ATC Operational Control, Is It Necessary?
Atc Operational Control- Is It Necessary?
This article will focus on the somewhat unusual practice of Australian Air Traffic Control authorities exercising operational control over all aircraft operating in controlled airspace. As in previous issues my knowledge is confined to operating Boeing 747 aircraft in IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) operations – the procedures as applied to general aviation aircraft may be different to those applied to RPT aircraft.
First of all let us consider the need for operational control. Of all the countries in the world to which Qantas operate, Australia is the only one to exercise ‘operational control’. The Department of Aviation argument is, of course, that by exercising this control over aircraft they are achieving a better safety record and a more orderly system of Air Traffic Control. Overall the Australian aviation safety record is very good compared to the rest of the world but I believe it is rather like comparing oranges and apples because the weather conditions in this country are much more favourable than many parts of the globe.
Closing airports when airports are experiencing marginal conditions is one way to achieve a good safety record but I would suggest that it is a very good example of overkill. Australia has not one Category 2 ILS (Instrument Landing System) available anywhere. This means that the landing visibility required is immediately increased from 400 to 800 metres and the ceiling required goes up from 100 to 200 feet. The increase in visibility is the significant factor here.
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How is visibility measured? At overseas airports a transmissometer gives instant readouts about every 15 seconds, sometimes three units are available for different positions along a given runway. At Australian airports a rather more archaic method is employed – the airport safety officer drives his vehicle onto the runway and makes a visual assessment of the visibility based on the number of runway lights he is able to see. This is obviously a sub-standard method bf assessing visibility. Two reasons for this are that it is too slow and it can be inaccurate, depending on the skill of the measurer. In marginal visibility conditions such as fog, the tower controller can close the airport to all operations or permit departures only. During this period arriving aircraft are not permitted to land or commence an instrument approach. However what the controller sees from the tower is not necessarily going to be same as what a pilot sees in front of him at 200 feet on the ILS. For this reason alone I do not believe that ATC should have the right to prohibit aircraft from making an approach to minima, landing if conditions are suitable or carrying out a missed approach if conditions did not permit a landing. Overseas there are no limitations on carrying out an approach to company minima except that two countries (the United Kingdom and South Africa) state that you are not permitted to continue an approach below 1000 feet if the actual RVR (Runway Visual Range) for the runway is below your company minima. This I believe to be an excellent way of regulating approaches in marginal conditions and I commend it to the Department of Aviation for consideration. You will note that the ceiling is not mentioned or required. I know that 8/8 at 200 feet at the tower is not always 8/8 at 200 feet some three-quarters of a mile from the airport.
I believe that a similar system could be applied equally well to departures in reduced visibility conditions. At present, airports have been closed to departures when the visibility is around 600 metres, although Qantas aircraft are permitted to take off overseas when the visibility is 300/400 metres. The Department I am sure will argue that safety is enhanced by closing airports when there are reduced weather conditions but at what cost? A diversion of a Boeing 747 from Sydney to Brisbane for example would cost a minimum of $20,000. The self-regulation system practised by Qantas at overseas ports holds us in good stead. Qantas still have diversions but at a much-reduced frequency than when operating to Australian airports (40% in fact).
Operational Control is not just confined to airports. When en route, ATC takes just as much interest in us. As an example, if our radioed position report time interval disagrees with that on the filed flight plan then we are asked our ground speed so that the controller can check our calculations. Any variation between flight plan time intervals and those being actually achieved will be as a result of wind variations between flight plan winds and those actually being experienced. This kind of procedure is outdated and is naturally resented by many pilots. Another facet of operational control difficult to comprehend is that we are required to give ATC our endurance at the point of entry into Australian airspace. This is presumably so that a check can be made to verify that we have enough fuel to reach our destination. Does this mean that airline crews entering Australia are not to be trusted? This kind of intrusion does not occur anywhere except Australia and most pilots consider it totally unnecessary and bureaucratic.
I would conclude by stating that I accept that the Department of Aviation is charged with ensuring that the safety of aircraft is paramount but I would suggest that a move away from the regimented ‘operational control’ standpoint would be welcomed by the majority of pilots. Furthermore, I do not believe that the high safety standards that exist in this country would be jeopardised by allowing a self-regulating system to regular public transport operations by jet aircraft
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