Helo News

Whilst it has been a quiet year for helicopter sales generally in Australia, some new equipment has been added to the off-shore fleet. Essa has taken on two Bell 412’s for their Bass Strait operation. And Lloyd Aviation has started operating a Bell 214ST. The SuperTransport- first-of-its-type to be flown in Australia – is based in Devenport, Tasmania supporting an Amoco rig in the Bass Strait.

Other helicopter sales include two AS-350B Squirrels and the reported sale of an Agusta 109A Mk 11. After Calling tenders; the NSW Forestry Commission selected an AS-350B Squirrel in utility configuration to add to their fixed-wing fleet. The Squirrel will be used by the Commission in agricultural-type operations – specifically pine forest seeding and phosphate spreading. The helicopter will also be available for bushfire fighting – the priority role that largely determined the tender specifications. Local Aerospatiale distributor Rex Aviation expect to have delivered the machine by early October – well in time for the summer bushfire season.

The other Squirrel has been sold to Lee·uin Helicopters, a company closely associated with Perth-based Flightways. Flightways is a relatively new but rapidly expanding fixed-wing charter and third-level airline carrier in West Australia. Acquisition of the helicopter by their associate company is expected to mark their entry into the helicopter charter field although the machine will be used for corporate purposes as well.

Delivered during the last week in September, the Squirrel was the first in Australia to be delivered in a 7-place configuration. Two passenger front bench seats had previously been STC’d by both Aerospatiale and their American subsidiary, however, Rex Aviation undertook the development and certification of a high-backed front passenger bench that would meet the Australian Department of Aviation requirements.

Although no public-announcement had been made at press time, informed sources have confirmed the decision by the New South Wales Department of Main Roads to buy a new· Agusta 109A Mk 11 to replace their Jet Ranger 11. The DMR called tenders in late 1983 for a twin-engine helicopter but then announced it would not be proceeding with the acquisition at that stage. News of the decision to go ahead with the Agusta surprised the local distributors competing for the sale – as they had expected a new tender would be called. In recent years the role of the DMR helicopters has increasingly been one of VIP transport for government ministers and senior public servants although traffic surveillance is ·still considered the primary function.

DARLING HARBOUR-THE SORRY SAGA OF SYDNEY’S HELIPORT

When the last HeIi-Aust helicopter flew out on 22nd August, 1985, bound for temporary accommodation at Berths 22/23, Pyrmont, the final curtain fell at last on Wharf 39, Darling Harbour, as Sydneys Central Business District Heliport. The quiet and uneventful departure was in marked and pathetic contrast to the pomp, ceremony, and fanfare which marked the official opening of the site by Premier Wran on 7th August, 1979. The dismal path that traversed those six years of helicopter history is littered with unfulfilled expectations, failed negotiations, bitter recriminations, economic loss, and unresolved controversy. And while the helicopters no longer land and take off at “DHH” – as it was officially designated – the controversy surrounding the entire episode is raging more strongly than ever as the House Standing Committee on Expenditure, Sub-Committee on Aviation proves that and other issues raised by Dick Smith in his book: “Two Years in the Aviation Hall of Doom”.

Thus far, two full sitting days of the Sub-Committee have been _devoted to hearing submissions about Darling Harbour alone – the Sub-Committee heard evidence in Sydney on 5th August and in Canberra on 18th September. And an extraordinary story has unfolded in that evidence. In fact, before the inquiry into Smith’s allegations were announced, former Aviation Minister Kim Beazley described the Darling Harbour situation as an appalling example of an inter-departmental brawl. “It was extraordinarily heated and the Department didn’t exactly cover itself in glory by its approval, disapproval and argument. ” But there are those both within and outside the helicopter industry who feel that – even though the original “hiccup” with Darling Harbour was the fault of the Department’s Central Office – nonetheless the helicopter industry hasn’t exactly outdone itself either. Many feel that, when faced with the Department’s controversial stand on Darling Harbour early in the piece, the helicopter industry failed to present a united, effective lobby to solve the problem – until it was too late.

The story ·as told to the Aviation Sub-Committee was that several efforts had been made to find a spot for a Commercial Business District (CBD) Heliport for Sydney and that the Department had been on a number of ad hoc committees to that end. In late 1978, largely but not exclusively due to pressure from Scruse-Air Helicopters wanting a CBD Terminal for their Reg 203 commuter service from Gosford, the NSW Government re-opened the issue and made some previously unconsidered sites available for consideration.

The NSW Regional Director at the time, Mr Peter Langford, appointed his 21C Bob Green to represent the Department while the state government side consisted of representatives from the State Pollution Control Commission and the Premier’s Department. Several sites were examined and it emerged that the State Government preferred Wharf 39, Darling Harbour – provided it met the Department of Aviation safety standards. Bob Green, allegedly mindful of a Department policy establishing AIP-AGA-7 Category 11 as the standard for. APT helipads, assessed the site as suitable and so advised Langford who in turn advised the NSW Government. It turns out that, although Green had a helicopter licence and that he consulted – unofficially – some senior members of the helicopter industry in Sydney, and that he had directed technical personnel in the Region to carry out some measurements, etc. – that at no stage he sought advice from the “helicopter specialist” at Central Office. Indeed, it turns out, the Central Office was never formally informed of the proposed development.

Meanwhile, the State Government had acted quickly, with Premier Wran announcing that 39 Darling Harbour had been selected as the site for Sydney’s long-awaited and much-needed CBD heliport. The Maritime Services Board, who owned the site, were directed to call tenders for the development of the site. Evidence was given that Brookvale Investments Ply Ltd – a subsidiary of Channel 1 O TV in Sydney – was the successful tenderer and was invited to proceed with site development. Mr Bob Wilson, who cited as experience over 24,000 hours flight time world-wide (half on helicopters) spanning some 30 years, gave evidence that as the Chief Pilot of Channel 1 O at the time, he carried out much of the negotiating with Region and the various other government authorities. He was adamant that- not only had the tender specification required it- but that indeed all negotiations were predicated on use of the site and a day/night and commuter facility. He considered the site adequate and suitable for such purposes.

It was thus established before the Sub-Committee that Central Office first became aware of the proposal through an Article in “The Australian” and that they became concerned at the apparent industry expectations for the site which, they recall, contrasted with their belief that the general area proposed might not have the requisite forced-landing sites commensurate with such a public-use heliport as was being discussed in the press. They formed these views despite not having exact information about the location of the proposed development and despite not having the extent of the proposed development before them.

Whatever the exact knowledge of the proposals being made up in Sydney, it appears Mr Alan Newman became so concerned that central Office expertise had not been utilised that he directed his helicopter specialist, Mr Reg Trewenack to investigate. Evidence as to what exactlv was said by Mr Trewenack when he visited the site sometime in mid-1979 differs with the telling. One key witness has since been tragically killed in an air crash. However, it is clear that Mr Trewenack felt the site was not suitable as a public helipad because the southern flight paths did not have adequate forced-landing areas in accordance with AGA-7 – which Mr Trewenack referred to as the “current legislation” that he felt bound to apply. He so advised Central Office and thus began the “brawl” that Mr Beazley referred to.

By this stage of the proceedings, Channel 10 had finalised its plans, construction was nearing completion, and invitations had been sent for a gala function to celebrate the official opening. Alarmed at reports of Mr Trewenack’s visit to the site and comments he had allegedly made there, Channel 1O sought urgent assurances from the Regional Office-which was by this stage well and truly caught in the squeeze. They had assured the state government that the site was okay, only to be reversed by the Central Office only a short time before the much-heralded opening. Pressed for an answer by Channel 10-who needed to know if the opening would go ahead – Region “dispensed with” the provisions of Paragraph 3. 1 of AGA-7 to allow operations at pilot discretion but this excluded night and RPT flights. In the weeks after the opening, telexes, letters and interdepartmental minutes flew backward and forward at a great rate.

Langford pointed out the possible legal implications and suggested that Central Office had neither the true philosophical basis of the forced landing area requirement in mind, nor a true understanding of the legal status of AGA-7. Central Office replied that it was a question of safety and that safety standards could not be compromised. Eventually, when pressed by Channel 1O for an answer, the “Department” concluded that, having assessed the southern flight sector as “unsuitable” under Paragraph 3. 2. 1 of AGA-7 – it was inconsistent to continue to allow “pilot discretion” movements over that sector. So a new Instrument of Authorisation was issued under ANR-85 restricting movements to the northern sector and limiting operations to a maximum downwind component of 5 knots. Night flights and RPT lights were out. Able to be used for some operations but is completely uneconomic because of the exclusion of RPT flights. Darling Harbour Heliport emerged as a great “White Elephant”.

In late 1979 an indignant Sydney helicopter community attempted to revive the Helicopter Association of Australia-an unincorporated association that had been formed in 1977 to lobby for helicopter landing facilities but that had since become defunct. Indeed this “revived” HAA rattled off a series of angry letters, telexes, and press releases demanding action before it, too, withered and died on the vine sometime in late 1980. Over the next five years, there were periodic demands that the matter be reconsidered which were inevitably met by replies from the Department that the site had been re-assessed and still found unsuitable. Recommendations for the lifting of restrictions by two different NSW Region examiners of airmen were not accepted by the Central Office.

Whether the heliport would have stayed at Wharf 39, Darling Harbour, if it had not been for the restrictions placed on it is open for debate. By early 1984, the Department was saying, whenever the issue arose, that regardless of the merits of the place, the matter had been overtaken by events in that the site would have to be closed to make way for the Bi-Centennial Darling Harbour Re-development Scheme.

But the industry believe that the original Darling Harbour redevelopment plans included the Heliport at Wharf 39 and that it was only subsequently removed when the state government finally accepted the Department of Aviation’s assurance that nothing could be done to make the site work as a day/night and commuter heliport. This view was confirmed by Mr Wran at a meeting with the Industry in early 1984.

Between 1982 and late 1983, the helicopter industry focused its attention on forming a proper industry association. Third time lucky, the Helicopter Association of Australia was finally incorporated as a nonprofit company limited by guarantee and it seemed at long last an effective industry lobby would be heard. The Association’s constitution provided for branches corresponding to the Regional Offices of the Department and in due course a ”NSW Branch” of the HAA picked up the ball in respect of PHH-but by that time it was apparently too late as bulldozers were already demolishing the Darling Harbour Goods Yard on a tight schedule that could not be slowed if the project was to be finished before 1988.

Dick Smith’s interest in the matter and his unrelenting campaign for an inquiry may have been more effective than the HAA’s efforts, but even so, by the time the inquiry was announced it was obvious to many that it would be more of a “coronial inquest” than a “tribunal for redress. ”

The Department maintained before the Sub-Committee however disappointed the helicopter industry might have been – and however much the NSW Region might have contributed to the industry holding unrealistic expectations in respect of Darling Harbour -the fact remained that the southern flight sectors were unsuitable for overflight and that the Central Office-when it learned of this problem-had no choice but to take the action that it did. They pointed to subsequent flight evaluations conducted by a series of Central Office pilots and purportedly relying on empirical data to support the original assessment made by Mr Trewenack.

Aside from some extraordinary “Departmental Dirty Laundry” that was aired under Parliamentary privilege – and whose main probative value seemed to be to suggest the existence of a “feud” between certain Central Officers and Certain Regional Officers – the helicopter industry submitted that there was, and had never been, anything wrong with the southern flight sectors when compared with the flight paths into and out of other similar sites around Australia and the world. The flexibility of the helicopter in tailoring its flight path to suit the wind condition prevailing allowed safe operations, it was said. The industry again pointed out that senior people in the Central Office misunderstood the “Height-Velocity Curve”, the forced-landing area requirements, and indeed the legal status of AGA-7. The industry dismissed the Central Offices’s supposedly objective flight evaluations as being contrived, based on half-truths, and reliant upon mutually-supporting hypotheses. The industry argued that more pertinent empirical data was contained in a survey conducted by Dick Smith which showed that the overwhelming majority of helicopter pilots who used Darling Harbour felt that it was safe and disagreed with the restrictions that had been placed upon it. If the Department’s assessment was correct – the industry argued – then it must follow that the overwhelming majority of helicopter pilots in Australia are completely incapable of assessing landing sites. The implications of this conclusion in light of the status of AGA-7 as a pilot-monitored standard were unacceptable – the industry said.

It seems that, whatever the outcome of the Sub-Committee’s inquiries, the bitterness and resentment expressed by the participants in the “Darling Harbour Saga” will not be assuaged for a very long time. Some feel that because of changes to State Legislation and public perception,

the chance to have a general-purpose, public heliport in the Sydney CBD has been lost forever. Recent events surrounding the establishment of a “temporary” helipad site at 22/23 Pyrmont have done little to allay that suspicion. Although the Department of Aviation has “approved” the temporary site and a couple other contending sites as suitable for day/night operations, the interim “licence” issued under the recently amended NSW Noise Control Act prohibits high-time operations.

And the new noise guidelines allow the SPCC to set limits on the number of movements allowed from a helicopter site. The interim “licence” for 22/23 Pyrmont allows an average of 30 movements a day with a maximum of 210 in any one week. According to Heli-Aust, this figure is approximately the same or even slightly below the average utilisation of Darling Harbour in the months before it was closed-even with all of Darling Harbour’s restrictions. It is unclear who the authority for allocating the limited number of “slots” will be, should – as it is expected – demand for utilisation exceed the supply of movements available. Of course the site at Pyrmont is only temporary and the SPCC restrictions are only interim measures pending preparation of an Environmental Impact Study. But the community response already manifested in protest and legal action indicates the level of opposition that any site will generate.

The question of whether the state government could permit temporary relocation without treating the site as “designated development” is already before the Land and Environment Court. And on 21st September, an angry demonstration by East Balmain residents outside the temporary helipad became farcical when a Heli-Aust pilot attempted to drive through their ranks to gain access to the site. Protestors claim the Heli-Aust pilot ran some of them down, although-remarkably- no one was injured. The Heli-Aust pilot claimed, however, that his car was kicked and bashed as he drove through the crowd.

At press time, the outcome of this “farce” is not yet resolved. Nor is it by any means certain that Sydney will have unrestricted CBD Heliport State government promises over the years notwithstanding. It seems very clear that, whatever view the House Sub-Committee takes on the handling of the Darling Harbour matter, it is the helicopter industry that has had to “foot the bill” for the entire sorry saga.