Getting Our Sea Kings to Sea

The navy has lost much of its clout, both operationally and politically over the past two years, while the fact that the FFG frigates will remain without their all-important helicopters till at least 1987 is grim testimony to the state of our present blue water naval strength.

Of foremost concern to the navy is not the effective loss of the Skyhawk or Tracker forces fates are basically sealed due to their age and technical obsolescence – the real problem lies in what to do with the eight Sea King helos. The eight Westland Sea Kings, two new examples of which have recently been delivered, constitute some of the best heliborne ASW capability in the world today. At present, they are virtually wasting away at Nowra which is where they will end their lives if a ship is not found on which they can once more deploy operationally with the fleet.

The requirement for a capable ASW helicopter to screen a fleet or convoy is paramount to the safety of that force. Those who were generally against the concept of the RAN having a replacement carrier for HMAS Melbourne generally thought in terms of the relatively great cost involved in building, manning and operating such a ship. A ship of the overall sophistication of Hermes or Invincible is more than merely a helicopter carrier. Hermes, for instance, at full strength requires a crew of over 2000 and even on minimal strength half this number would be required. That is simply too high a manpower costing to support half a dozen medium-sized ASW helos. And so enters the logical progression from a helicopter carrier to a carrier equipped with Sea Harriers and ASW helicopters. Certainly a viable idea except that in the real world of 1983 Australian politics both in Parliament House and at Russell Hill the cost of such a ship was not acceptable.

Exit the highly capable multi-role aircraft carrier.

What has emerged in recent months has been a rejuvenation of an old concept that may just be what the RAN is looking for in order to at least salvage its ASW helicopter capability.

The Falklands war did prove that helicopters and indeed Sea Harriers can be launched from non-naval ships. Previously the United States had pioneered such research in conjunction with Great Britain in the Arapaho programme. Arapaho was intended to evaluate the feasibility of maintaining ASW helicopters aboard select freighters in a typical convoy situation. Certainly, the provision of intrinsic air power at sea aboard merchant ships is not new. The British during the Second World War successfully deployed Sea Hurricanes aboard standard trampers as a defence against prowling Luftwaffe Condor maritime patrol aircraft. While not the equivalent of a carrier the makeshift CAM (Catapult Armed Merchantman) ship did achieve the desired result, a result that is not too distant from that of the latter-day Arapaho programme.

The US Navy, of course, has little real need for Arapaho due to its inbuilt advantage of having fifteen carrier battle groups with which to fight the next war. On the other hand, the remainder of the World’s maritime forces, particularly Australia and Great Britain, showed great interest in the lessons derived from Arapaho. Britain was so impressed that with British Aerospace as prime contractor, they moved ahead with SCADS (Shipborne Containerised Air Defence System), a system that could also offer our own Royal Australian Navy a solution to the Sea King ASW problem.

SCADS, as projected for Australia, would be based around an appropriate number of standard ISO freight containers deployed aboard a standard configuration container ship. Ships of upwards of 10,000 tonnes would be most applicable and the number and specific type of container elements would be varied to suit the particular mission.

The basic SCADS as offered to the RAN comprises a number of support units built into containers. Accommodation, messing. stores and repair facilities can be fully self-contained and built up or deleted as required for the specific task. Already under test aboard MV Astronomer, a container ship now deployed to the South Atlantic with the Royal Navy, the SCADS concept also comes complete with its own integral surveillance and control radar, close-in air defence system and decoy launchers.

Plessey are supplying an AWS-5A surveillance radar system complete with an independent power source, support facilities and command and control functions. The AWS-5A is optimised for all-around surveillance and is designed to track, identify and target surface threats and supersonic aircraft alike. Air defence is supplied by British Aerospace’s combat-proven Seawolf short

Range SAM system, Seawolf for SCADS would be in the space-efficient vertical launch mode and the number of units available could be varied to suit the projected level of threat. Seawolf can be fired against both incoming aircraft and sea-skimming missiles alike and is specifically tailored for defence against air-launched threats. While in the Falklands War, the Atlantic Conveyor came near to epitomising a SCADS environment (though the Conveyor’s role was merely to deliver the appropriate aircraft and helicopters) it too would have survived if it had been fitted with a Seawolf close-in defence system. While opponents to the concept of an armed container ship speak loudly of the lack of damage control facilities and the ‘soft’ structure of the hull itself it might be remembered that the Sheffield burnt just as well as the Atlantic Conveyor did.

In addition to Seawolf, SCADS operates the proven Shield Missile Decoy System based on rockets and a comprehensive range of multi-range distraction and seduction mode chaff and flares. This system Itself ‘saved’ Invincible during the attack that successfully took out the Atlantic Conveyor, which itself had no integral self-defence capability. Australia, of course, is also progressing at speed with Project Winnin which could also be deployed as required.

What would SCADS mean to the RAN?

Basically speaking it is a low-cost option for getting the Sea Kings back to sea. Presently in Australia, and for that matter throughout the world, there are a number of suitable container ships in the desired tonnage available for purchase or long-term lease. The Navy has also suggested that by using a suitable ANL or BHP ship, of which there are several currently lying idle, on charter as required for specific exercises planned in advance, the Department of Defence would not only be paying a pittance to regain ASW sea-going helo operations but would also be assisting an Australian enterprise.

At present our navy does not have any blue water ASW capability other than its dedicated surface fleet and submarines, the loss of the Sea Kings to the fleet is a truly serious blow to the navy’s ASW capabilities and one that we would pay dearly for in the event of hostilities.