Space

Historically, the spaceport proposal was initiated by Stanley Schaetzel who wrote to Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen in August, 1986, suggesting that Northern Queensland had a major geographical advantage if it was used as a spaceport site. The Queensland government reacted quickly and a Phase I Feasibility Study was initiated under the auspices of the Institution of Engineers. Participation of the IEAust was sought to ensure the credibility and objectivity of the proposal. This study addressed the technical feasibility of building the site, access to orbits, related matters of trajectories, site access, land ownership and infrastructure, weather, projected traffic and recommendations on site location and layout.

At this stage it appears that the Queensland Government took some of its own initiatives in the matter. Before the findings of the study were published, it announced that the project would be a purely commercial venture. The Queensland government also contracted six consulting organisations for the Phase II study with Touche Ross being chosen as project manager. This decision was made without the prior consultation of the Phase I study group or Steering Committee.

The Phase II studies were completed in July and the Queensland Premier’s Department announced that registrations of interest from commercial organisations would be accepted until late October, 1987, subsequently, this was extended until November. When the study report was issued in September, 1987, the IEAust who printed the report(s) disclaimed any responsibility for the contents.

It appears that the Phase II study failed to address the main aspect of the spaceport problem, the all-important national business strategy.

HdH had drawn this conclusion after major discussion with overseas launch organisations and subsequently made a presentation to the Australian Space Board suggesting that the spaceport is a truly national enterprise and that ASB is the appropriate body to oversee the program. This appears to have resulted in a formal approach by Queensland to the Federal Government and a subsequent statement that the ASB will become involved in the program. Federal government support for the program is necessary for a number of good reasons, which are apparent upon closer examination of the program.

Cape York the Pro and Cons

While the proposal has had a lot of coverage, given the often very technical reasons behind the assessment, much has been overlooked. The fundamental advantage enjoyed by Cape York is geographical and this could be said to be just as distinct as the reasons for building maritime ports in deep bays. Needless to say an insight into the physics of space launches is necessary to see this (refer p70 Sept AA).

The proximity of Cape York to the equator means that a launch vehicle can exploit the Earth’s angular velocity and carry between 18 to 25% more payload into an equatorial orbit compared to most other sites. This means either multiple launches, bigger spacecraft or significantly, more propellant for the spacecraft’s orbital manoeuvring system. This could add several years of life to an expensive asset.

Cape York also offers equatorial and polar orbits by virtue of suitable drop zones over the Pacific and central Australia (as a launcher carries it discards burnt-out booster stages – these cannot be allowed to fall on to populated areas for obvious reasons. . . ) and the remoteness of the site and availability of a lot of unused land adds a lot of flexibility and potential for expansion.

The climate and weather are another advantage in that launch restrictions due to high winds and electrical storms are minimal (roughly half of the time lost at Kennedy or Kourou).

The proximity of Weipa (and the Comalco facilities) and the proposed RAAF bare-bones base means that a lot of infrastructure needs to be merely expanded rather than built from scratch, needless to say the large runways of a spaceport would offer a lot more defence capability than merely a RAAF bare bones site.

Another major advantage is that Australia is a stable democracy with a well educated population. This means that local personnel can staff the facility on a permanent basis and launch organisations can expect to have their legal rights observed. Fiji illustrates the risks inherent in the Third World.

Queensland lies at the rim of the Pacific which the Us perceive to be their area of major strategic interest over the next few decades, certainly proximity to China and Japan cannot be overlooked.

While all of these factors offer a considerable payoff, they must be viewed in a broader context. The commercial nature of the facility has unique implications. Australia does not manufacture launchers and plays a minor role in world space activity.

Therefore, the spaceport project must involve one or more major overseas commercial suppliers of space hardware.

This situation is without precedent as every other overseas space launch site was built and is largely supported by a national (or joint) space program paid for by local taxpayers. While launch organisations pay fees for the use of a facility, these seldom cover the basic costs of the site infrastructure and are viewed as a bonus rather than the profit sought. Cape York is expected to pay its way and the additional costs thus incurred by users of the site could well erode the advantages outlined above (some of which are more relevant to the site nation).

Mr Schaetzel’s paper examined this aspect of the program. In the event of the Cape York site capturing eight major launches per year, charges for the infrastructure (estimated at $700m for a single pad site, assuming current interest rates, 10 yr repayment) would amount to over $20m per launch, roughly ten percent of the overall cost of a launch. A commercial customer seeking use of the Cape York facility would have to weigh this figure carefully against whatever gains in payload and trajectory were offered by the site. The gain in payload could be considered against the cost of increasing the performance of the launch vehicle (eg. to extend the orbital life of the satellite). Other factors worth attention are independence from home government agencies and technology transfer restrictions.

While the former factors may interest US suppliers such as General Dynamics, Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas, the latter may interest both China’s Great Wall Corporation (Long March) and Russia’s Glavkosmos (Proton, Vostok). It is stressed that these organisations would act as suppliers of launch hardware and would not be responsible for the running of the facility, manned by Australians. These factors are crucial to investors and must be resolved to allow potential customers to assess their possible involvement. Ultimately there are four basic issues: Is there a real commitment to the Cape York Spaceport? Is there a time scale for the Cape York Spaceport? What terms and conditions will govern the use of the site? Who is responsible for range safety (ie. the destruct button)?

The latter issues will require Federal Government involvement. Existing space law renders the Federal Govt responsible for any damage to other nations caused by falling debris. While it appears that the Queensland Government sought to shift this responsibility on to the parent nation of the launch organisation, this could be difficult in a commercial context. Furthermore, the import and export (via launch) of space hardware would require a major involvement of Customs and Excise. Federal departments are also responsible for meteorological services, long haul communications, navigational facilities and airspace control. The DoD would also have to carry the additional burden of a high value facility to be protected in a remote area.

Some of this burden could be reduced by co-locating planned facilities such as the RAAF base and some proposed space support facilities in the spaceport complex.

As is apparent a major commitment by the Federal Government is required to get the project off the ground. The depth of this commitment must be such that sufficient incentives exist for commercial organisations to get involved, and a certain degree of subsidy may be necessary in the initial Phases of the program.

Ultimately this would require a strong commitment to cooperation between the Federal and Queensland governments – something one finds difficult to foresee given the attitudes of many of our politicians.

For Australia not to capitalise on its fundamental geographical and political advantage in this area, at this favourable instant in time would be, to say the least, unfortunate. The development of any other major equatorial site in this hemisphere could divert a sufficient fraction of the market to prevent Cape York from paying for itself in the near term, therefore it is imperative that a major move is made in the near future.

Infatuation with short-term profitability has always plagued Western governments and to some degree industry, hopefully now is the time to learn. Cape York has the potential to place Australia in a very strong position in the space transportation industry of the twenty-first century if a modest commitment is made now. Let us all hope our national leaders have enough foresight to act on this matter.