combat radius of over 300nm which is however acceptable for its primary role. Accepting this limitation, its acceleration and turning performance make up the principal elements of a successful air superiority fighter design.

In terms of weapon load, the MiG-29 typically carries two large medium range R-23 (AA-7 Apex) missiles and four R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) heat-seeking dogfight missiles. These are supplemented with a single barrel 30mm cannon for close-in combat. Soviet Fulcrums are also reported to carry the newAA-1OAlamo BVR missile and the AA-11 Archer dogfight missile. All missiles are carried on wing mounted pylons with the resulting drag penalties. An unknown factor at this time is the performance of the new Fulcrum C which is reported to have a substantially higher internal fuel capacity as a result of a larger fuselage hump. Other upgrades reported involve a fly by wire control system and glass cockpit, which imply a mission computer and thus highly automated cockpit and weapon system.

Mission

The principal role of the Fulcrum is air superiority and air defence in support of Soviet land forces. While the aircraft is claimed to be capable of carrying up to 6,700Ib of air-to-ground stores, it does not appear to be fitted with the inertial navigation equipment or laser designator required for precision bomb delivery. Given the abundance of dedicated strike aircraft in the FA WS inventory, mud bashing was obviously not a priority.

Deployed in the central European theatre, the Fulcrum would be used to engage NATO’s F-15 and F-16 force, thus allowing FA strike aircraft to penetrate NATO’s air defence barrier. In the air defence role it would use its lookdown shootdown radar to engage NATO’s low flying F-111 and Tornado aircraft, up to now almost impossible to stop. The greatest tactical limitation of FulcrumA is its limited radius which is rather low for its class of air superiority fighter (and almost certainly not what the designers intended), nevertheless, it is a vast improvement over the earlier Fishbed, the later Flogger not being a serious contender for this role. Fulcrum C will almost certainly match its Western counterparts in combat radius. Deployment of the Fulcrum spells the end for older air superiority fighters such as the F-4E/F and the Mirage 111/F. 1 and will now force the need for fighter escort for most NATO strike aircraft.

In Third World scenarios, the Fulcrum balances the F-16A and defeats all earlier aircraft.

The Australian Perspective

From the Australian observer’s viewpoint, both the Fulcrum and Flanker represent a potential long term problem, both in terms of a general threat to Western air power and as potential regional threats. While the contingency of a large full scale confrontation between the Western world and the Communist bloc is increasingly unlikely with time (as the USSR’s relative economic strength and thus ability to fight a protracted conflict decline) the determined marketing effort of the Soviet government will see these aircraft sooner or later proliferating throughout the Third World. In a full scale confrontation the superior numbers of Western teen series fighters would lead to rapid attrition of the numerically inferior Soviet force, ie even trading one for one will result in a favourable long term outcome and thus Soviet defeat.

A regional confrontation between a lesser power such asAustralia and a Third World threat is, however, a rather different situation, as the criterion of numerical superiority would no longer apply and thus an exchange rate of that order would be at the least disastrous. In comparative terms both Soviet fighters must weigh out about equal in performance to their Western counterparts, the slight advantage in agility would almost certainly be balanced by better airmanship and superior Western weapons and electronic warfare capability.

The latter factors may be considered seriously by competent air warfare strategists, however those are few and far between amongst the ranks of Third World military leaders who are more likely to conclude that x percent better aerodynamic performance will directly translate into a very favourable exchange rate. The folly of the Argentine air force must be quoted as a case study, where the supersonic Mirage was perceived to be more than a match for the subsonic Harrier. As the Falklands demonstrated, airmanship, employment of tactics, weapon systems and missile performance had a far greater impact upon exchange rate. As a result it is reasonable to conclude that a cheaply acquired force of several dozen Fulcrums may well be perceived as offering a sufficient advantage to make a confrontation winnable. That is of course a dangerous situation as it may encourage hostilities, once of course committed to a confrontation, it is difficult for a government to extricate itself. Faced with such a confrontation, Australia with its existing inventory would be in a difficult situation unless the RAAF were given the freedom to wage a full scale counterair campaign with the objective of destroying as many of these aircraft as possible on the ground, thus conferring a sufficient numerical advantage in the air to secure a reasonable exchange rate. Under these circumstances rules of engagement become quite critical, as the best means of defeating such a threat lies in exploiting the superior radar/missile/systems performance of the F-18 in BVR combat. If the Rules of Engagement (ROE) force combat at visual range, exchange rates cannot be expected to be particularly favourable.

The whole USAF strategy behind the ATF hinges on the ability to defeat Soviet aircraft in BVR engagements by using superior radar/missile/systems performance combined with stealth technology to degrade the capability of Soviet radar and missiles. If the ROE forces the ATF to engage the Soviet aircraft in visual combat, much of its technological advantage is wasted and the exchange rate may no longer reflect the imbalance in technology. The air war over North Vietnam was a case study with ROE effectively robbing the USAF and USN of any advantage conferred by technology.

There are two aspects of defeating this class of threat which the RAAF would have to address. The first is ensuring an acceptable kill ratio in air superiority operations and the second is ensuring that strike aircraft are not subjected to attrition by this threat.

In dealing with the first aspect, there are several options available. The first involves hardware upgrades to the F-18A to its agility, BVR lethality and electronic warfare capability. This would involve fitting more powerful engines (ie 18,000lb F-404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance Engine), laser warning equipment and better jammers and missiles to improve kill ratios during close-in combat.

The second would involve trading in some F-18s and acquiring some higher performance aircraft instead, producing a two tier hi-lo mix fighter force like that of the USAF or USN. The third, and least credible to an opponent option, is to acquire standoff airfield attack munitions and attempt to preemptively destroy the threat on the ground, once hostilities commence.

In dealing with the second aspect- defending strike aircraft the choices are more limited. Because the Fulcrum will burn through jamming at close range and can use its IRST/LR also at close range, fitting the F-111 with laser warning equipment is a must, while upgrading the jamming suite may also be of some

benefit. This may not be adequate though and the choices then largely reduce to that of providing fighter escort on strike missions (assuming that the RAAF fighter force can engage on favourable terms) and that of supplementing or replacing the F-111 with a stealth technology strike aircraft such as the A-12A Avenger II (Advanced Tactical Aircraft) sooner than currently anticipated.

Both of these options will be expensive. Fighter escort at extended ranges will require more tankers which would probably need to double up as communications relay platforms. Airborne Early Warning may be another requirement. Fighter capability is another problem, as discussed above.

The other alternative of acquiring the A-12 will also be expensive, although given realistic timescales the F-111 is likely to be out of airframe life at about the time when such a contingency could be reasonably expected to arise. TheA-12 may well be the eventual replacement for the RAAF F-111 regardless, this aircraft having already been designated as the long term replacement for the USAF F-111 fleet.

In summary, acquisition of the Fulcrum by regional powers would require the RAAF to adopt a range of measures to restore the current favourable balance in capability. We can hope that the RAAF will give this problem some careful thought to ensure that a properly structured and appropriate response is taken, should this situation arise.

The risk in not doing so will ultimately lie in a potential regional opponent seeing the odds to be more favourable than they really are, and behaving accordingly. It will be rather late to cry wolf once that has occurred.

REFERENCES: Whitford R ‘Design for Air Combat’, Jane’s Publishing Co, 1987. Shaw R L ‘Fighter Combat, Tactics and Manoeuvring’, Naval Institute Press, 1985