Air War, South Atlantic

Early preparations for RAF deployment to the Falklands went ahead without me. I, instead, was sent to Liverpool to inspect the then laid-up Cunard container ship, Atlantic Conveyor, and together with other officers decided that the ship could, in fact, carry helicopters and Harriers to the South Atlantic, operating the former, but not the Harriers, during the course of the voyage.

The group discussed many options as well as time scales involved in the proposed conversion of this ship. Even the largest container ship has cabin space for only some 30 crew this is clearly insufficient when one takes into account the number of pilots and aircraft support crews needed, as well as the ship’s crew itself which would not necessarily alter in number from the original ship’s complement

In view of the number of GR3 Harriers involved – a total of six were to be landed on Atlantic Conveyor at a later date, together with eight Sea Harriers of 809 RN Squadron and a number of helicopters -‘- it became apparent that the logistics problem would prevent us from operating the Harriers regularly while the ship was under way. There would not even be a chance for some of the pilots to practise landing on a ship while at sea. Atlantic Conveyor would simply have to be used as a Harrier ferry vessel with the aircraft being ferried as deck cargo.

The ship steamed from Liverpool, her home port, to Devonport where the Royal Navy dockyard got to work, converting her for this new role. In addition to carrying our RAF Harriers and RN Sea Harriers, with a variety of helicopters, Atlantic Conveyor was also to carry a vast amount of military stores, both for land-based and sea-based operations. Within the ship’s hull, there was also stowed a complete packaged tented town to be used to house approximately 4000 troops. Atlantic Conveyor also carried our RAF BL-755 clusterbomb units (CBUs), bombs and other required weaponry, for use by both our own Harriers and the RN Sea Harriers.

Conversion completed, the ship left Devonport and sailed without any Harriers for Ascension Island, though she was carrying a number of key RAF personnel on board. The Harriers of No. 1 (F) Squadron left for Ascension Island independently, flying first from our base at RAF Wittering to St Mawgan in Cornwall and from there to Ascension Island with a flying time of about nine-and-a-half hours, refuelling in flight from RAF Victor tankers.

The ferry flights were spread over three days, May 3, 4 and 5, with three Harriers departing on each day, During my ferry flight, we undertook five refuellings en route on this 3500 nm (6000 km) leg. We could have got away with only three ‘top-ups’, but as an extra safety factor we operated so as never to deplete our fuel level below that required for a diversion to a friendly shore base if the next ‘top-up’ failed to provide additional fuel due to system malfunction. Victor tankers were used and the refuelling took place at 30,000-32,000 feet at speeds of Mach . 8. The Harrier GR3s were carrying 330 gallon ferry tanks on the in-board pylons and empty 100 gallon tanks on the out-board pylons. These latter would be used during our combat sorties since the task force was positioned a considerable distance east of the Falkland Islands. The 330 gallon tanks would be discarded after arrival as they were not required once the ferry flight was complete.

At Ascension Island; a day after all the Harriers had arrived, six GR3s air taxied from Wideawake airfield over to Atlantic Conveyor and landed vertically on board, using the specially built VTOL landing pad situated on her deck toward bows, just aft of the forward mast. This VTOL spot allowed the aircraft to land, turn aft and taxi through a gap in the container walls towards the bridge superstructure, where they were marshalled and parked. Three Harriers of No. 1 Squadron were left on Ascension Island, as there was a threat – albeit a slight one – of a possible air attack. In addition to the six Harriers of No. 1 Squadron, Atlantic Conveyor also took aboard eight Sea Harriers of 809 Squadron, plus Chinook and Wessex helicopters. All these made for a very crowded ship.

As for RAF and RN crews, there was a total of 8 pilots and 18 ground crew for the RAF Harriers alone. However, to ease the accommodation problems, some of the personnel were embarked in the North Sea ferry Norland.

It was the first time most of the pilots had ever landed their Harriers on board a ship at sea. Many had not even seen a carrier from their cockpit in flight. But calm sea conditions with little wind and a steady ship at anchor offshore provided an ideal vertical landing pad and no difficulties were experienced in these first-ever deck landings.

The Chinooks were from 18 Squadron RAF and had been landed-on at Devenport. On May 18, Atlantic Conveyor closed the task force in latitude 52 South, and when within sight the Harriers and Sea Harriers were ferried by a short VTOL flight to their respective carriers. Most, including all the GR3s went to Hermes.

This cross-deck operation was carried out in good weather so some of our pilots still had to experience a vertical landing onto a ‘live’ flight deck- an experience which was inevitably going to arise from the bad weather generally prevailing in the South Atlantic.

Wing Commander Peter Squire led the GR3s from Atlantic Conveyor on to their new home, but two aircraft of No. 1 Squadron were unserviceable due to very minor defects (everything had to be perfect). These two did not leave Atlantic Conveyor for Hermes until the next day, May 19. Unlike the earlier Harrier ferry hops to Hermes, these last two GR3s had to fly firstly to HMS Invincible, as the flagship was by then out of range. Having landed on board Invincible, the two GR3s were refuelled, turned round rapidly and then flew on to their new base ship, Hermes, which was by then much closer to the Falklands.

On May 19, a number of carrier-based practice sorties were held to acclimatise the RAF pilots to their new roles- operating from a carrier at sea and under war conditions. Typically this involved two against-one in air-to-air combat, though our role was destined to be ground attack, releasing the RN’s Sea Harriers for combat air patrols (CAP). But on May 20, No 1 (F) Squadron went to war for the first time, after the smallest amount of training for this particular role. The first mission, led by the Commanding Officer, Wing Commander Peter Squire, with me as his number two and Squadron Leader Jerry Pook (both of us flight commanders) also in the formation, was briefed for an attack on military installations in the Fox Bay area. These consisted of fuel and oil reserves for the Argentinian forces.

All the Harriers involved carried BL-755 cluster bomb units (CBUs) and we made one fast low pass over the target, releasing the ordnance. We observed secondary explosions- caused by the CBUs going off- and this was followed by the eruption of a massive fireball: the dump had exploded.

Operationally it was fairly straightforward but it was, after all, the first wartime action by No. 1 Squadron since World War II and we considered it to be a great success. As in any part of the South Atlantic at that time of year, the weather was in general bad and the visibility variable. At times we had a cloud base that was down to 100 feet, but one could fly a short way out of that area to find the cloud base to be non-existent (i. e. down to the sea). One could also fly at 25,000 feet with maximum visibility over the same area!

On our return from this first attack we went through cloud off the North Coast of East Falkland, where the weather was a bit better than West Falkland, and managed to locate the task force and our base ship, to make a carrier-controlled landing.

We had made our attack at high speed and low level and we did not see any anti-aircraft artillery. But, while this first ground attack mission was considered a great success, with a fuel dump hit in the first run, day two (May 21) proved that the wheel of fate had turned. No. 1 Squadron suffered its first casualty. Flight Lieutenant Geoff Glover was shot down over Port Howard when carrying out an attack on Argentinian positions. Whilst carrying out his attack, Geoff was hit by ground fire. On Hermes morale took a knock, even though we had expected something like this. We did not know at that time whether Geoff had in fact survived, and this obviously affected us deeply.

The following day, No. 1 Squadron flew to Goose Green where four Harriers attacked the defences consisting of slit trenches, fox holes, company positions and about eight or nine parked Pucaras. CBUs were used and a lot of flak was observed- the area was very well-defended. The Argentinian defence forces were firing air burst and barrage anti-aircraft artillery using 20, 35 and 40 mm guns. The four aircraft carried out their attack in a single pass, delivering two CBUs per aircraft. Again, it was a successful raid.

On May 24, No. 1 Squadron attacked Port Stanley airfield itself – the hub of the Argentinian defence forces and the area where one could expect the maximum defence capability. On this occasion a total of six aircraft was used- four GR3s and two Sea Harriers. I led the attack. The Sea Harriers used 1000 lb bombs fused for air burst to keep down the heads of the defenders. The two Sea Harriers attacked from the sea, while we completed a circuit to approach the same target from the opposite direction over the land. We hugged the the contours as close as possible – that is what we are trained to do- and our GR3 formation was not detected by the defences until it was too late for them to react.

We dropped 1000 lb retarded bombs and we hit the runway several times, as well as knocking out a couple of Pucaras and a helicopter into the bargain. There was a fair amount of flak but, surprisingly, not as heavy as the firepower we had experienced at Goose Green. We caught the defenders totally by surprise, coming in as we did from the other direction to the attack delivered by the Sea Harriers. All the anti-aircraft guns were pointing out to sea, not in our direction. In general terms, the anti-aircraft artillery aiming was not terribly accurate and fire was fairly spasmodic, although we all admitted, following that attack, that the barrage fire and small arms weapons were heavy and efficient. It turned out afterwards that quite a few ground-to-air missiles had been fired at us, including Roland, but none of them hit.

Following the attack, we made our escape at high speed and at very low level, skimming only a few feet above the sea on our way out. I am told that missiles did in fact follow us, but observers have told me that some dived into the sea and some shot straight up, as we disappeared from the missile’s ‘lock’ when we followed the ground’s contours. It was an interesting sortie.

The following day was a bad one for the task force; as Atlantic Conveyor was hit by an air-launched Exocet. It was a great blow to us because we had all got to know Captain Ian North (called Captain Birdseye by the Press, but very fondly known as Father Christmas by those on board his ship) and his very professional Merchant Navy crew. He was a very nice man and we mourned his loss. From Hermes we could see his ship dying in the distance. Some of her crew were brought over to us and of all the equipment on board, apart from the Harriers flown off earlier, only one Chinook managed to get away. We had an enormous amount of respect for Atlantic Conveyor’s crew, so much that it is hard to describe how we felt.

On May 26 we were still at the peak of the Argentinian Air Force attacks on our landing forces. With the loss of Atlantic Conveyor we knew we had lost a large number of CBUs, 1000 lb bombs, Chinooks and support equipment on her deck and in her holds, all of this equipment vital to our forthcoming military push on land. But our ground attack missions in support of the army went on as usual, and on May 26 we managed to avenge Geoff Glover. We returned to Port Howard, attacking the same ground where he had been shot down. It was an extremely good attack. We used CBUs along two lines of Argentinian positions and we could see the bombs exploding right along the lines with 100 per cent accuracy.

During the run-in to that target the cloud base was less than 100 feet, and it was a very interesting approach at that height. The attack was well planned and no anti-aircraft artillery was observed. We did have an uninvolved observer at the time. A Sea Harrier on CAP at about 25,000 feet followed us over the target to watch the results. He told us by radio that we were on track for the target. We approached at high speed at very low level, following the contours of the ground as we had been trained to do in the European theatre. As we topped the hill just prior to the target there it was, right in front of us, dead in line with our approach.

The following day, May 27, the 2nd Parachute Regiment began their advance on Darwin and Goose Green. We were told that we might be needed to provide ground attack fire support for their advance, and it would be in high risk areas (i. e. well-defended).

I was sitting in my cockpit on the deck of Hermes at five minutes of cockpit alert. The scramble alarm went and within a very short time the Harrier was roaring along the flight deck to launch up the skijump. We formed up and flew at high level towards our briefed targets. Information from the land forces was, at that time, rather sparse and we were not in contact with the forward air controller (FAG). So we had no close control by radio near the target. We did have bare details of the target types and approximate positions, however.

The priority target was infantry defence positions and they acted particularly hard to see. On my first pass I was virtually over the target and away before I spotted the positions. My own specific target was a single Argentine field gun- not the easiest of targets the test of times, but I was almost on top when I spotted it.

I called up my number two who was slightly behind me, and had co sufficient timeline up for an attack-he got the CBUs away on his first pass and I think was on target. being a priority target, I turned and ran in a second time, but again I spotted it too late isolated gun is a pretty difficult target to acquire visually, especially at low level. So rather than continue to make fruitless passes over the primary, I decided to divert to the secondary still of importance. I did not want my number two to accompany me to that second target- after all I was still ‘bombed up’ and he was not, so why give the Argentinians two aircraft to shoot at? No point, so I carried on alone.

For my third pass over enemy positions, my target was a company-defended position consisting of slit trenches and foxholes. I attacked and experienced very heavy flak throughout. Without assistance from a FAG or target marker, the attack was even more difficult. I dropped the bombs and the formation re-formed to return to the flagship – to another rather gamey landing.

But after landing, the day’s activities were clearly not yet over as we were ordered to re-arm and turn round quickly for a second go at the same targets. That reinforced my own opinion that the Paratroopers were in fact in trouble.

Turnaround time was kept to a minimum even allowing for the fact that Hermes was operating 21 Harriers and each one on the flight deck was being turned around as fast as possible – Sea Harriers for CAP and ours for ground attack. We all had to take our place in the replenishment and re-arming queue.

Back again into our cockpits and we waited for our launch time. Launch up the ski-jump and back over the Falklands once more. Again there was no FAG assistance and several targets were in the offing. I was told to go for a different gun, but I neither saw it nor received any detailed information about its precise location. It was a secondary target anyway. But I went round for a second look and on that pass I detected company positions. I released my CBUs and it was, I think, a good attack. But, because I assumed the Paratroopers were in trouble and needed every form of assistance they could get, I decided that I would give this attack everything I had. So I came in again, low and fast to use my 30 mm guns. Normally this is tactically inadvisable, but in view of the ground situation, I felt it was a must.

The gun attack worked well, giving the Argentine troops a long burst right along their trenches before pulling off. I had reversed my flight path down to 100feet when I felt hits, one closely followed by the other. They must have been fairly heavy calibre as the shock through the aircraft was very noticeable – two heavy thumps. Almost immediately the fire warning light came on, and I detected fumes in the cockpit. Suddenly the controls froze completely- I thought I must have been hit in both the hydraulic control systems. Shortly after they cleared again, but when I carried out a rapid visual cockpit check I found I was losing hydraulic pressure at an alarming rate.

I punched the fire extinguisher system and checked in the mirror, looking along the top of the aircraft where I saw flames. Smoke then started pouring into the cockpit. Then the controls went slack and the aircraft went into a dive. I managed to arrest the angle by vectoring the engine nozzles (this provides a very powerful nose-up trim change which can be used to great effect in air combat) and the aircraft nose picked up. Although I had by then corrected the angle of dive, flames now started licking into the cockpit itself.

The Pegasus engine was still running in fine style, but it was obviously a situation that I could not sustain without any usable flying control, so I pulled the ejection handle. I must have passed out for a few seconds because the next thing I knew I was flying horizontally through the air and going straight for a fireball- my burning aircraft.

There were a few tense moments at that point, but fortunately, the main chute opened and I was dropping clear of the fireball. I think I was on the chute only for about five or ten seconds- it was very quick indeed. As I landed I could not see very well, as my eyes were affected by the high speed wind blasting at my face during the ejection. I did know, however, that I was on the wrong side of the lines – behind the Argentinian frontline forces. I saw dots coming down the hill in the distance and my immediate reaction was that they were enemy troops looking for me.

On reflection later I thought they could have been animals, but one cannot be too careful in a situation like that. At that range, with my eyes streaming, I could not make out what they were so I did the obvious thing, I cleared off in the other direction, and much later that evening I found a deserted farmhouse.

I knew the Argentinians were looking for me as a Huey helicopter with a big searchlight came towards me that evening. He began hovering over one spot, so I think he must have found the aircraft’s remains. Even though it was pitch black, I recognised that it was a Huey by the rather distinctive sound made by its rotor blades which I knew from my tour flying AV-8A Harriers in the US Marine Corps.

He moved away from the spot where he had been hovering and came towards me. Fortunately, at that moment, the night attack on Goose Green started up and he moved off, not wanting to be caught in the open with all that ordnance flying around.

I spent the following two days either in the heather or in the farmhouse at night, as it was bitterly cold and any form of shelter was welcome. I was eventually picked up on May 29 by a Royal Marine, flying an army Gazelle helicopter. He had been searching for me and took me back to 3rd Brigade Headquarters where I was made royally welcome by the officers and men. Next day I was ferried back to Hermes by a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter. Needless to say, the ‘welcome home’ back on board was also very congenial.

Due to minor injuries received during ejection, I was laid off flying for a few days, and next took to the air on June 5 on a sortie to Port San Carlos, where we had by then established an 850 ft metal runway with refuelling facilities. From there we flew close air support missions on Port Stanley, but no targets were called for us. Two other pilots flew the aircraft back from Port San Carlos to the ship and I stayed with a family locally for two days. It was great to have a real bed that did not heave up and down. The family were marvellous and I enjoyed my stay- it was either that or two days in trenches, not much of a choice.

I flew out from the metal strip on June 7 and it was very uneventful except that by this time my back was beginning to give me trouble and I was, grounded’ by the Hermes medics and on June 11 sent back to the United Kingdom. The first part of the journey, to Ascension Island, was made on the BP tanker, British Trent and also on board were some survivors of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Sir Tristram which had been bombed in the Bluff Cove landings. I finally touched home soil on June 24, the last part of the journey being made by VC-10. I was the first pilot of No. 1 Squadron to return home to Wittering.

Air War Over the South Atlantic Will Be Continued in the Next Edition of Australian Aviation. Don’t Miss It!

Air War Over The South Atlantic is derived from John Godden’s excellent book, Harrier, Ski Jump To Victory. This book is available in Australia through Pergamon Press (Australia). Ltd, PO Box 544, Potts Point 2011, and -selected book shops nationally.