Why Australia Needs an AEW System

At this stage, in early 1982, the RN had only one other platform capable of embarking fixed-wing aircraft, STOVL only – the former conventional carrier HMS Hermes. As the RN’s envisioned role was anti-submarine/anti-shipping warfare, in the North Atlantic, operating in conjunction with US Navy Carrier Battle Groups, little attention was paid to in-depth antiaircraft defences, whether SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) or fixed-wing fighters. Pitted against aircraft of the Aviatsia Voenno-Morskovo Flota or Dal’naya Aviatsia, the RN would contend with the massive Tu-20 Bear, Tu-16 Badger and Mya-4 Bison, hardly capable of evading shipboard surveillance radars and nimble Sea Harrier FRS. 1 fighter. Nastier elements of Soviet Naval Aviation, such as the Tu-26 Backfire, were to be left to the AEW E-2Cs and F-14 fighters of the screening US CBG. With the RN in such a sadly neglected shape and the nearest British base being Wideawake Field in the Ascensions, 6000 km away, it is obvious that the temptation would have to be too great for the Argentine junta to resist. Confident of their capabilities, having bullied all their smaller neighbours and internal opposition, the Argentine armed forces decided to put on a massive display of power, humiliating one of the greatest colonial powers of all times, Britain. So, at the beginning of April 1982, Argentine troops overpowered the small British garrison and raised their flag over the disputed islands.

Britain’s response was immediate – within days the bulk of the Royal Navy was despatched, determined to recapture the islands.

So the war escalated; with the arrival of the Task Force in the South Atlantic, we all had the opportunity to watch it on television, day after day. The gutting of the Sheffield, the graphic demise of the Antelope, the daily air raids on the San Carlos beachhead, the devastating strike on the Sir Galahad and Tristram.

British tactics were straightforward – isolate the Falklands with an air and sea blockade to prevent resupply and reinforcement of the Argentine garrison, after some shelling and bombing to soften the defences, carry out an amphibious landing and recapture the islands. The naval blockade was easy to enforce; the Argentine navy wisely avoided the conflict, after the surprise sinking of the cruiser Belgrano by a nuclear attack sub. The big battles were thus left to the Fuerza Aerea Argentina, or Argentine Air Force (AAF). The AAF’s inventory was typical of a better Third World country – a handful of supersonic Mirage IIIEAs, complemented by some 26 Israeli-built Neshers (much like a Mirage V). Strike aircraft were abundant, the A-4P/Q Skyhawk numbering 80, and the local turboprop Pucara, over 60 of which were in service. All of these aircraft lacked all-weather avionics for first-pass attacks, all ground attacks were visual only. The AAF did not have any Precision Guided Munitions in its inventory, its primary weapon being free-fall iron bombs and unguided rockets, though the radio command Bullpup missile was apparently used. The only sophisticated equipment in use were a few, newly delivered, Super Etendard strike fighters equipped with the 40 nm Exocet sea-skimming anti-ship missile. Though the Etendard was no match in air-air combat, the Exocet was difficult to contend with.

Maintaining the aerial blockade were the subsonic Sea Harriers of the RN, backed up by the type 42 destroyers, equipped with the Sea Dart area defence SAM (Surface to Air Missile). The Sea Dart, with a range of 45 nm, was an effective weapon, the radar picket destroyers equipped with the system deployed to the edge of the fleet, later also covering the San Carlos beachhead. The AAF knew of the Sea Dart’s capabilities, the missile was ineffective at low altitudes, below the horizon of the shipboard radar which provided illumination for the missile’s guidance. Argentine tactics were simple – fly very low, below radar while approaching the islands, at closer range the A-4s and Mirages exploited the cover provided by the land mass of West Falkland to sneak in close and surprise the British vessels. The destroyer Coventry was caught, in this fashion, and sunk, just as the frigates hit on air defence duty in San Carlos Bay. As it appears, the tracking radar for the Seawolf missiles was confused by close land masses, further affecting the capability of the RN’s missile screen. The Harriers were disadvantaged, as their radar had little range or lookdown capability; they had to rely on vectors from the picket ships or visual acquisition. In this sense, the AAF succeeded in repeatedly surprising the RN, the most shocking incident being the raid on the two landing ships in Bluff Cove, unprotected even by SAMs.

At sea, the RN had to contend with the Exocet, a radar-guided sea-skimming missile. The gutting of the Sheffield was a rather rude awakening to the absence of close-in defence weapons on the majority of RN vessels, but the fact that a radar picket itself was a prime target was itself more serious. This meant that pickets were not allowed to stray beyond the cover of Harriers on CAP (combat air patrol), i. e. they were denied positions west of West Falkland, reducing what radar warning time was available. That allowed the AAF to reach the coast of West Falkland undetected, in many instances. In-flight refuelled Exocet-armed Etendards had the range to strike a·t the fleet; providing they chose their approach wisely, they had enough time to launch their missile and escape scrambled Harriers. Two decoyed Exocets thus missed their intended target, Invincible, and hit the hapless Atlantic Conveyor. As much as the RN had tried, their aerial blockade of the islands had only limited success. AAF aircraft repeatedly accessed Port Stanley under the cover of darkness, penetrating below the radar of the destroyers shelling coastal positions and avoiding the feared Harriers, which lacked the ability to detect low-flying intruders at night.

In spite of these setbacks, the RN decimated the AAF, 31 aircraft falling victim to the Harriers and 21 to the shipboard SAMs. The following humiliation of Argentine ground forces by advancing British ground forces concluded the conflict, with the surrender of the Port Stanley garrison and HQ.

As one may observe, virtually all the vessels which were lost throughout the conflict, need not have been destroyed, providing the Task Force had adequate warning of an impending attack. Radar pickets on open seas, just as the vessels tasked with air defence at the beachhead, could have benefited from knowing where and when the enemy would appear. . The effectiveness of the Harrier could have been increased many times, as little time would be wasted on CAP or searching for incoming targets. Surprising incoming strike aircraft would force them to jettison stores and take evasive action, disrupting AAF strikes; likewise, the total number of kills could have been increased, as enemy aircraft that escaped detection would have been destroyed. The aerial blockade could have been air-tight, given there were AEW to detect intruders at night and vector Harriers into kill positions. Britain had paid a great price for ignoring the requirement for AEW, even if that price was less than expected (apparently the loss of a carrier was budgeted for). The speed with which an AEW Sea King helo was developed, fitted with an EMI Searchwater radar modified from a Nimrod MR. 2, illustrates just how seriously the RN now takes the matter of AEW. The AEW Sea King is a lash-up; though it may perform adequately, its limited transit speed, endurance and radar range would enable it to cope only with a low-density, low-level environment.

Were Argentina to have possessed modern front-line first pass attack platforms, such as the RAAF’s F-111C, it is doubtful the RN would have even considered Operation Corporate, as it would most likely have lost the best of its vessels, fire control radars jammed, at night, in miserable weather, being hit with 1000 lb free fall or laser-guided bombs. Aircraft in this class can only be stopped with capable AEW to direct fighters. The effectiveness of virtually every defensive or offensive operation the British carried out in the Falklands could have been increased by the use of a modern AEW aircraft.

How effective AEW can be, particularly in conjunction with Elin! (electronic intelligence gathering), was well demonstrated by the Israelis’ remarkably successful operation in Lebanon, in June 1982. In the process of evicting the PLO from Lebanon, the IAF (Israeli Air Force) mounted an exquisitely planned and precisely executed strike on Syria’s SAM belt, crippling one of the world’s densest air defence systems, within hours.

Operation Peace For Galilee – Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon

Wars between Israel and her Arab neighbours have been taking place since 1948, and are usual; each flare-up is followed by several years of quiet, as both sides ponder their mistakes and prepare for the next round. Israel had suffered heavy losses in the 1973 Yorn Kippur war, when Egyptian SAMs and AAA accounted for 150 aircraft in a mere three days. Though the IAF was actively involved in electronic warfare even during the earlier War of Attrition, operating converted KC-97 transports in the role, the losses sustained in 1973 were taken very seriously, leading to a growing emphasis on electronic warfare and surveillance. To that effect, Israel had purchased the Grumman E-2C, not only providing AEW but also an Elint ability, built upon the aircraft’s PDS (passive detection system – a computerised surveillance system that monitors and identifies radar emitters up to 500 nm away). It also appears that the IAF had refitted two Boeing 707 transports as Elint and jamming platforms. Aside from these specialised EW platforms, strike fighters such as the F-4E Phantom were fitted with Shrike (some sources indicate also Standard) anti-radiation missiles, which home on radar transmitters. Israel’s good experiences, during the Yorn Kippur war, in the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), led to the development and deployment of the Scout and Mastiff RPV, small enough to be invisible to both radar and the naked eye, at several thousand feet of altitude. Further effort was focused on the development of a new anti-radiation missile, the ground-launched New Zeev (Wolf). As always, the IAF had effectively prepared for combat. In this instance, the new F-15s and F-16s complemented the established F-4E and Kfir, the former types specialising in predominantly air-air combat, the latter focusing on air-ground strikes.

This array of weaponry was pitted against Syria’s MiGs and SAMs. When Syria entered Lebanon in the mid-seventies, it sought to consolidate its position against Israel. Lebanon provided a convenient forward base for advancing on Northern Israel, not to speak of a useful place to dump off the Palestine Liberation Organisation (it seems Syria’s commitment to the PLO was as deep as her love for Israeli air strikes at Damascus). Syria established a massive air defence system in Lebanon, built around the SAM systems stationed in the Bekaa Valley. Mobile SA-6 missiles were deployed, apparently also supported by ZSU-23/4 mobile radar-directed AAA (guns). This first line of defence was backed up with large ground-based radars, in Syria, operating in conjunction with MiG-21 Fishbed and MiG-23 Flogger fighters. Protected by Syria from any Israeli raids, the PLO had sought to attack Northern Israel. Deploying mobile Katyusha rocket launchers and heavy artillery, they sporadically shelled and rocketed Israeli settlements in the North. The Israelis did mount some air strikes against the PLO, but these had limited effect. It appears they also lost some aircraft to SAMs in the process. But the Israelis were not as idle as everyone may have thought. SAM site locations were identified and catalogued and some extensive Elint was carried out to establish operating frequencies used for GCI (ground-controlled intercept).

In early June 1982, Israel launched a mass armour attack into Southern Lebanon supported by scores of attack aircraft, the objective being the permanent removal of the PLO from Lebanon. Syria rapidly reinforced its SAM belt, finally deploying 19 batteries of the SA-6 Gainful. The 9th, 10th and 11th of June saw the destruction of the SAMs, together with a lot of Floggers and Fishbeds.

Israel executed a precise and deadly attack on the Bekaa valley. Initially, RPVs were flown into radar range, these being fitted with deceptive electronic countermeasures. Using textbook EW tactics, the EW RPVs appeared on Syrian radar scopes as fast, low-flying fighters, out on a strike mission. All SAM guidance and tracking radars were powered up, to lock on to the non-existent attackers. At this stage, several E-2C Hawkeyes were orbiting off the coast of Lebanon, these aircraft instantly detected the SAM radar systems with PDS and relayed their positions to waiting strike squadrons. Meanwhile, Wolf missiles were launched at the radars, presumably at the detected SAM positions. Once in close range, the Wolf’s seeker locked onto the transmitter and the missile destroyed it. It appears as this was going on, the EW Boeing 707s were actively jamming all Syrian communications.

Once the majority of the radars was crippled, the fighters moved into action. Presumably, the first wave carried Shrike ARMs, to knock out the remaining transmitters; these aircraft were backed up with cluster bomb and iron bomb armed fighters, which attacked the actual SAM launchers. These fighters flew in below Syrian ground-based radar, presumably under the direction of the E-2Cs and surprised the SAM crews. Once hit by cluster bombs, the systems were disabled, iron bombs were then used to finish off the job. It appears that the IAF destroyed 19 SAM batteries, including their Gun Dish radars and supporting 23 mm, 37 mm and 57 mm AAA systems within an hour or so. It could be assumed that a lot of chaff was released in the initial stages to confuse the gun-laying radars on the AAA system, as it is likely these would have escaped the ARMs in the initial attack, as the AAA would serve to defend the SAMS alone.

Looking at the prospect of losing their SAMs, the Syrian Air Force did not stand by idly. Floggers and Fishbeds were despatched to deal with the attacking Phantoms and Kfirs. But, unknown to the Syrian pilots, the E-2Cs were tracking them even as they taxied along their runways. Amidst severe jamming, they were vectored into the Bekaa valley, to be ambushed by waiting F-15s and F16s.

Of the 60 aircraft flown into Lebanon, 36 were destroyed. Israel continued with its destruction of whatever Syrian equip ment it could find in the region, mainly armour, being attacked by Pantoms and Kfirs armed with bombs, rockets and presumably Maverick missiles. Some sources indicate the use of a terminally guided antitank submunition, which blows holes through the dorsal armour of the tanks. Once again, Syria attempted to stop the carnage, 50 MiGs flew into the Bekaa valley and Israel claimed everyone was shot down, and ambushed by fighters directed by the E-2Cs. F-4s, Kfirs, F-15s and F-16s participated, it appears they used all weapons from guns to radar-guided Sparrows, including stocks of older Sidewinders. Having sustained such losses, the Syrians ceased their mass air attacks, leaving their ground forces at the mercy of the IAF. The Israelis surged up through Lebanon, entered Beirut and the rest is really something most of us watched on TV.

Some MiGs were flown into Lebanon later, e. g. two Floggers were downed, followed by a recce l\/liG-25 Foxbat, which it is fair to assume fell victim to a Sparrow firing F-15.

In a matter of two days, Israel had destroyed 19 SAM batteries, and their supporting AAA systems and shot down over eighty aircraft, losing only a single A-4 close support aircraft to a shoulder-launched SAM.

Though these results may seem incredible at first glance, they are, in fact, quite feasible. The SAM systems are easy targets; once deprived of their radar, they are blind and helpless. Though it is not publicised, it is fair to assume that a lot of Israeli fighters carried dedicated jammers to foil the operation of the Gun Dish, Low Blow and Fan Song radars associated with the AAA, SA-6, SA-3 and SA-2 systems deployed. Combined with the disruption caused by communications jamming, chaff spreading and ARM attacks, the SAMs, their locations exposed by the E-2Cs, were defenceless targets, surprised by very low-flying IAF jets.

The Syrian MiGs were in an equally hopeless situation. Communications jamming deprived them of contact with their ground-based surveillance radar and in the jammed and cluttered low-altitude environment, their limited radars had little hope in sorting out friend from foe. The Israelis, on the other hand, had an excellent idea of what was happening, as the E-2Cs effectively tracked all air traffic in the region, the IFF (identification friend foe) systems instantly tagging the Syrians as hostiles. Thus the IAF fighters could be vectored into favourable positions to attack the Syrians without warning, the MiGs, forced to rely on visual target detection only, were at a disadvantage.

The key to Israel’s stunning success, in this pre-emptive strike, lies in the use of Elint and AEW aircraft. Without the Elint capability offered by the E-2C’s PDS, Israel would have found it difficult to rapidly sort out all the data gathered on the SAM radars, once baited by the drones into exposing themselves. Any delay would give the launchers time to move.

The ability to track low-flying aircraft allowed the E-2C to coordinate the low-level strikes directed against the SAM batteries. The role AEW played in the annihilation of the MiG force was paramount. The MiGs could be virtually lured into traps if following GCI instructions to attack IAF jets at medium altitudes, as detected by ground-based radar, they could be attacked from six o’clock by low-flying fighters, concealed from their GCI radars.

The E-2C could monitor all of this and set such traps (this could account for the high success rate of the Phantoms and Kfirs, supposedly dedicated to the ground attack phase of the operation – once having released their ordnance, they could loiter at a low level, awaiting a vector from the E-2C).

It must be rather humiliating for the Russians to see their SAMs destroyed by cheap free-fall bombs and watch new MiG-23 Floggers fall to gunfire from ageing F-4E Phantoms, but the decisive edge in this war was provided by AEW and EW. Any weapon system is defenceless, if it isn’t aware of its enemy’s location. The combination of AEW and jamming provided Israel with all the information it needed and denied Syria as much as was available.

The results speak for themselves – an air-air kill ratio better than 80:0, against front-line aircraft operated by the Warpac, e. g. the Soviet Frontovaya Aviatsia (tactical aviation).

The Soviets will be seriously rethinking their air defence strategy after observing the two days of carnage that decimated (rather exterminated} an air defence system modelled on that of the Red Army and the FA. It will further accelerate their efforts to deploy AEW systems in the European theatre, backing up the AWG-9ski equipped Super Foxbats (Foxhound) serving with the PVOS and presumably attached to units of the FA VVS.

As the two wars of 1982 graphically illustrated, life without AEW in the last quarter of the twentieth century is inviting disaster. Whether one looks at offensive or defensive operations, AEW is a must for survival. Israel exploited most of what the E-2C had to offer and demonstrated enviable results in what must be a propaganda coup comparable only to the Six-Day War strike against Egypt. The total annihilation, within hours, of a front-line air defence system, with losses not worth mentioning.

Britain, on the other hand, suffered disproportionate losses when battling an unsophisticated opponent, oblivious of EW and other refinements of late twentieth-century technology. Britain’s success in the campaign may be attributed to a high level of professionalism, courage and the Argentines’ sheer gnorance of modern warfare, combined with World War Two tactics (no doubt gleaned from the various elements of Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe brass, who settled there after 1945).

The implications this has for Australia are numerous, but they all point to the necessity of acquiring AEW, the sooner the better. Both the RAAF and the RAN should not be denied AEW aircraft, whether fixed or rotary winged; the advantages offered could vastly outweigh the cost, even in peacetime.

AEW and Australia

The case for AEW platforms in Australian service probably need not be discussed; it should be self-evident.

Australia is in the unique position of being an isolated continent, with vast areas of sparsely or non-populated territory. Though this may appeal to followers of ‘Brisbane line’ defence philosophies, it creates numerous problems that make life very difficult for small defensive forces. Logistics is one of the biggest, as one must cover long distances to deploy forces and just as much distance to resupply them. Establishing, for instance, a chain of ground-based surveillance radars and SAM systems along the northern coastline would involve ridiculous expenses, not to speak of the dubious combat value of such a system. Likewise, concentrating fixed defences around military and resource centres makes little sense, as the enemy may exploit gaps to penetrate behind the defensive screen. And good defences will be needed. The oil and gas-rich north of Western Australia would be a prime target in any war of attrition, the Barrow Island and North West Shelf installations being ideal targets for weapons such as Exocet, currently being ordered by our immediate neighbour to the north.

Air bases and harbours would also be likely targets, even if less attractive for propaganda-oriented strikes. Australia would need a lot of SAMs to cover the multitude of targets, though, on the other hand, there is nothing to say that an enemy couldn’t parachute or otherwise land commandos anywhere along the coastline, to deal with such installations.

Clearly, mobile defences are essential, with the ability to deploy rapidly, anywhere along the coast, at any time.

The next major, self-evident problem is surveillance. There is only one way of policing such a vast area as the north, in wartime or peacetime, that is via the use of AEW. It is, in fact, surprising that neither the RAAF nor RAN had ever focused on AEW in the past, as the requirement has always been there. The way things are, at the moment, anyone from the Tu-20s of the Soviet Long Range Aviation Forces to low-flying Cessnas, flown by drug traffickers, can cross the coast without being detected, let alone challenged. It is a sad state of affairs when the DoD apparently suggested that vapour trails, sighted over the Kimberley, ‘probably came from a Russian Tu-20. ‘ The fact that anyone can usually fish in Australian territorial waters, as long as they avoid the occasional chartered surveillance aircraft or perhaps Orion (the P-3C force has enough of a task policing the Indians), is rather disappointing.

It would be rather difficult to defend the north, without precise information on the enemy’s location and composition (one should not expect miracles from four RF-111Cs), particularly when dealing with low-flying intruders.

Ground-based radar would be ineffective against such aircraft, as they could cross the coast out of radar range and approach the target at a low level, overland. One could, of course, argue that such situations could be dealt with by use of the Jindalee OTH-B (over-the-horizon backscatter) radar system, but OTH-B is a long-range surveillance system and could hardly be expected to match a proven AEW system, at close range. Furthermore, exposing the capabilities of such a system in peacetime would hardly be wise. As it appears, AEW is an unavoidable necessity and one can only applaud the RAAF’s efforts to acquire such aircraft. Of the three possible contenders for the role, the Boeing E-3A Sentry, the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye and the BAG Nimrod AEW. 3, the E-2C won with little difficulty. The E-3A was optimised primarily for the European theatre of operations, a high-density overland environment in the presence of heavy jamming, its Boeing 707 airframe demanding airfields capable of handling such a large aircraft. It was too big and too expensive for the role; it also lacked a PDS system and the ability to operate with limited ground support.

The Nimrod AEW. 3 does possess a passive surveillance system – Loral ESM – however, it is a large aircraft like the E-3A and is an immature system, still under development, being deployed this year (one could expect a lot of modifications, if only software before the aircraft becomes a stable design).

The E-2C offers a lot of advantages that the RAAF did not fail to observe. It has powerplant commonality with the P-3 Orion and the C-130 Hercules, both major types in the RAAF inventory, all employing versions of the T-56. Being built for USN carrier operation, the E-2C has a rugged undercarriage and airframe, allowing for rough field operation, this aspect is enhanced by full prop pitch reversal. E-2Cs operated by the USN are usually parked on the carrier flight deck, exposed to the elements; the aircraft was designed to cope with prolonged exposure to a hostile environment, which will enhance its lifetime in a less demanding land-based role.

The E-2C is a mid-seventies development of the earlier E-2B and as such, offers a proven and mature airframe, as considerable experience has been gained in maintaining the type, availability may be high, Grumman suggests an operational readiness of 80%. Maintainability is enhanced by a lnflight Performance Monitor (IFPM) Bit system, which is claimed to isolate 80% of all faults down to a Line Replaceable Unit. As the aircraft may be maintained with minimal resources, deployment at smaller airstrips in the NT or WA is feasible. The wing folding system is very convenient, as the aircraft may be parked under hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) or in recessed revetments, to minimise the likelihood of destruction in a surprise attack.

As the E-2C is the key element in the USN’s air defence system, both the F-14 and F-18 have compatible datalinks, as part of the Airborne Tactical Data System (ATOS). This means that F-18A fighters can be automatically vectored via datalink onto unsuspecting targets; conversely, the X-band AN/APG-6 multimode radar of the F-18A may relay target information to the E-2C, effectively increasing the 250 nm range of the E-2C’s AN/APS-125 radar. As the RAAF will deploy F-1BAs in the north, the E-2C will perfectly fit into the future air defence system, most likely operating out of the same bases as the F-1BA.

In a purely defensive scenario, E-2Cs would patrol critical areas of the Timer Sea and the areas north of the Gulf of Carpentaria and Cape York. F-18As operating from the NT would stand by on CAP, being possibly supported by the 707 tankers, or wait to be scrambled from any strip longer than 2000 feet. Upon detection of hostile aircraft, the F-18As would be vectored via datalink into intercept positions, hitting targets. With beyond visual range missiles such as the Sparrow, or by then, perhaps AMRAAM.

The 250 nm radar horizon of an E-2C orbiting at 30,000 feet (9000 m) could provide up to thirty minutes of warning against a Mach 1 intruder, ample time for an F-18A on CAP to intercept. The APS-125 is claimed to have the ability to pick up a low-flying, fighter-sized target at its radar horizon, and detect low-flying cruise missiles in high sea states beyond 100 nm, an important factor in the cyclone-prone north. The system’s surface surveillance capability is also very good, apparently, the UHF band end-fire antenna, mounted in the rotodome, will allow the resolution of slow-moving surface targets; patrol boat-size vessels have been tracked beyond 100 nm. Hostile surface vessels can thus be detected and intercepted by naval vessels or attacked by the RAAF’s fighters. This feature alone is· an important aspect of peacetime operation, as all surface traffic may be monitored throughout the north.

The Tu-20 Bears and Tu-26 Backfires operating out of Cam Ranh Bay would also find the presence of E-2C surveillance less than desirable, as the USSR is hardly interested in arousing publicity over its Elint/reconnaissance operations in the region.

As for unauthorised civilian traffic, such as drug traffickers, USN E-2Cs have demonstrated the type’s ability to cope with this type of target, in the south of the United States.

In some respects, the capabilities of the APS-125 and its Advanced Radar Processing System (ARPS) exceed immediate requirements. The system automatically tracks 250 airborne targets, and employing inputs from the PDS and datalink sources, can track 600 targets. Employing IFF, it can differentiate between friendly and hostile targets, depending on interceptor fuel state, type, armament and position; the central processor, a Litton L-304, then calculates the optimum flight path to intercept and relays it to the fighter, via datalink or voice link; in this fashion 40 intercepts may be controlled, alternately, ground attack missions may be directed. Grumman claims the E-2C could enhance the air defence capability of the Mirage 1110 2. 5 times, also interfacing with the existing Hubcap installations in use with the RAAF (Hubcap is an ageing GCI system acquired in the sixties which is presently being upgraded under the Recap programme).

It is conceivable that the E-2C will also acquire an HF datalink, as the F-18A is expected, to interface with the Jindalee OTH-B system.

The ARPS is also credited with a very good anti-jam performance, though no figures have been released.

The aircraft’s ALR-59 Passive Detection System is a further asset, as demonstrated by the Israelis. PDS is credited with a range of 500 nm, it will acquire bearing information and identify radar emitters from a computer intelligence file. The use of PDS can assist in war and peacetime operations. In peacetime, it allows undetected surveillance of enemy radar activity; combined with a bit of baiting by a low-flying F-111C, any belligerent regional powers would be likely to reveal the location and composition of their radar and SAM systems, aside from any naval activity. In a wartime situation, this Elint capability would be very useful, tor obvious reasons. It is unlikely the RAAF will be able to afford the luxury of dedicated Elint aircraft, the E-2C would thus fill an existing gap:

In an offensive scenario, the E-2C has just as much to offer.

Preemptive strikes on hostile opponents are possible; combined with adequate preparation and EW, the E-2Cs could direct air superiority operations, air-to-ground strikes and close support for ground forces. That does mean deterrence, any opponent will think twice about starting a war, if it knows it is being watched continuously and that its supposed victim can strike at will.

Medium-range Elint missions are feasible, as the E-2C does have six hours of endurance or 9. 3 hours in the extended-range version.

At a current unit cost advertised as US$33. 6 million, the E-2C is a very good buy. It can offer the RAAF a whole new dimension in air-to-air operations, bolstering the capabilities of the ageing Mirage 1110, until the F-1BA reaches full operational readiness. From there, it can assume its role in a tightly integrated air defence system which should keep intruders away from Australian shores. The F-18A’s effectiveness in the air defence role hinges on the E-2C, it was designed from the outset to interface with it. If the USN regards the E-2C/F-18A combination as adequate to defend its naval forces from aerial and surface threats, in high-density environments, it is fair to assume these types can tackle any regional threat that may appear in the near future. The USN will rely on the E-2C as its front-line AEW platform till at least 1994, when its projected and yet nonexistent replacement is to begin entering service. With its flexible, software-configured systems the E-2C should remain an effective system, in RAAF service, well into the next century.