Update Northrop B-2

The problem is that the US DoD is looking towards a future riddled with ongoing defence cuts in addition to a number of key programmes that will require what is nowadays loosely described as mega-funding. Alongside the B-2 programme will range the Advanced Tactical Fighter, the C-17 long-range airlifter, LHX helo programme, the Navy’s ATA and Seawolf projects plus ultimately development of a mobile ICBM to replace the early generation Minuteman missile squadrons. In this environment many within the US defence community are questioning the purchase of an aircraft that to date is designed to fly a mission that could well become redundant if the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is successful. The spectre of Pershing and Tomahawk missiles being cut up and burnt under recently negotiated arms reduction treaties is beginning to raise questions not as to the B-2’s ability to successfully penetrate Soviet airspace but moreover, its ability to successfully survive the mooted major arms treaties that are destined to come out of Geneva in the years ahead.

Despite this the B-2 is nothing short of a technological marvel. When Northrop won the assignment to build the ultra secret aircraft in 1981, it came as no surprise that the company would utilise what is effectively a flying wing. Northrop pioneered this revolutionary technology back in the forties and had a flying wing bomber prototype, the XB-35, flying in 1946. A jet engined derivative flew a year later and the USAF ordered 30 of the reconnaissance version though unfortunately for Northrop this order was subsequently cancelled when two of the test aircraft exploded in mid air for unexplained reasons. As an example though of how effective aerodynamically the flying wing concept was, the piston engined XB-35 had a maximum speed of just under 400mph and a long-range economical cruise of 183mph over a range of 8,100 miles carrying a 16,000lb bomb load. This was New York to Paris and return, something that was at the time far superior to even the much-heralded B-29. Hence, it was no surprise that Northrop, some thirty years later, chose what essentially is a flying wing for their stealth bomber design.

Ironically the B-2 shares exactly the same wingspan, 172ft, as the XB-35 of 1946. The B-2s height is 17ft and its length a stubby 69ft, or slightly shorter than an F-111. No details are given as to its weight though the Pentagon has intimated that its warload is less than the B-1B and substantially less than the geriatric B-52. Not that this matters particularly to the two crew of the B-2 as their primary mission will be to hunt out the new generation of Soviet SS-24 Scalpel and SS-25 Sickle mobile ICBMs deep within the USSR. A secondary mission will be to hit very high value fixed targets such as the massive Soviet underground command and control bunker complex outside Moscow that would house the bulk of the USSR’s hierachy in the event of a nuclear exchange. Opponents of the B-2 however point out that the systems with which the B-2 will be able to locate and successfully target the mobile missiles have not even been perfected yet while longrange stealth based cruise missiles would do a far more cost effective job of hitting known fixed targets deep within the USSR. Long-range Over The Horizon Radars would also be able to track the B-2 via its accompanying tanker support en route to the Soviet borders. OTHB also is immune to stealth technology to a large extent and in this regard our own excellent Jindalee system may well be discreetly employed in the development phase of assessing the B-2’s penetration capabilities. In the long run though the B-2 might well find itself more gainfully employed shadowing and harassing the massive Soviet naval surface fleets that would be used to interdict the vital North Atlantic air and sea bridge that would be Europe’s only long term hope of surviving a massed Warpac attack. In this role the ‘invisible’ ultra long-range B-2 would be formidable indeed, striking fear into the very soul of a Soviet battle group commander. In this regard the presence of the B-2 might well also cause the Soviets to accelerate their own aircraft carrier programme. Their first 63,000t class carrier is scheduled to become operational around 1995 with a second vessel entering service perhaps two years later.

Stealth technology itself appears to have taken a new turn between the design era of the recently unveiled F-117A and the B-2. The F-117A largely features angular panels while the B-2 exhibits more flowing lines. Both aircraft though use non afterburning versions of existing General Electric engines, the F-117A has dual F404 units of 11,000lb thrust and the B-2 four 19,000lb thrust F118-GE-100s which are derived from the engines now powering late delivery F-14 and F-16 aircraft. Other companies involved with Northrop and GE were Boeing, LTV and Hughes. The two crew will operate a complex, and still largely under development, sensor suite primarily based on passive detection rather than active radars which in most cases would betray the presence of the aircraft. Finished in a dull powder blue paint, the B-2’s engines are shrouded both in intake and exhaust with the latter cooled by external air to reduce infra-red signature. In hostile airspace the B-2 (and also the F-11?A) will operate subsonically at either very high altitude or either at low level. The high altitude capability of the B-2 will greatly increase its tactical radius as fuel burn at altitude is only a fraction of that required for low level operations.

Six B-2s will be employed in the development programme with the first of type planned to test fly as we closed for press. Five of the six aircraft will then enter operational service with the Strategic Air Command at Whiteman AFB, Missouri with the first unit becoming operational around 1993/94. The 8-2 will augment the 97 remaining Rockwell 8-1Bs and what survives of the ageing but competent (particularly in its stand-off and maritime role) 8-52 fleet as the backbone of the manned bomber component of the US nuclear triad.

The revolutionary 8-2 may well be the ultimate memorial to the doctrine of the manned bomber, it may well also severely strain the US Defence Department’s budget though one thing is for certain, it will also be creating a whole new set of problems for defence planners from Minsk to Vladivostok.