Air Safety

Preflight inspection and run-up indicated that the aircraft was fully serviceable. A normal takeoff was carried out and the port engine fire warning light flashed on when the aircraft reached a height of about 300 feet. The captain instructed the second pilot to make a visual inspection of the port engine from the main cabin – that inspection revealed a sheet of flame between the gills and the engine cowl. The port airscrew was immediately feathered, port fuel and magneto switches were turned off and the fire extinguisher was operated.

The pilot commenced to turn the aircraft back to the aerodrome and the second pilot notified control. The aircraft, which by this time was over the sea, was cleared for an immediate landing. Subsequently, the vibration in the aircraft became progressively greater and only partial control over the aircraft was available. When the aircraft commenced to lose height in a shallow dive attitude, the pilot closed the starboard throttle and attempted to level out over the water. Response to the controls was very sluggish with the result that the aircraft struck the water in a slightly nose down attitude. After impact occurred, it remained floating for some four minutes before it disappeared out of sight.

Both pilots abandoned the aircraft through the escape hatch and were rescued by a nearby fishing boat. Shortly afterwards, they were transferred to a patrol boat which effected their return to land. The pilots received minor injuries.

Cause and Comments

The Dakota was salvaged from the sea but the port engine could not be recovered. Eye witnesses to the accident confirmed that the port engine had broken away from the fuselage prior to impact. The unsuccessful search for the port engine was continued for three days.

Without the port engine, it was impossible to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the exact cause of the fire. However, the most probable cause was a leakage of fuel into the engine bay. Such a leak could have resulted from a broken, disconnected or loose fuel line; loose or faulty hose connections or jubilee clips. The area in which the fire appeared to be concentrated seemed to be around the engine oil tank and upper wheel well. A fire in the vicinity of the carburettor would quickly destroy any rubber hose connections and increase the intensity of the fire by the addition of more fuel and oil. This fire could spread to the upper wheel well where the oil tank is situated and ignite the latter, thus causing a fire of substantial intensity.

The captain and the second pilot displayed clear thinking, good airmanship and coordination through the emergency.

Category: Miscellaneous – Undetermined. The next item was an accident which occurred in the United States.

Convair Ditching

“MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY. We have an engine fire and are returning to the airfield. ”

The Convair had departed only four minutes earlier with a crew of six and nine passengers on board. It never made it back. After the left wing failed from the engine fire, the aircraft fell into a river, 1,700 feet short of the runway threshold. The only survivor, a passenger, was thrown clear.

The investigation revealed an internal failure in the engine, resulting in major damage and an uncontrollable oil fed fire. The crew had probably diagnosed the problem initially as the usual rough running engine and had reduced power for 90 seconds before shutting it down. The Convair reached 9 miles from the airfield during its turn back and the left propeller was feathered at 7 miles inbound. Witnesses report seeing the left engine on fire at 6 miles, although the left wheel stayed up. On short final, the flames were noticed to be intense and the engine was drooping. Heat from the fire weakened the wing structure which began to fail at the front spar; the failure progressing to the rear. On impact, all seat belts failed due to excessive G forces. The investigation noted that a similar mishap involving a Convair 240 occurred at altitude. Although the crew feathered the propeller immediately and all actions were performed promptly, the wing failed 6 minutes after the initial emergency call.

The pilots did all that could be reasonably expected of them. A rough running engine is par for the course on an old Convair. The pilots commenced a turn back but without any strong sense of urgency. They completed the emergency procedures and prepared for landing. With the runway in sight less than 8 miles away and established on final, probably neither pilot considered an emergency landing or a ditching in the river; how many of us would? And if consideration was given to ditching, no one was wearing life jackets; after all, it was a landlocked airfield they were using.

The flight attendants gave the passengers an emergency briefing and removed the overwing escape hatches. It is unknown what actions the other crew members took, although the flight engineer was probably very busy throughout the sequence. It is at critical times like this when crew coordination and teamwork are paramount, when each member of the crew can and should be doing something positive to help save his life and the lives of those on board. Let us move on from this real life situation to the hypothetical ‘general’ case and ask ourselves just what could each member of the crew do. With an engine problem like this one, both pilots and the flight engineer are going to be pretty busy. If the emergency includes a bit of smoke in the cockpit or a night or IMC approach, the pilots will definitely appreciate useful and timely inputs from other crew members.

The captain can only make his decisions in the inputs he receives. In this mishap, it is possible the pilot was too busy on final to look out the side window at the engine. If someone had told him the flames were intense and the engine was drooping, he may have decided to land immediately without lowering the gear. But don’t swamp him with information either. His mind may then become saturated and start selecting pieces of information and ignoring others, some of which may be critical. If you are a flight attendant, a loadmaster, or any other crew member on board, take on the responsibility to brief the passengers and prepare the cabin without interrupting the pilots.

The copilot should devote his full attention to meeting the captain’s requirements. He should be prepared to assist the captain on the controls, if requested; he should run the check lists asked for and be prepared to suggest other appropriate checks which the captain might overlook in the heat of the moment; and he should make the radio calls as requested by the captain, but must place the captain’s directions in first place, even ahead of replies to air traffic control. Bearing in mind that the captain will be very busy, the copilot must closely monitor the captain’s actions and indicate loud and clear when they are wrong.

Thf flight engineer will always be busy in these situations. If his checklist does not fix the problem, then he must earn his pay and fall back on experience and systems knowledge. With this, he should advise the captain of the most appropriate actions to be taken, including whether or not the situation is desperate enough to require an immediate landing. Once he has done all he can to secure the emergency, the flight engineer can continue to keep the pilot up to date with developments. For example, in this mishap, he may have had time to visually monitor the fire and advise the pilot of its changing condition.

The loadmaster (if a military transport) may be called upon to help troubleshoot, depending on the problem. He may be in a very good position to monitor fire progress and its effect and the condition of different systems – gear position, flap position, or whatever else he can see. Again, he must not interrupt the pilots unnecessarily, but he must advise if, for example, he notices the engine is drooping or one wheel has not come down. The loadmaster must follow his emergency checklist and prepare the cabin or cargo compartment accordingly. All loose equipment must be stowed. Emergency exits should be removed only with the concurrence of the aircraft commander. If, however, it is obvious the pilot is too busy, then the loadmaster may have to decide on exit removal using the information he has available; every emergency situation is different and a loadmaster who has given some thought to his emergency actions some time before will be best able to make the right decision in an actual emergency. The loadmaster must also ensure the passengers are briefed and ready with life jackets on, seat belts tight and bodies in the brace position.

Each member of the crew must be ready to face his unique emergency. Think about the actions you must take in an emergency and think about unusual emergencies. Discuss these emergencies and your proposed actions with your other crew members. That way, they will know what to expect from you if it happens and you get feedback which will help you to modify your planned actions and to know what your other crew members might do. Have a personal plan of action to follow once the aircraft comes to rest. Be able to find and operate all the exits in tt·,e dark and all the escape aids.

In an emergency, the crew concept is at its peak of importance and of vulnerability. To make it work, the crew must work well together and each member must impose strict self discipline. Although even the best crews don’t always make it, their chances are greatly improved over crews which have never worked well as a team and which dissolve into separate members at the first sign of an emergency. For your own protection, think up unusual emergency scenarios, research them and talk to your fellow crew members about them.

Both of these examples show how quickly an emergency can develop into wet feet despite all the best endeavours of the crew. When it is all happening in a rush, your best bet is a sound knowledge of procedures and a well prepared crew.

The final incident from ‘FlightFax’ shows the value of experience and a professional approach. Instead of losing both crew and Caribou, the impending accident resulted in relatively minor damage. This US Army crew decided not to push their luck

The Right Choice

When in-flight emergencies occur, aviators sometimes pass up suitable landing sites and try to make it to the nearest airfield. Not so with a YC-7 crew who had a fire in their right engine. They were only 10 minutes from an airfield, but they would probably not have reached it had they continued flight.

After taking off from an airport and just before reaching the assigned altitude of 6,000 feet MSL, the crew saw the right generator light come on. The copilot tried to reset the generator but was unsuccessful. A few minutes later, a popping sound was heard and the right engine quit. As shutdown and feathering procedures were accomplished, the crew chief announced that the right engine was on fire. The copilot closed The fuel and oil shutoff valves to the right engine and activated one of the engine fire extinguishers, but it did not extinguish the fire. Activation of the second extinguisher also did not put out the fire. An attempt to blow out the fire by diving to increase airspeed was also unsuccessful and resulted in a loss of 1,500 feet in altitude.

The pilot called approach control to tell them about the emergency. Approach control advised of an airfield about 1 O minutes flying time away. The crew decided the field was too far away and that the aircraft should be landed as quickly as possible. A cotton field was chosen as the most suitable landing site. The aircraft was landed without further damage. The engine fire could not be extinguished with an onboard aircraft fire extinguisher. A civilian fire truck arrived within a few minutes and the fire was extinguished with water from the truck.

The engine fire started as a result of the right engine generator. An object was thrown through the wall of the generator cooling duct adapter and penetrated a nearby fuel line. Sparks and bits of molten metal from the generator initiate the fire. Pieces of Teflon and other debris clogged the fuel pump, causing fuel starvation and failure of the engine. As the aircraft descended, the fire was fed by a combination of fuel and oil.

The pilot had more than 5,000 fixed wing hours and the copilot had more than 3,000 fixed wing hours. The highly experienced crew’s sound judgement and quick, positive action limited damage to the engine. Because of the intensity of the fire, had the crew tried to continue flight to the airfield, it is doubtful aircraft integrity would have been maintained long enough to make a safe landing. Don’t let mission accomplishment, pride or coercion cause you to try to fly an aircraft that may fail you at any moment. When you get the first warning that something may be wrong, select a suitable landing site, put your aircraft down and leave it down.

Air safety reports courtesy of the Directorate of Air Force Safety, RAAF, Canberra