Profile – Douglas DC-8

The DC-8 and 707 Rivalry

It was on June 7, 1955, when the Douglas Aircraft Company announced its plans to build a new civil transport, it was to be the companies first turbojet powered airliner.

Douglas decided on the DC-8 designation when announcing their new jet. It had initially been used to describe a possible airliner version of the B-42 Mixmaster bomber. This prototype was never built, so Douglas reassigned the designation to its new jet transport.

Despite the time lag between European manufacturers flying their jets and the Americans doing likewise, Douglas had been studying the idea of a jet transport. However, Douglas was also noting the problems that the Comet was beginning to experience, problems which included high stress on the airframe and subsequent metal fatigue. Problems which also caused several of the Comets to crash in then mysterious circumstances. Naturally enough Douglas was moving very cautiously. If Douglas had been able to take its own time in its research and development of the DC-8, it probably would have been one of the leisurely aircraft ever to be produced. But that was not to be. Douglas’ hand was forced when Boeing first flew the 707 on July 15, 1954.

In the past, Douglas dominated in propeller driven aircraft. Lockheed came a respectable second and Boeing a distant third, indeed barely in the race. Then came Boeing’s 707 and the DC-8 wasn’t ready. Douglas, unlike Boeing, hesitated before the huge costs of building a long-range jet transport and was also discouraged by its two best customers, American Airlines and United Airlines. CR Smith, of American, told Douglas that the jet powered aeroplane wasn’t timely and not to worry about competition, because nobody would ever buy a Boeing aeroplane. United boss, William Patterson, was equally negative. Douglas listened and procrastinated while Boeing leapt ahead. When Douglas finally decided on the DC-8, they made a strenuous but unsuccessful attempt to close the gap. The effort was so expensive that Douglas was forced to withdraw from the SST (Supersonic Transport) competition, leaving the field to Boeing and Lockheed. From 1957 to 1961, they sold only 47 additional DC-8s while Boeing had sold 170 707s. In 1960 Douglas lost $53m, at the same time Boeing earned more than $37m in operating profit.

At the time no-one could have predicted the reversal in the positions of the two companies. Douglas had the confidence of the industry (through its DC-3 to DC-7 series), just as Boeing has it today. Douglas had nothing to prove, whereas Boeing, which had been outside the commercial business- its Stratocruiser having failed badly- had much to prove.

As one English observer noted at the time, “Boeing saw Douglas off in a big way”, and for the first time since 1934, leadership passed out of the hands of Douglas, the company which had previously supplied at least two thirds of the world’s civil airliners.

The DC-8 flew just five months before the first 707 entered service with PanAm. When United eventually started service, on the same date as Delta, on September 18, 1959, it appeared that United had lost its gamble. Nearly eight months had elapsed since American Airlines started service with the 707, with American holding a distance advantage with traffic and financial statistics to prove it (American Airlines had the 707 flying on January 25, 1959). Despite its earlier advice to Douglas that the jet wasn’t timely, and that no-one would ever buy a Boeing, American had indeed opted for the Boeing. The lure of the new jets affected the public so much that United benefited only from the passenger overflow from American.

But the Boeing lead did give Douglas an advantage. Douglas could now benefit from what it saw were the 707’s disadvantages. Douglas then decided that a wider cabin was necessary, so that more seats could be used and also that the airliner should have a greater range.

The salesman then began hitting the airlines with their sales pitch. Boeing, Douglas salesmen admitted, would have earlier deliveries. But wait about a year, these customers were told, for a superior product. Their salesmen were effective. The customer appeal of the DC-8 and the great appeal of the Douglas marque were enough to convince the buyers. This is indicated by the fact that by the end of 1957 the Douglas order book for the DC-8 stood at 98 aircraft for 7 airlines, whereas Boeing had only received 73 orders from 6 airlines. This despite Boeing having a working prototype in the air, and Douglas showing customers over a wooden mock-up of their, as yet, unproven design.

The actual development of the DC-8 was meticulous. The designers had seen the 707 prototype and strove for a superior product. No detail was too small. No fewer than 42 shapes for cabin windows were tested before one was selected, one not only as strong as that of the 707, but also a third larger. Remembering the Comet, the window frames were subjected to almost 120,000 pressurisation cycles to prove durability. Some 3,000 employees of varying heights and weights were sent through evacuation doors before a design was chosen that would make an emergency exit as speedy for a 140kg man as for a 35kg child. As a test for windshield strength, the bodies of 2kg chickens were fired from a compressed air gun at 750km/h to simulate mid-air collisions with birds. The famed ‘Chicken Gun’ is still used today.

In the actual outer design, the DC-8 was basically similar to the 707. The four Pratt &Whitney JT3/4 engines had the same placement and were podded similarly, as well as a conventional undercarriage. But the reduced angle of sweep selected by the Douglas design team, led by Art Raymond and Ed Burton, meant that the DC-8 would have better low speed handling and lift characteristics, thereby improving airfield performance significantly.

Even before its first flight, there were many prestigious orders for the DC-8. The first of these was from Pan American, who, on October 13, 1955, bought 25 DC-8s and 20 707s worth (in 1955) an astronomical $269m. This sale indicated that PanAm was prepared to support the company which had supplied it with so many reliable aircraft in the postwar years, but it was also a warning that tradition and sentiment would not guarantee a continued market. PanAm leaned towards Douglas in its initial order because of Douglas’ reputation and the DC-8 fuselage was slightly wider giving a definite advantage in passenger preference and allowing PanAm to accommodate more passengers in the one aircraft.

At the time, PanAm’s Juan Trippe bluntly told Boeing that the only reason that PanAm had ordered the 707 was that the company coldly considered the 707 to be an interim plane, purchased solely because of the earlier delivery date. The airlines own engineers preferred DC-8s. The main reason was the optional engines – Pratt & Whitney JT-4s on the DC-8 with 45% more power than those of the 707’s early JT-3s-and the greater lift which would allow the DC-8 to carry enough fuel for the nonstop max-pax transatlantic range the early 707 often lacked.

As mentioned above, United Airlines also ordered DC-8s. The company had evaluated the 707, but the fuselage width was fractionally thinner, only by 15cm but it was enough to mean less seats. When asked to widen the cabin by boss William Patterson, Boeing would only offer the cheaper method of a fuselage stretch. But even with that stretch, the 707 did not have the capacity of the DC-8. It was then that Boeing decided to redesign the 707. The fuselage was now 30cm wider, 2. 5m longer, with a 5. 25m greater wingspan while increasing its range by 1,000nm. PanAm took one look at the new plane and changed its order, they now wanted six of the first model and 14 of the new version. In fact PanAm also changed its order in regards to the DC-8 – it only took delivery of 19 of the 25 ordered. No-one was really sure why such a decision was made by management, although it is suspected that PanAm was disappointed with the order of the 30 series which apparently failed to meet the manufacturer’s payload/range guarantees.

It was this lack of confidence that really affected sales of the DC-8. With this new found confidence, Boeing went off to win new markets and, due to its flexibility of being able to offer both versions and its willingness to cater for changes to customer needs, the orders rolled in.

Still, beyond Boeing’s eagerness to please, there was actually little to choose between the DC-8 and the 707. Each plane had advantages and disadvantages. Passenger capacity was now about the same. Some pilots preferred the docility of the DC-8, while others preferred the 707’s greater ruggedness and speed. The others then stood in favour of the 707 to the DC-8 2:1.

Troubleshooting

With the early turbojets also came noise. There were attempts to counter the noise problem after complaints from the public and with airlines realising that their business depended upon this public (one set of Dallas high rise apartments had Go Away Jets painted on the top). In an attempt to partly remedy the problem, the aircraft were fitted with ‘piped organ’ tubes at the rear of each engine. These diffused the jets’ noise to some extent however, they also reduced thrust by 10% and added about $10,000 a month to each planes fuel costs.

The cost would appear less than it was, because in the 1960’s although the jets were less fuel efficient (the DC-8 achieved 42 passenger miles per gallon as compared with the DC-Ts 59), it was cheaper to operate jets as the kerosene used in jets was then only 10 cents per gallon, as compared with 25 cents a gallon for the high octane avgas fuel used by piston engines.

The introduction of the turbofan, in the DC-8 series 40, (and the 707B) cut fuel consumption by up to 20% while also lowering maintenance costs. In addition, the turbofans were less noisy than turbojets.

Other problems with the big jets also began to arise in 1959. At times the hydraulically actuated landing gear refused to lower, but all the crew had to do was merely resort to one of the jetliners two backup systems, one electrical, the other manual.

The problem was eventually traced to the pump that supplied the hydraulic fluid to the eight wheel main gear. The pumps were wearing out faster than expected due to the demands of daily airline operations and the temperature extremes that the pumps were exposed to, ranging from 50°C on the ground to well below zero at altitude.

The airlines were advised to check the pumps. The actual problem proved more vexing than dangerous.

The new jets were also prone through a form of instability- they could stall in severe turbulence. Called an ‘upset’. It was found that some pilots were slowing down in storms to reduce their penetration speed to prevent structural damage. In a jet, because the narrow, swept wings were less effective at low speeds than those of earlier airliners, throttling back could permit a severe down draught or up draught to pitch the plane into a stall. Recognising the jets superior structural strength, it was recommended to fly faster in storms to thus prevent stalls Basically, Boeing outsold Douglas because of the two year lead and lower prices. But in the early years, in spite of massive sales penetration into all the major airline markets of the world, both companies lost money on the projects. Douglas wrote off $300m in development costs up to the end of 1960. Boeing was slightly better off because of partial commonality with the military tanker, with which much of the development costs could be shared. The original 707 was used by the USAF from 1957 as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the VC-137 VIP transport, aircraft themselves which gained considerably from Boeing’s experi once derived from the B-47 and B-52 jet bomber programmesat a time when Douglas was building the lumbering C-124 and C-133 transports and DC-6/7 piston engined airliners.

NEXT ISSUE: Douglas’ fight for survival begins as the high development cost of a large number of different DC-8 versions begins to take its toll on the company’s cash reserves. These different marks are also described in full with an accompanying colour spread. Don’t miss it.