Asian Air Forces – Philippines

The Marcos government is quick to admit that the bases are essential to the national economy and to the nation’s defence. Filipino Defence Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, said in 1983 that the Philippines could not contend with the development of Soviet strength in the Pacific/South China Sea without the US bases.

The overall effect of this situation has been to create conflicting and strange demands on Hukbong Himpapawiding Pilipinas – the Air Force of the Philippines. There has been a tendency to limit the air defence capabilities of the air force on the assumption that the United States will play the major role against an external aggressor; internal security requirements have therefore been given priority in recent acquisitions. The strains of operating in a situation of high internal insurgency are often seen in the air force – technical personnel are away from major bases, pilots are operating in remote areas and the budget is consumed in replacing damaged or ‘worn out’ aircraft, particularly helicopters. Because manpower, facilities and resources are directed towards the countering of insurgents, it is often noted that major equipment items of the air force do not achieve the operational levels expected of a modern air force; the logistics and maintenance problems associated with the ill-considered Filipino acquisition of eight F-8H Crusaders is the most obvious example of low serviceability of major equipment. Problems with the ongoing maintenance of Australian-supplied GAF Nomads are another example of this problem.

For the purpose of improving local skills, the Air Force of the Philippines (hereafter AFP) has established a Self Reliance Development group that operates air maintenance and research facilities. To date AFP has established a heat treatment and casting laboratory, designed and developed to the point of flight testing a light trainer, converted seventeenT-34s to COIN configuration, designed and tested UH-1H armament pods for helicopters, and manufactured bombs and fuses. The Filipino government is also seeking co-production deals with helicopter manufacturers for the purpose of developing a local aircraft industry and thereby raising skills; unfortunately for the Marcos government recent civil unrest has deterred some companies from pursuing such deals, the Indonesians through deals with MBB, Aerospatiale and CASA have ‘sewn up’ much of the ASEAN market for co-production, and the Filipino budget is already greatly constrained by recession and funding counter-insurgency needs.

Major equipment acquisitions over the past years have reflected the extent to which counter-insurgency operations have taken their toll on the air force. It is believed that in the past five years AFP has lost in action or had to ‘write-off’ due to damage over a dozen helicopters; one AC-47 has been reported as shot down by a Muslim rebel fired SA-7 Grail SAM. Towards meeting these losses, plus the eventual deletion of overworked, older equipment the AFP will receive twelve to fifteen Bell 212s under US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits for 1984 fiscal year. Also under 1984 FMS will be gained an unspecified number of Bell Textron UH-1Hs, plus some other Hueys surplus to US Army needs. The most recent purchase has been seventeen Sikorsky S-76s and two S-70A-5s. The S-76s will be configured to various roles: two will operate as Search and Rescue; one will be a 12 passenger utility; two will be eight-passenger and twelve will be troop/logistic support/medevac aircraft. Further equipment may be gained if the Reagan administration is successful in getting Congress to endorse a 36% increase in aid (including military aid) to the Philippines; President Reagen put this to the Congress in early February of this year.

Beyond the threat to internal security posed by communist and Muslim guerillas, the Philippines’ other major security concern is with the policing and enforcement of its conception of its EEZ. I used the words ‘its conception’ because there are various ways of interpreting how the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone is measured. The Philippines has been one of the earliest movers for the ‘archipelagic principle’ – the idea that a nation that is an archipelago of islands must measure its EEZ from ‘baselines’ which are imaginary lines joining the outermost territorial boundaries of the Philippines. This may seem an obscure piece of legal theory but it has important implications for the Filipino navy and air force which must both patrol and enforce the Manila government’s claim to a vast EEZ.

In particular the Filipino armed forces must enforce the Manila government’s claim to the Spratly islands group in the South China Sea; this group is claimed in part by Malaysia and in whole by the Peoples Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. To date the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan have all established garrisons on the various islands, cays, reefs and sand spits of this group. Vietnam occupies seven such sites, Malaysia has occupied Terumbu Layang Layang off the coast of Sabah (Borneo) and the Philippines has 1000 marines at Commodore Reef, west of the Filipino major island of Palawan. An airfield has been established on Commodore Reef and STOL transports from the navy (Britten Norman Islanders) are responsible for supplying this garrison.

Ultimately is the responsibility of AFP to provide the air defence of the claim. It is also the responsibility of the naval air elements and the air force to patrol this area and monitor Vietnamese activities.

The need to expand patrols in this area will increase with greater undersea oil exploration. Swedish-American drilling in the Commodore Reef area has already produced encouraging results.

The air force is the service which has been given the greatest capability in EEZ surveillance in the form of three Fokker F-27 Maritimes. These aircraft can patrol at speeds as low as 150 knots, using the 360-degree AN/APS-504 radar system. The F-27 was chosen for a variety of reasons. According to AFP Colonel Frederico Paaion,

‘We have much coastline and a large area to cover …So we had to have an aircraft with the ability to patrol at low altitude for extended periods. Then came economy of operation, plus our familiarity with the aircraft and the maintenance skills we’ve acquired. These factors clinched the decision.’

The last-mentioned reasons are important: the first F-27 appeared in the Philippines in 1959; seventeen such aircraft were eventually acquired for civilian and government operation (including Presidential transport) with nine being transferred to the AFP in 1971. Familiarity was obviously the important factor.

Despite the capabilities of the three F-27 Maritimes, the EEZ surveillance task is clearly beyond the capabilities of the AFP with the equipment it at present possesses, the EEZ to be covered, and the variety of tasks involved including the spotting of arms smuggling operations to Muslim and communist guerillas using civilian vessels.

The present state of the Filipino economy (which has been exacerbated by foreign reluctance to invest in the light of civil unrest) means that the Air Force of the Philippines can only expand its equipment and capabilities through one means – United States FMS credits. These credits are limited and the government has made clear its priority is helicopters. For this reason the AFP for the foreseeable future will be fated to undertake a great diversity of tasks with limited means available. Thus the ultimate air security of the Philippines will continue to be underwritten by the United States 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base.