Vulnerability of the STOVL Carrier

Does this scenario sound anything like what the RAN will be able to field in either a current or future naval battle? Of course not. How would HMAS Melbourne fare if attacked by half a dozen Backfires, Bears or Badgers with stand-off cruise missiles? How would a future RAN carrier perform without the long-range intercept protection of aircraft like the F-14, without ECM jammers such as the Prowler, without AEW aircraft such as the Hawkeye, without sub hunters like the Viking or a counterattack capability comparable to the A-6 or A-7? The result could certainly be disastrous and most probably just as fatal for the lone carrier’s escorts.

From where we stand the primary objection to a carrier purchase by the RAN revolves around pure economics. Economics in pure dollar terms and in terms of value for money.

Even the most blatantly biased naval STOVL carrier supporter will admit that the RAN needs at least two such vessels and preferably three – if they get one it will be lucky as that battle alone is now more than a decade old. One carrier in the class projected by the RAN will cost in the region of one billion dollars equipped with its air wing and ready for deployment. To buy three carriers would probably cost in the region of (in 1982 dollars) 2. 5 bn, or a similar amount as our NTF force is costing. Problem number one is that only one carrier would grace our Navy, not three as the RAN has so often stated as being the number required to maintain a viable degree of naval air power.

Problem two is simply vulnerability as outlined earlier.

Certainly a future RAN carrier equipped with eight or twelve Sea Harriers or Harrier IIs and ASW helos can offer a degree of defensive and offensive anti-ship capability. However, it does not take much to envisage a scenario where if REAL hostilities commence between Australia (or the West) and our communist adversaries (and WHO might they be ten years hence?) then our small carrier would be a priority target to every maritime bomber and submarine in the region. How long would it last with three or four hostile submarines stalking it relentlessly about the Indian Ocean?

An Asian power equipped with Soviet submarines, destroyers and aircraft (does that bring back memories!) could dramatically alter the strategic situation Australia currently finds herself. Let’s be honest, there is no obvious threat at present, nor has there been for the past decade and a half yet this does not mean that one of our northern neighbours could not openly embrace communism and become regionally hostile, something that has already occurred in recent decades.

Such an enemy with a dozen Soviet-built conventional attack submarines, with a modern navy of Russian destroyers, frigates and missile-armed fast patrol boats backed up by a modern air arm featuring long-range maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft such as the Backfire {which will no doubt be exportable by 1990) could create havoc amongst Australia’s shipping lanes. More than nine-tenths of our overseas trade is carried in ships and while barely 5% of that is in Australian registered tonnage the vast majority concerns ships operated by or on behalf of our major allies.

In this regard, the RAN would be better equipped to operate in concert with allied forces, principally American, in the event of any major action in our region of maritime influence. It is in this situation that Australia might do better to look at the alternatives to spending vast amounts of money on a single low-end hull such as a light STOVL carrier. A billion dollars could go a long way, in fact, all the way, to financing a locally built follow-on submarine squadron. Submarines, such as the Vickers 2400, which Vickers Cockatoo are fully capable of building locally, are relatively inexpensive to build, to operate and to man. Their defensive punch lies in their ability to represent a threat, a real deterrent, to any aggressor while their offensive power is awesome when the capabilities of the Harpoon missile and Mk48 homing torpedo are considered. The existing updated six Oberons with an additional twelve Vickers 2400-type boats would present a maritime force many more times capable of deterring and defeating a potential enemy wishing to interdict our sea lines of communications or wrest control of Australian territory. It goes without saying that the submarines can be built locally whereas a carrier, whether American, Spanish, Italian or British will have to be built in an overseas yard. Unlike aircraft, offset deals with ships are fairly limited due to the small number built of any one type and the often myriad versions of one hull built for a diverse number of nations with differing operational requirements.

Operating a relatively large number, by existing RAN standards, of modern submarines would offer better value for money when teamed with ASEAN or US forces in any regional conflict other than a Vietnam-style land-based situation. A lone STOVL carrier would offer little to the awe-inspiring might of the 7th Fleet, however, the presence of more than a dozen RAN submarines would be an invaluable aid not only to maritime firepower but also as an intelligence gathering facility.

The carrier debate now enters its umpteenth and hopefully final stage. Certainly, if a carrier is purchased it will ultimately be at the expense of the remainder of the RAN fleet.